January 17, 2000
Are We "Salvadorizing" Colombia?
by Garry Leech
Elite U.S.-trained counter-insurgency units are routinely carried
by U.S. helicopters to remote parts of this Latin American country
to confront Marxist guerrillas. Supplied with U.S. intelligence
and directed by U.S. military advisors, these counter-insurgency
troops work hand in hand with right-wing paramilitary death squads
as they terrorize the local peasant population. Back in Washington,
a battle is being waged in Congress over the increasing U.S. involvement
in the conflict and the issuance of U.S. aid to a Latin American
military notorious for its human rights abuses. This is a description
of El Salvador in the 1980s, right? Wrong! It is the year 2000
and the country is Colombia.
President Clinton did his best Ronald Reagan imitation last week
when he announced a $1.3 billion aid package to fight the "drug
war" in Colombia. Clinton's proposal, if approved by Congress,
will result in
Colombia
receiving military aid comparable to the Reagan administration's
funding of the Salvadoran military in the 1980s. The primary difference
between the policies of the two administrations appears to be
in the justification for such a rapid expansion of military support.
The Reagan administration used the old Cold War "international
communist conspiracy as a threat to U.S. interests" rationale
to justify its support of the Salvadoran government. However,
according to the Clinton administration, it's not the Red menace
the United States has to fear, it's the White menace: cocaine.
The Clinton Administration has maintained the long-standing U.S.
position that the conflict in Colombia largely revolves around
the drug trade. As a result, it has managed to obscure the fact
that guerrillas began fighting the repressive Colombian Government
decades before the cocaine boom began in the late 1970s. The huge
profits that resulted from cocaine production added another twist
to the conflict and brought the Colombian crisis to the streets
of U.S. cities and suburbs. All the parties involved in the Colombian
conflict--the guerrillas, the paramilitaries and the Colombian
Army--are involved in, and profiting from, the drug trade. Therefore,
whoever the U.S. supports in the drug war will result in it becoming
an ally of the very forces it is supposedly fighting against.
In order to obscure the fact that Washington is allying itself
with the same drug traffickers it is supposedly at war with, the
Clinton administration insists on labeling the guerrillas "narco-terrorists"
and placing them at the center of the drug trade. This tactic
provides the necessary simplification desired by the administration
for easy U.S. public consumption. As a result, the guerrillas
are rapidly becoming the enemy of the United States, thereby,
blurring the line between the drug war and the civil war. Publicly,
the administration continues to insist that it is only fighting
the drug war and is not being drawn into Colombia's civil war.
The quiescent mainstream media aids Washington in this distortion
of reality by consistently parroting the administration's line.
Rarely do the news networks or the mainstream print media partake
in investigative journalism, more often than not they rely on
White House or State Department statements. Consequently, what
the government says becomes the news instead of the news event
itself.
It is no coincidence that the proposed aid package comes on the
heels of a scarcely-reported proposal by the United States at
the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly meeting
a few months ago. The U.S. proposal called for the creation of
a regional military intervention force that could be used whenever
a nation's democracy is threatened, even if that threat is internal.
Needless to say, Latin American member states voted against the
U.S. proposal for fear of increased U.S. intervention in the region,
especially in Colombia.
Before the OAS meeting, both the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
and drug czar Barry McCaffrey had claimed that "democracy"
in Colombia was being seriously threatened by the conflict and
that government forces could be defeated within five years. With
the OAS proposal defeated the Clinton Administration had to find
an alternate method of propping up the Colombian government; hence,
the drastic increase in aid represented by the new package.
The Clinton administration downplays the fact it is supporting
a military that is annually labeled by international human rights
organizations as the worst abuser of human rights in the western
hemisphere. The Colombian military is closely allied with paramilitary
organizations, many of which were established by drug traffickers
to protect their huge wealth and economic interests. Washington
has allied itself with the Colombian military and, therefore,
the paramilitaries, in order to protect its own political and
economic interests. A friendly government in Bogotá that
passively accepts its place in the New World Order is far more
desirable to Washington than a government formed by Marxist guerrillas
that could potentially pose another Castro- or Sandinista-style
threat to U.S. hegemony in the region.
The Reagan administration justified its support of the Salvadoran
government by insisting the Salvadoran guerrillas were merely
puppets controlled by Managua, Havana and Moscow, thereby ignoring
the domestic political, social and economic causes of the civil
war. In much the same manner, the Clinton administration portrays
the Colombian guerrillas as profit-seekers primarily responsible
for the drug trade while ignoring the glaring social injustices
and inequalities so prevalent in Colombian society that caused
peasants to take up arms in the first place.
Drugs have replaced communism as a convenient evil upon which
to focus the attention of the U.S. public. However, making the
guerrillas the principle enemy in the drug war will inevitably
draw the United States into the broader civil war. In a statement
about the proposed aid package, Clinton claimed that "it
will help boost Colombia's interdiction and eradication capabilities,
particularly in the south." What Clinton failed to mention
is the fact that southern Colombia is precisely the area of the
country controlled by the guerrillas and, therefore, a primary
location of conflict between the guerrillas and the Colombian
Army.
Consequently, the Clinton administration is supporting Colombian
Army units whose primary mission is to fight the civil war, not
the drug war. The proposed aid package, as was the case with El
Salvador, results in increased support for a repressive military
that is closely allied with right-wing death squads. As a result,
such support can only increase the levels of violence and, as
was the case in El Salvador, the civilian population will continue
to be the principal victims.