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April 8, 2002
Colombia's Hidden Terror
by Garry Leech
The small farm that 38-year-old Jorge Eliécer Rodríguez
calls home sits atop a hilltop overlooking a lush green tropical
landscape that stretches as far as the eye can see. Jorge and his
family have survived for years at a subsistence level by cultivating
a variety of food crops and raising a small herd of cattle. But
Jorge can longer perform the demanding physical chores required
to operate even a small family farm in rural Colombia. Two and a
half years ago, he lost his left leg when he stepped on a landmine
that had been planted on his property. Since that fateful day Jorge
has had to depend on his wife Aniana to provide for the family.
Sadly, the Colombian government and the media have paid little attention
to the plight of Jorge and the thousands of other innocent civilians
who have fallen victim to Colombia's hidden terror.
Media
coverage of Colombia's conflict has generally focused on high-profile
activities like guerrilla kidnappings, paramilitary massacres, and
U.S. interventionism, often ignoring the illegal use of landmines
by all the armed groups. In Colombia today, there are an estimated
100,000 landmines in at least 168 municipalities that are indiscriminately
killing and maiming innocent Colombians on an almost daily basis.
In 2001, more than fifty percent of the 203 known victims of this
hidden terror were civilians, and more than half of those were children.
In reality, the number of casualties is likely far higher because
many incidents that occur in remote rural regions go unreported.
Jorge recalls his tragic encounter with a landmine while walking
along a path on his small farm, "I felt the explosion and then
fell. When I stood up I didn't have my foot. It blew my foot off!
I tried to jump on my only good leg, but I fainted." By the
time his relatives got him to the nearest hospital it was too late
to save his left leg.
Jorge is determined to remain on the family's farm even though
he is now dependent on his wife, Aniana, to perform the agricultural
work he has done all his life. But Aniana worries about their three
young children, "They can't go far from the house because we
don't know if there are more mines. We have notified the army, but
they say they don't have mine detectors."
The Colombian government has done little to help Colombians living
in mine-plagued rural communities. In early March, the government's
National Planning Department announced that Colombia would not be
able to meet the de-mining goals established by the 1997 Ottawa
Convention's Mine Ban Treaty, to which Colombia is a signatory.
This latest declaration is the most recent example of Bogotá's
unwillingness to meet its obligations under the treaty. According
to Diana Roa of Colombia's Campaign Against Landmines (CCCM), a
government report detailing Colombia's de-mining operations, provisions
for landmine victims, and current stockpiles that was due on August
28, 2001, still has not been delivered.
Not
only has the government failed to live up to its treaty obligations,
there are also reports that the Colombian army is blatantly violating
the Ottawa Convention by continuing to use landmines. "We have
heard from several sources that the army has used mines in Sumapaz,
south of Bogotá, to protect the battalion stationed there.
We have requested permission from the Ministry of Defense to investigate,
but have not received an answer. They have to be new mines because
the battalion was only created about six months ago," says
Roa. These mines are in addition to the estimated 20,000 landmines--more
than 12,000 of which were supplied by the United States--that the
military laid prior to Colombia's signing of the Mine Ban Treaty
on December 3, 1997.
The Colombian army has also yet to begin humanitarian de-mining
operations to rid civilian communities of anti-personnel mines.
However, the army does conduct de-mining in order to protect it's
own soldiers during military operations. In recent months, military
de-mining has occurred in the rural community of Zaragoza in northeastern
Antioquia where the army has recovered 37 mines because soldiers
were getting injured while conducting operations.
The only humanitarian de-mining that has been performed in the
area occurred when the local town council convinced the government
to dispatch a National Police mine-sweeping team to Zaragoza after
a 40 year-old man and a ten year-old girl were maimed by landmines
three days apart in the same location. But instead of searching
the 30 percent of Zaragoza's rural zone that is estimated to contain
landmines, the de-mining team only swept the immediate area around
where the accident occurred. And just in this confined area they
discovered six more mines, all of them near a school.
There have been at least eleven victims of landmines and unexploded
ordnance in Zaragoza's rural zone since 1998. Of the eight civilian
casualties, four were children. According to Zaragoza mayor, Freddy
Andrés Piñeda Rojas, "The guerrillas and paramilitaries
fight over territory to control coca and collect taxes. The guerrillas
plant mines for the paramilitaries when they leave and vice-versa.
This causes the displacement of people from the rural zone to Zaragoza
and elsewhere."
It is difficult for locals to detect landmines because the illegal
armed groups use many different types of homemade devices. Many
are pressure-activated mines that are either chemically or electronically
detonated. A canister, often an empty food can, is filled with shrapnel
and an explosive compound, usually Indugel Plus. A plastic syringe
is inserted into the top of the can, which is then buried in the
ground with only the top of the syringe's plunger left exposed.
When a victim steps on the syringe, sulphuric acid is injected into
the detonator if it is a chemical device, or a connection is made
to a small battery if it is electronic, and the mine explodes.
Most
victims lose a leg, but one in four lose their life. According to
a local doctor, Gregorio Ramos, "Many accidents occur in the
rural zone and the roads are very bad. It can take four hours to
arrive here at the hospital and the patient can die from loss of
blood." Even if a victim is alive upon arrival at the small
hospital in Zaragoza, the facility is not equipped to cope with
such traumatic wounds. Doctor Ramos attempts to stem the flow of
blood and clean the wound before sending the victim to a larger
hospital, a journey that often entails a boat ride downriver to
a neighboring municipality in order to catch a small plane to Medellín.
Dispatching local doctors and nurses to the site of a landmine
accident is not always a viable alternative, especially when it
is located in a conflict zone. Sometimes the armed groups won't
allow a medical team into an area and when they do, "You go
in afraid that they will make you attend to their wounded. And if
you attend to the wounded of one group, then the other group thinks
you are collaborating with that group," explains Doctor Ramos.
When CCCM raised the issue of landmines with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the rebels claimed that landmines
are weapons of the poor, and when the government stops using bombs,
planes and satellites they will stop using mines. Meanwhile, CCCM
continues to aid communities like Zaragoza that are affected by
this hidden terror through the implementation of landmine awareness
programs that educate potential victims.
So far the armed groups have not targeted CCCM, but Roa is concerned
that the guerrillas, because they lay the majority of Colombia's
landmines, may see the campaign against mines as a campaign against
them. To combat this, CCCM emphasizes the fact that its campaign
targets the weapon, not any specific armed group, and that ultimately
the government is responsible under its Mine Ban Treaty obligations.
As Roa puts it, "We work under the understanding that the government
should enforce human rights requirements."
Research for this article was funded in part
by the Dick
Goldensohn Fund
This article originally appeared
in Colombia Report, an online journal
that was published by the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA).
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