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April 8, 2002

Colombia's Hidden Terror

by Garry Leech

The small farm that 38-year-old Jorge Eliécer Rodríguez calls home sits atop a hilltop overlooking a lush green tropical landscape that stretches as far as the eye can see. Jorge and his family have survived for years at a subsistence level by cultivating a variety of food crops and raising a small herd of cattle. But Jorge can longer perform the demanding physical chores required to operate even a small family farm in rural Colombia. Two and a half years ago, he lost his left leg when he stepped on a landmine that had been planted on his property. Since that fateful day Jorge has had to depend on his wife Aniana to provide for the family. Sadly, the Colombian government and the media have paid little attention to the plight of Jorge and the thousands of other innocent civilians who have fallen victim to Colombia's hidden terror.

Media coverage of Colombia's conflict has generally focused on high-profile activities like guerrilla kidnappings, paramilitary massacres, and U.S. interventionism, often ignoring the illegal use of landmines by all the armed groups. In Colombia today, there are an estimated 100,000 landmines in at least 168 municipalities that are indiscriminately killing and maiming innocent Colombians on an almost daily basis. In 2001, more than fifty percent of the 203 known victims of this hidden terror were civilians, and more than half of those were children. In reality, the number of casualties is likely far higher because many incidents that occur in remote rural regions go unreported.

Jorge recalls his tragic encounter with a landmine while walking along a path on his small farm, "I felt the explosion and then fell. When I stood up I didn't have my foot. It blew my foot off! I tried to jump on my only good leg, but I fainted." By the time his relatives got him to the nearest hospital it was too late to save his left leg.

Jorge is determined to remain on the family's farm even though he is now dependent on his wife, Aniana, to perform the agricultural work he has done all his life. But Aniana worries about their three young children, "They can't go far from the house because we don't know if there are more mines. We have notified the army, but they say they don't have mine detectors."

The Colombian government has done little to help Colombians living in mine-plagued rural communities. In early March, the government's National Planning Department announced that Colombia would not be able to meet the de-mining goals established by the 1997 Ottawa Convention's Mine Ban Treaty, to which Colombia is a signatory. This latest declaration is the most recent example of Bogotá's unwillingness to meet its obligations under the treaty. According to Diana Roa of Colombia's Campaign Against Landmines (CCCM), a government report detailing Colombia's de-mining operations, provisions for landmine victims, and current stockpiles that was due on August 28, 2001, still has not been delivered.

Not only has the government failed to live up to its treaty obligations, there are also reports that the Colombian army is blatantly violating the Ottawa Convention by continuing to use landmines. "We have heard from several sources that the army has used mines in Sumapaz, south of Bogotá, to protect the battalion stationed there. We have requested permission from the Ministry of Defense to investigate, but have not received an answer. They have to be new mines because the battalion was only created about six months ago," says Roa. These mines are in addition to the estimated 20,000 landmines--more than 12,000 of which were supplied by the United States--that the military laid prior to Colombia's signing of the Mine Ban Treaty on December 3, 1997.

The Colombian army has also yet to begin humanitarian de-mining operations to rid civilian communities of anti-personnel mines. However, the army does conduct de-mining in order to protect it's own soldiers during military operations. In recent months, military de-mining has occurred in the rural community of Zaragoza in northeastern Antioquia where the army has recovered 37 mines because soldiers were getting injured while conducting operations.

The only humanitarian de-mining that has been performed in the area occurred when the local town council convinced the government to dispatch a National Police mine-sweeping team to Zaragoza after a 40 year-old man and a ten year-old girl were maimed by landmines three days apart in the same location. But instead of searching the 30 percent of Zaragoza's rural zone that is estimated to contain landmines, the de-mining team only swept the immediate area around where the accident occurred. And just in this confined area they discovered six more mines, all of them near a school.

There have been at least eleven victims of landmines and unexploded ordnance in Zaragoza's rural zone since 1998. Of the eight civilian casualties, four were children. According to Zaragoza mayor, Freddy Andrés Piñeda Rojas, "The guerrillas and paramilitaries fight over territory to control coca and collect taxes. The guerrillas plant mines for the paramilitaries when they leave and vice-versa. This causes the displacement of people from the rural zone to Zaragoza and elsewhere."

It is difficult for locals to detect landmines because the illegal armed groups use many different types of homemade devices. Many are pressure-activated mines that are either chemically or electronically detonated. A canister, often an empty food can, is filled with shrapnel and an explosive compound, usually Indugel Plus. A plastic syringe is inserted into the top of the can, which is then buried in the ground with only the top of the syringe's plunger left exposed. When a victim steps on the syringe, sulphuric acid is injected into the detonator if it is a chemical device, or a connection is made to a small battery if it is electronic, and the mine explodes.

Most victims lose a leg, but one in four lose their life. According to a local doctor, Gregorio Ramos, "Many accidents occur in the rural zone and the roads are very bad. It can take four hours to arrive here at the hospital and the patient can die from loss of blood." Even if a victim is alive upon arrival at the small hospital in Zaragoza, the facility is not equipped to cope with such traumatic wounds. Doctor Ramos attempts to stem the flow of blood and clean the wound before sending the victim to a larger hospital, a journey that often entails a boat ride downriver to a neighboring municipality in order to catch a small plane to Medellín.

Dispatching local doctors and nurses to the site of a landmine accident is not always a viable alternative, especially when it is located in a conflict zone. Sometimes the armed groups won't allow a medical team into an area and when they do, "You go in afraid that they will make you attend to their wounded. And if you attend to the wounded of one group, then the other group thinks you are collaborating with that group," explains Doctor Ramos.

When CCCM raised the issue of landmines with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the rebels claimed that landmines are weapons of the poor, and when the government stops using bombs, planes and satellites they will stop using mines. Meanwhile, CCCM continues to aid communities like Zaragoza that are affected by this hidden terror through the implementation of landmine awareness programs that educate potential victims.

So far the armed groups have not targeted CCCM, but Roa is concerned that the guerrillas, because they lay the majority of Colombia's landmines, may see the campaign against mines as a campaign against them. To combat this, CCCM emphasizes the fact that its campaign targets the weapon, not any specific armed group, and that ultimately the government is responsible under its Mine Ban Treaty obligations. As Roa puts it, "We work under the understanding that the government should enforce human rights requirements."

Research for this article was funded in part by the Dick Goldensohn Fund

This article originally appeared in Colombia Report, an online journal that was published by the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA).

 

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