|
September 9, 2002 Washington's Mouthpiece in Colombia According to the byline of the September 4 New York Times article, "U.S. Is Stepping Up Drive to Destroy Coca in Colombia," the paper's Colombia correspondent Juan Forero was in the southern department of Putumayo exactly one week after I had left the same region. But according to the tale he tells regarding the ongoing fumigation of illicit crops, we may as well have been in different countries (I urge readers to compare for themselves the dramatic difference between U.S. Is Stepping Up Drive to Destroy Coca in Colombia and my report Plan Colombia's Killing Fields). Forero's article is nothing more than a propaganda piece that helps the Bush administration deceive the U.S. public regarding the effectiveness of almost two billion dollars in U.S. taxpayer money that has so far constituted Washington's contribution to Plan Colombia.
In "U.S. Is Stepping Up Drive to Destroy Coca in Colombia," Forero repeatedly writes about fumigated coca plants with little mention of the food crops that have been destroyed by the aerial spraying. He found two coca growers willing to discuss the effectiveness of the fumigation against their illegal crops, but apparently could not find a single farmer whose food crops had been sprayed in a region where it is virtually impossible to visit fumigated areas without observing the devastating effects of the chemicals on legal crops. During the six days I spent in Putumayo a mere week prior to Forero's arrival, there was an abundance of people willing to openly criticize the spraying campaign. Not only were local farmers complaining about their food crops being fumigated, but government agencies were also outspoken about problems related to the implementation of Plan Colombia. Officials working for two government agencies in Putumayo—Corpoamazonia, the Environment Ministry's agency responsible for sustainable development in the region; and PLANTE, the government agency in charge of implementing Plan Colombia's alternative crop programs—were eager to describe the corruption that has hindered the disbursement of funds earmarked for alternative crop programs. Instead of quoting official sources such as these who work with the alternative crop programs on a daily basis in Putumayo, Forero instead casually noted the government's failure to follow-up on its alternative crop promises and then stated, "Many farmers who pledged to eradicate their coca simply did not comply." Forero neglected to mention that many farmers who did comply stood by helplessly as the spray planes fumigated their newly planted alternative crops. He also failed to explain that the alternative crop agreements signed by farmers gave them 12 months to manually eradicate their coca so their families wouldn't starve while waiting for the new crops to grow. The closest Forero came to questioning Plan Colombia's effectiveness was to quote Klaus Nyholm of the United Nations Drug Control Office in Colombia regarding the UN official's concerns that coca cultivation will simply move to other regions after it is eradicated in Putumayo. And after briefly summarizing the criticism of the fumigation by community leaders—one can only assume the author felt that directly quoting these leaders might lend too much credence to their claims—Forero then quoted a human rights worker who stated, "There has been no real evaluation of the effects of fumigation." Clearly, Forero is only concerned with the destruction of the coca plant, not the welfare of impoverished farmers forced to grow illicit crops out of economic necessity. Appropriately, Washington's mouthpiece saved the article's most extensive quote for U.S. embassy officials: 'What keeps them from going back to growing coca is the spray plane, and only the spray plane,' said an official at the American Embassy who works on the antidrug programs. 'The coca fields are enormous and there are a lot of different owners, and you just have to rub it all out. That is the only way you are going to make this work.' Not only does the single-minded militaristic attitude exhibited in this quote typify the tone of Forero's entire article, it also illustrates the embassy's willingness to accommodate reporters from mainstream media organizations who, for the most part, refrain from seriously criticizing Washington's drug war strategies in Colombia. Meanwhile, the embassy has been less than forthcoming with journalists who write for publications more willing to honestly critique Plan Colombia. I know several independent journalists who have been stonewalled by the U.S. embassy in Bogotá. And I have personally contacted the embassy more than a dozen times before, during, and after my last two visits to Colombia in an attempt to obtain interviews with embassy counternarcotics officials and access to information about the ongoing fumigations. It is now more than six months since my initial request and I am still waiting for an answer. One embassy official in charge of arranging interviews openly acknowledged that he knew of my work and made it clear that he did not approve of it. Clearly, such censorship of the media undermines U.S. democracy
and is reminiscent of the tactics used by authoritarian governments
that only disseminate information to media outlets willing to promulgate
the official propaganda. In other words, instead of providing the
U.S. public with access to differing perspectives about U.S. policy
that allows people to develop informed opinions about the actions
of elected and appointed officials, government officials limit the
flow of information in order to ensure the continued implementation
of their own agenda. For such propaganda techniques to be effective,
Washington needs reliable mouthpieces working for so-called respectable
media organizations. Juan Forero serves this purpose regarding U.S.
policy in Colombia. This article originally appeared in Colombia Report, an online journal that was published by the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA).
Copyright © 2003 Colombia Journal. All rights reserved. |
Forero
clearly operates under the premise that U.S. policy in Colombia
is non-negotiable. And like a politician who's afraid to sound soft
on drugs, he only makes token mention of the problems resulting
from Plan Colombia without ever questioning the legitimacy of U.S.
policy in the region. As a result, he routinely ignores or grossly
understates any evidence that might undermine Washington's political
and economic agenda in Colombia.