|
December 2, 2002
The U.S. War of Terror in Colombia
by Doug Stokes
In the aftermath of September 11th, a counterterror orientation
developed within U.S. foreign policy that has led to a blending
of the war on drugs with an alleged "war on terror." U.S.
Attorney General John Ashcroft stated, "The State Department
has called the FARC the most dangerous international terrorist group
based in the Western Hemisphere," and that Colombia's leftist
guerrillas have "engaged in a campaign of terror against Colombians
and U.S. citizens." The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State,
Otto Reich, has argued that the "40 million people of Colombia
deserve freedom from terror and an opportunity to participate fully
in the new democratic community of American states. It is in our
self-interest to see that they get it." As a result, the Bush
administration, which has committed $514 million to Colombia for
the year 2002with 71 percent of the grant in the form of military
aidis now set to commit some $700 million for 2003 for what
it argues is an extension of its international "war on terror."
While
all the armed actors within Colombia conduct terror campaigns against
civilians, right-wing paramilitaries that maintain close ties with
drug traffickers and the Colombian militarythe primary beneficiary
of U.S. military aidare consistently responsible for the vast
majority of civilian deaths. Leading human rights organizations
attribute over 80 percent of all civilian killings to these death
squads. Human Rights Watch, together with Colombian human rights
investigators, conducted a study that concluded that half of Colombia's
eighteen brigade-level army units have extensive links to the narco-paramilitaries.
This collusion is national in scope and the units include those
receiving or scheduled to receive U.S. military aid.
In its 1999 Human Rights Report on Colombia, the
U.S. State Department concluded, "Paramilitary forces find
a ready support base within the military and police, as well as
local civilian elites in many areas." The latest Human Rights
Watch report states that there has been an almost complete failure
on the part of the Colombian government to effectively address "the
problem of continuing collaboration between its forces and abusive
paramilitaries and military impunity has contributed to a continuing,
serious deterioration in human rights guarantees." The report
also points out that "the United States has violated the spirit
of its own laws and in some cases downplayed or ignored evidence
of continuing ties between the Colombian military and paramilitary
groups in order to fund Colombia's military and lobby for more aid."
The role of the United States in Colombia's paramilitary
terror against the Colombian civilian population escalated when
U.S. military advisers traveled to Colombia in 1991 to reshape Colombian
military intelligence networks. This secret restructuring was supposedly
designed to aid the Colombian military in their counternarcotics
efforts. However, Human Rights Watch obtained a copy of the order
and nowhere within the order is any mention made of drugs. Instead,
the secret reorganization focused solely on combating what was called,
"escalating terrorism by armed subversion."
The reorganization solidified linkages between
the Colombian military and narco-paramilitary networks that in effect
further consolidated a "secret network that relied on paramilitaries
not only for intelligence, but to carry out murder." Once the
reorganization was complete, all "written material was to be
removed" with "open contacts and interaction with military
installations" to be avoided by the paramilitaries. This strategy
has allowed the Colombian government to plausibly deny links to,
or responsibility for, paramilitary human rights abuses that "dramatically
increased" after the U.S. reorganization.
In effect then, U.S. military aid is going directly
to the terrorist networks throughout Colombia primarily responsible
for trafficking cocaine into U.S. markets in order to fund their
activities. Moreover, the United States has been instrumental in
helping develop what Human Rights Watch termed a "sophisticated
mechanism...that allows the Colombian military to fight a dirty
war and Colombian officialdom to deny it." While the so-called
wars on drugs and terror are being waged in Colombia, they are merely
components of a much wider and more significant war against the
FARCthe largest leftist insurgency in Latin Americaand
Colombian civil society.
Targeting the coca plantations within FARC territory
serves a dual purpose: It allows Washington to continue claiming
that Plan Colombia is an anti-drug plan, while at the same time
pursuing its counter-insurgency objectives. But more importantly,
by concentrating all of its militaristic drug war efforts on coca
plantations within FARC territory, Washington aims to cut off significant
tax revenue for the rebel group, thereby making the insurgency harder
to fund and thus sustain. In short, the Bush administration has
chosen to wage a war on terror in Colombia by allying itself with
the terrorist narco-paramilitaries that share Washington's political
and economic objectives.
The United States has substantial economic interests
within Latin America in general and Colombia more specifically.
Vast oil reserves have been discovered in Colombia and as a result
this South American country has become the United States' seventh
largest oil supplier. In an interview with the Bogotá daily,
El Tiempo, the U.S. ambassador to Colombia, Anne Patterson,
explained that the September 11 attacks have made the "traditional
oil sources for the United States" in the Middle East "less
secure."
According
to Ambassador Patterson, sourcing U.S. energy needs from Colombia
would allow "a small margin to work with," which would
mean the United States could "avoid price speculation."
Such a strategy necessitates the elimination of any regional threat
to U.S. oil interests, which is clearly illustrated by the Bush
administration's request for $98 million in aid for a specially
trained Colombian military counterinsurgency brigade devoted solely
to protecting the U.S. multinational Occidental Petroleum’s
490-mile-long Caño Limón oil pipeline in Colombia.
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell explained
that the money will be used to "train and equip two brigades
of the Colombian armed forces to protect the pipeline" in order
to prevent rebel attacks which are "depriving us of a source
of petroleum." Ambassador Patterson noted that although this
money is not being provided under the pretext of a war on drugs,
"it is something that we must do," because it is "important
for the future of the country, for our oil sources and for the confidence
of our investors."
Colombia's war fits into the classic mode of counterinsurgency
that emerged under President Kennedy's reorganization of Latin American
militaries as part of the National Security Doctrine. Counterinsurgency
involves focusing on internal enemies that, during the Cold War,
were accused of being communist subversives. For U.S. counterinsurgency
experts, communism was typically manifested through political demands
for reforms or popular organizations that sought a more egalitarian
distribution of national resources.
In the case of Colombia, civil society organizations,
especially those that seek to challenge prevailing socio-economic
conditions, are construed by the U.S. government as potentially
subversive to the social and political order, and in the context
of counter-insurgency, legitimate targets for "paramilitary,
sabotage and/or terrorist" attack. As outlined above, the 1991
post-Cold War U.S. reorganization of Colombian military and paramilitary
networks and the massive levels of post-Cold War U.S. funding of
the Colombian military serves to underline the continued relevance
of counterinsurgency for destroying movements that may threaten
a stability geared towards U.S. interests.
The primary weapon in a strategy that has been
called "counterterror" in U.S.-sponsored counterinsurgencybut
what can be more accurately described as "terror"has
been the use of paramilitaries. In the Colombian context, the link
between the paramilitaries, the Colombian military and the United
States is clear. As a result, in the last fifteen years, an entire
democratic leftist political party was eliminated by right-wing
paramilitaries, some 151 journalists have been killed, and 2.7 million
people have been forcibly displaced from their homes. Also, 4,000
activists were murdered in the 1980s; three out of four trade union
activists assassinated worldwide are killed by the Colombian paramilitaries;
and so far this year, there have been over 8,000 political assassinations
in Colombia with 80 percent of these murders committed by paramilitary
groups. Paramilitary death squads also regularly target human rights
activists, indigenous leaders, community activists and teachers.
This repression serves to criminalize any form
of civil society resistance to U.S.-led neoliberal restructuring
of Colombia's economy and stifle political and economic challenges
to the Colombian status quo. According to right-wing militia leader
Carlos Castaño, he and his paramilitaries "have always
proclaimed that we are the defenders of business freedom and of
the national and international industrial sectors." Amidst
this repression, according to the World Bank, over half of Colombia's
population live in poverty, with those most vulnerable being "children
of all ages."
During the Cold War, anti-communism served as
the ideological vehicle to justify the repression of any attempt
to change the prevailing socio-economic structure of Colombian society.
In the post-Cold War era anti-drugs and the "war on terror"
have served as the latest justifications for the continued U.S.
backing of a terror war in Colombia. There has thus been a major
continuity in Washington's Colombian policy that has crossed from
the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. Furthermore, this policy
continues to have terrible human rights implications and leads to
the death of significant numbers of Colombia's civilian population,
while maintaining structural inequalities and destroying any democratic
alternatives.
Doug Stokes is an academic at Bristol University,
UK. His research is on the continuity of post-Cold War U.S. foreign
policy in the global South, in particular those policies that continue
to lead to large-scale civilian suffering. He has published extensively
on U.S. counterinsurgency in Latin America with a strong emphasis
on Colombia. Read more of his work at www.dougstokes.net
This article originally appeared
in Colombia Report, an online journal
that was published by the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA).
Back to Top .
Comments
Copyright © 2003 Colombia
Journal. All rights reserved.
|