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July 21, 2003
What Cease-fire?
by Garry Leech
Last week, the Colombian government and the country's largest right-wing
paramilitary organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC), announced an agreement to begin peace talks that will lead
to the demobilization of the AUC by 2005. This decision evolved
out of six months of exploratory talks and a corresponding unilateral
cease-fire called by the AUC in December 2002. The cease-fire was
a requirement demanded by President Alvaro Uribe before the government
would enter into discussions with any of the armed groups. The U.S.
government has also held discussions with the paramilitaries and
have endorsed the peace process. But what the Uribe and Bush administrations,
as well as the Colombian and U.S. mainstream media have conveniently
ignored is the fact that, in reality, there is no cease-fire. Since
the alleged cease-fire was initiated, right-wing paramilitary death
squads, often aided by the U.S.-backed Colombian military, have
killed countless numbers of unarmed Colombians they suspected of
being guerrilla sympathizers.
President
Uribe has repeatedly stated that his administration will not participate
in negotiations with any armed group until they have called a cease-fire.
Last November, AUC leaders Carlos Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso
announced that their paramilitary organization would implement a
unilateral cease-fire beginning December 1, 2002, in order to begin
negotiations with the Colombian government. While the two militia
leaders said that AUC fighters would not disarm during the cease-fire
because they needed to defend themselves against guerrilla attacks,
they clearly stated that AUC troops would only act in self-defense
and would not conduct offensive operations. Meanwhile, two regional
paramilitary groupsthe Metro Bloc in Medellín and the
Self-Defence Forces of Casanare (ACC) in eastern Colombiarefused
to participate in the cease-fire and negotiations until the guerrillas
also ended hostilities. While these two paramilitary fronts have
continued to operate offensively, they have only been responsible
for a small fraction of the killings attributed to the paramilitaries
since the December cease-fire began.
In the city of Cucuta, the first month of the cease-fire saw 84
people killed by paramilitaries who had supposedly agreed to cease
hostilities. The violence in Cucuta continued into the New Year
with the worst atrocity occurring on the night of January 9 when
a paramilitary death squad entered the poor barrios of Camilo Daza
and Antonia Santos and massacred eight unarmed civilians including
a local community leader. Also in January, 150 paramilitary fighters
from the Elmer Cárdenas Bloc crossed the border into Panama
where they attacked two indigenous Kuna villages and killed four
community leaders. Almost 500 indigenous people were displaced by
the paramilitaries' cross-border incursion.
Amnesty International described attacks against indigenous communities
in Arauca in April when paramilitaries and soldiers from the Colombian
army's Navos Pardo Battalion entered several rural indigenous communities
in the municipality of Tame. Paramilitary gunmen killed two people,
including a pregnant 16-year-old girl who was raped first and had
the fetus cut out of her stomach. The attackers also raped three
indigenous girls aged 11, 12 and 15, while three more indigenous
people were "disappeared." During the military offensive,
army helicopters allegedly transported soldiers and paramilitary
fighters into the area. According to eyewitnesses, some of the paramilitaries
were wearing armbands identifying themselves as ACC fighters who
are not participating in the cease-fire, while other gunmen were
wearing AUC armbands. By mid-May, army-paramilitary operations had
forcibly displaced some 847 indigenous people from the municipality
of Tame to the towns of Saravena and Alto Caranal.
Similar paramilitary attacks have occurred throughout the country.
On June 6, in the municipality of Sergovia in northeastern Colombia,
four farmers were accused of being guerrilla sympathizers and massacred
by paramilitaries who also set fire to numerous homes and forcibly
displaced hundreds of peasants. And nine days later in the southwestern
Valle de Cauca department, paramilitary gunmen from the Calima Bloc
massacred eight unarmed civilians also accused of being rebel sympathizers.
Colombia's attorney general recently illustrated that it is not
only the Colombian Armed Forces that collaborate with the paramilitaries,
but also politicians. On July 11, the mayor of Barrancabermeja,
Julio Cesar Ardila, was arrested for allegedly ordering the assassinations
of a local radio journalist and four other civilians this past April.
Ardila is accused of using paramilitary gunmen supposedly participating
in the cease-fire to carry out the killings.
While the paramilitary cease-fire has resulted in fewer Colombian
labor leaders being killed in comparison to last year, 37 unionists
have still been assassinated during the first half of 2003. Among
the victims is the leader of an oil workers union killed last week
on the same day that the government and the paramilitaries announced
their peace talks agreement. Meanwhile, the number of death threats
against labor leaders has skyrocketed dramatically this year as
paramilitaries continue to intimidate unionists they consider to
be guerrilla sympathizers.
The above cases are only a few of the known paramilitary attacks
since the implementation of their unilateral cease-fire last December.
Neither the Uribe or Bush administrations, nor the mainstream media
in Colombia or the United States, have focused much attention on
these paramilitary atrocities. The examples listed above clearly
illustrate that the cease-fire is a charade, albeit a necessary
one for Uribe to save his peace process and to save face following
his prior proclamations of not talking with any armed group until
they cease hostilities.
Last week, Uribe called the peace talks agreement a "step
toward peace and the restoration of human rights." On the other
hand, human rights groups are afraid that demobilized paramilitaries
will simply be incorporated into the ranks of the military or will
remobilize and form new militias once the peace process has provided
amnesties to Castaño and Mancuso. The amnesty process began
last week when the government's peace commissioner, Luis Carlos
Restrepo, announced, ''For those who have committed crimes against
humanity, we are looking for punishment that is not jail, where
they can make amends for the damage they've done.'' Clearly, this
impunity process, which calls for human rights violators to pay
compensation to victims' families instead of going to prison, is
intended to pave the way for Castaño and Mancuso to become
legitimate political figures (see, Reinventing
Carlos Castaño).
With Colombia now involved in Washington's war on terror, human
rights have taken a back seat with regards to U.S. military aid
and battlefield tactics. And with U.S. counterterrorism aid to Colombia
not subject to the human rights conditions imposed on counternarcotics
aid, the Bush administration can freely provide counterinsurgency
assistance to all units of the Colombian military. A March 2003
United Nations report claims that human rights abuses committed
by the Colombian military have increased since Uribe assumed the
presidency last August, a strategy that makes some of the paramilitaries
expendable in Colombia's dirty war.
As for the Bush administration, it has openly embraced Uribe's
talks with the paramilitaries despite the fact that the U.S. State
Department holds the right-wing militias responsible for 70 percent
of Colombia's human rights violations and has listed them as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization. Furthermore, the Bush administration appeared
to violate its own stated policy of not negotiating with terrorist
groups when U.S. Embassy political officer Alexander Lee met with
a paramilitary emissary on May 3.
According to a leaked memo, the two discussed the peace process
and Lee told the emissary that paramilitary leaders Castaño
and Mancuso might receive lenient sentences for the drug trafficking
charges they currently face if they cooperate with the U.S. government.
The Bush administration's endorsement of the paramilitary peace
negotiationsincluding donating $3 million in initial funding
for the processstands in sharp contrast to Washington's blatant
lack of support for former-president Andres Pastrana's recently
failed peace talks with Colombia's largest guerrilla group, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
It appears that despite ample evidence that paramilitary forces
have violated their unilateral cease-fire, peace talks between the
AUC and the Colombian government will begin with the full blessing
of the Bush administration. Any agreement that results in the demobilization
of the paramilitaries will provide Uribe with a peace feather to
place in his militaristic cap. But such an agreement will not be
a "step toward peace," it will be nothing more than a
public relations victory for Uribe, Castaño and Mancuso.
Innocent Colombians will continue to die at the hands of the remaining
paramilitaries and the armed forces, who are increasingly utilizing
dirty war tactics under cover of the U.S.-backed war on terror.
Furthermore, if the army and the remaining paramilitaries prove
incapable of effectively fighting the guerrillas by the 2005 demobilization
deadline, then new paramilitary groups will inevitably arise to
pick up the slack. Former Colombian national defense adviser Armando
Borrero recently told the media, "The same factors that fostered
the rise of the paramilitaries will simply lead to the creation
of new militia groups if the state can't provide protection, and
I don't think the state has that ability." Sadly, the entire
peace process will likely prove to be nothing more than a political
public relations ploy that will do little to diminish the violence
endured by innocent Colombians.
This article originally appeared
in Colombia Report, an online journal
that was published by the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA).
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