March 1, 2004

(Un)Democratic (In)Security in Caquetá

by Garry Leech

While President Alvaro Uribe's democratic security agenda may be providing increased security for some of Colombia's urban population, it has massively destabilized many rural communities. This has been clearly illustrated by the Colombian Army's ongoing offensive in the southeastern department of Caquetá. These operations have not only failed to provide additional security, they have actually dramatically escalated the levels of violence in the region, instilled fear in the local population and led to massive displacement. Additionally, the mainstream media has once again dutifully reported the army's version of events in Caquetá.

In January, the Colombian Army's 12th Brigade launched Operation New Year, intended to seize control of rural zones in Caquetá controlled by Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. The first targets were the remote villages of San Isidro and La Unión Peneya. Troops under cover of darkness arrived in Blackhawk helicopters, armored personnel carriers and armored cars. According to the 12th Brigade's Major Edgar Ortega, the operation led to the capture of 27 FARC militia members and the seizure of weapons, communications equipment and rebel propaganda, including CD disks of “communist music.”

Operation New Year is the latest operation being conducted by the Colombian military as part of Uribe's “democratic security” program. However, the military's tactics in Caquetá have clearly been undemocratic—resulting in mass arrests of presumed guerrilla collaborators—and have caused instability throughout the region with hundreds of residents fleeing the army's pending arrival in La Unión Peneya.

Those displaced by the army's offensive fled to surrounding villages and towns. In one such village, a FARC militia member explains that the community simply does not have the resources to support the displaced that have arrived there. He notes that the economic situation has long made it difficult for peasants to survive and now the escalating violence is causing some to abandon the region.

Operation New Year is targeting the FARC's 15th Front, which has some 250 uniformed fighters, and the Teofilo Forero Mobil Column, whose 250 guerrillas operate throughout Caquetá. In addition to these forces, there are a handful of FARC militia members living in most of the region's remote villages. These fighters often wear civilian clothing while maintaining security in the villages, providing intelligence to the 15th Front and participating in local operations.

Peasants in rural Caquetá have become accustomed to governmental neglect and to living under FARC rule. Most villages are not linked to the national electricity grid and lack running water, and while some can be accessed by four-wheel drive vehicles via bumpy unpaved roads, the majority can only be reached on foot or horseback. For many local residents, the military is the only branch of the national government with which they have contact. Two children in a village not far from La Unión Peneya describe how a recent fishing trip to the local river was disrupted by Colombian military aircraft machine-gunning and bombing nearby.

This region has also endured repeated aerial fumigation of the coca crops that many farmers cultivate to supplement the mediocre income they earn from legal crops. The United States launched a new round of spraying in February that coincided with Operation New Year. According to one local farmer, “The fumigation has made life difficult for people because it has destroyed food crops and harmed animals.” Not surprisingly, fear of the military and years of government neglect have left the local population distrustful of the state.

While the FARC and many peasants hold the government responsible for the dire economic conditions fueling the country's civil conflict, the army's Major Ortega believes otherwise: “Colombia's problem is not poverty; Ecuador and Peru are poorer than Colombia and they don't have these problems. Nor is narco-trafficking Colombia's problem; Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru also have narco-trafficking. The problem is authority. We haven't had real leadership until now. We haven't had security until now.” However, despite Ortega's blatant endorsement of Uribe's security agenda and the 12th Brigade's attempts to implement it in rural Caquetá, the military offensive has dramatically reduced the level of security for much of the local population. In fact, operations like the one in Caquetá only affirm peasants' fear of the military and distrust of the state.

Many medium-sized towns situated along Caquetá's only major highway have long had a nominal state presence. However, their recent experiences illustrate the almost single-minded, militaristic focus of the Uribe government. While many of these towns are now heavily-guarded by the Colombian army, including soldiers from the peasant soldier program, there is clearly a lack of social and economic investment. In El Paujil, one of the nearest government-controlled towns to San Isidro and La Unión Peneya, a 2002 FARC rocket intended for the police station hit the local hospital instead. According to El Paujil's secretary of local government, Oscar Ochoa, the town cannot afford the $160,000 cost of building a new hospital. Ochoa claims, “The [national] government won't subsidize the cost of the new hospital and the town can't get a loan.” The government is, however, providing massive funding for the Colombian military, mostly subsidized with U.S. taxpayer money. With a huge majority of the $700 million that the Bush administration is sending to Colombia annually going to the military, there is little left over for building hospitals and other social and economic necessities.

Additionally, while towns like El Paujil have gained a certain measure of security by maintaining a permanent military presence, some of them have also seen an increase in right-wing paramilitary activity. The Uribe administration's security agenda has allowed paramilitaries to continue their dirty war against suspected subversives, a categorization that includes unionists, human rights workers and community leaders. In other words, Uribe's security program is selective in nature, protecting only those not critical of the government's security and economic policies.

Fully aware of what has occurred in these towns, and already skeptical of the state, peasants in rural Caquetá are afraid that the arrival of the military in their villages will also fail to bring a corresponding social investment. Even worse, they fear the army will open the door to paramilitaries who will inevitably view many of these peasants who have long lived under guerrilla rule as military targets.

While the mainstream media has repeatedly criticized the guerrillas—and in many cases rightfully so—it often acts as nothing but a mouthpiece for the U.S. and Colombian governments. Soon after it secured La Unión Peneya, the 12th Brigade brought in the national and international media—albeit, only mainstream media—who dutifully reported the army's version of events. None ventured beyond the virtually abandoned La Unión Peneya to find out how residents of other soon-to-be-targeted villages felt about the army's offensive or Uribe's security agenda. Without telephones, these peasants are also never included in the polls touting Uribe's 70 percent approval rating.

Also, despite the army's notorious history of falsifying battlefield reports, including exaggerating body counts and even dressing dead civilians in rebel uniforms, the mainstream press brought into view La Unión Peneya failed to ask any questions about why the guerrillas would leave behind all that weaponry and communications equipment when they knew about the military offensive more than two weeks in advance. Nor, when the army faced no resistance, was there any question about how the military knew that those arrested, who were all dressed in civilian clothing, were in fact FARC guerrillas. When I asked Major Ortega how the army can determine whether or not men clad in civilian clothing are guerrillas, he responded, “They have pistols tucked in their waistbands and they also have walkie-talkies.” Therefore, one has to assume that, despite knowing well in advance that the army was coming, FARC militia members idiotically waited with guns tucked in their trousers and walkie-talkies in their hands for the military to come and arrest them.

Most mainstream media correspondents in Colombia (with the partial exception of the Washington Post’s Scott Wilson) appear to view their journalistic responsibility in much the same way as New York Times reporter Judith Miller. When asked why her articles leading up to the war in Iraq often did not include the views of experts skeptical of the Bush administration's weapons of mass destruction claims, Miller shockingly replied: “My job isn't to assess the government's information and be an independent intelligence analyst myself. My job is to tell readers of The New York Times what the government thought of Iraq's arsenal.” In other words, she doesn't believe she has a responsibility to be an investigative journalist, only to serve as a mouthpiece for the U.S. government. This same attitude permeates U.S. and Colombian mainstream media coverage of Colombia's civil conflict, particularly when journalists repeatedly depend on U.S. embassy and Colombian military press junkets to report alleged drug war and civil war successes in remote rural zones.

Meanwhile, peasants throughout Caquetá continue to be targeted, whether they are victims of FARC attacks on government-controlled towns or military attacks in rebel-dominated territory. Many of those living in villages near San Isidro and La Unión Peneya are now waiting to see if they will be next on Operation New Year's target list. They are wondering when the armored unit temporarily based in El Paujil will receive its orders to roll. When that happens, these peasants will also have to decide whether to flee or risk being arrested as “subversives.” And when this happens, no doubt the mainstream media will dutifully report how President Uribe is providing security throughout Colombia. The victims of Operation New Year, however, are quickly learning that this security is not for everyone.

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