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May 24, 2004
President Uribe’s Hidden Past
by Tom Feiling
Colombia’s President Alvaro Uribe is, by his own admission,
a man of the right. Unlike most recent Colombian presidents, Uribe
is from the land-owning class. He inherited huge swathes of cattle
ranching land from his father Alberto Uribe, who was subject to
an extradition warrant to face drug trafficking charges in the United
States until he was killed in 1983, allegedly by leftist Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. Alvaro Uribe grew up
with the children of Fabio Ochoa, three of who became leading players
in Pablo Escobar’s Medellín cocaine cartel.
President
Uribe’s credentials are impeccable. He was educated at Harvard
and Oxford, is as sharp as a tack, and a very able bureaucrat. At
the tender age of 26 he was elected mayor of Medellín, the
second-largest city of Colombia. The city’s elite in the 1980s
was rich, corrupt and nepotistic, and they loved the young Uribe.
But the new mayor was removed from office after only three months
by a central government embarrassed by his public ties to the drug
mafia. Uribe was then made Director of Civil Aviation, where he
used his mandate to issue pilots’ licenses to Pablo Escobar’s
fleet of light aircraft, which routinely flew cocaine to the United
States.
In 1995, Uribe became governor of the Antioquia department, of
which Medellín is the capital. The region became the testing
ground for the institutionalization of paramilitary forces that
he has now made a key plank of his presidency. Government-sponsored
peasant associations called Convivir’s were “special
private security and vigilance services, designed to group the civilian
population alongside the Armed Forces.”
Security forces and paramilitary groups enjoyed immunity from prosecution
under Governor Uribe, and they used this immunity to launch a campaign
of terror in Antioquia. Thousands of people were murdered, “disappeared,”
detained and driven out of the region. In the town of San Jose de
Apartadó for example, three of the Convivir leaders were
well-known paramilitaries and had been trained by the Colombian
Army’s 17th Brigade. In 1998, representatives of more than
200 Convivir associations announced that they would unite with the
paramilitary organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC), under its murderous leader Carlos Castaño.
When Uribe launched his campaign for president, the candidate’s
paramilitary connections appeared to deter many journalists from
examining the ties between drug gangs and the Uribe family. An exception
was Noticias Uno, a current affairs program on the TV station
Canal Uno. In April 2002, the program ran a series on alleged links
between Uribe and the Medellín drug cartel. After the reports
aired, unidentified men began calling the news station, threatening
to kill the show’s producer Ignacio Gómez, director
Daniel Coronell, and Coronell’s 3-year-old daughter, who was
flown out of the country soon thereafter. Gómez was also
forced to flee Colombia and is currently living in exile.
Noticias Uno told the story of how in 1997, the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized 50,000 kilos of potassium
permanganate from a ship docked in San Francisco. Potassium permanganate
is a chemical used in the production of cocaine. The cargo was on
its way to Colombia to be delivered to a company called GMP Chemical
Products. The owner of GMP was Pedro Moreno Villa GMP, Uribe’s
presidential campaign manager. The chemicals seized were sufficient
to produce $15 billion worth of cocaine. The DEA confirmed that
GMP was Colombia’s biggest importer of potassium permanganate
between 1994 and 1998, when Uribe was governor of Medellin and Moreno
Villa was his chief of staff.
As the Presidential race intensified, journalists became increasingly
concerned that media bosses were threatening their editorial independence.
Two powerful business groups with ties to the political establishment
own RCN and Caracol, the biggest television and radio networks in
Colombia. Journalists’ concerns were further heightened when
Uribe picked a member of the Santos family, which owns the country’s
most influential daily newspaper, to be his vice-president.
Despite his links to paramilitaries and drug cartels, Uribe won
the presidency. But to call Uribe’s victory a landslide—as
many in and outside Colombia did—is a gross distortion of
the facts. Uribe received 53 percent of the official vote, but only
25 percent of the electorate voted. Many urban and middle class
Colombians, who have been largely sheltered from the civil war,
were thoroughly disillusioned by the peace process of outgoing-President
Andrés Pastrana, and backed hardliner Uribe. But the election
was hardly a fair one.
Mapiripán
is the site of one of the worst paramilitary massacres to date,
yet many of the town’s residents voted for the “paramilitary”
candidate, Uribe. Father Javier Giraldo of the Colombian human rights
group Justicia y Paz was in Mapiripán on election day: “There
was a great deal of fraud. There were paramilitaries in the voting
booths. They destroyed a lot of ballots. This was denounced to the
Ombudsman, but nothing happened.” Electoral fraud, widespread
paramilitary threats—denounced by virtually all the other
candidates during the election campaign—and the almost total
decimation of the electoral left in the preceding decade all contributed
to Uribe’s election victory.
Though Uribe has vowed that his “democratic security”
platform will bring peace and security to all Colombians, statistics
from the Trade Union School in Medellín show continued threats
to trade unionists and human rights activists. The number of trade
unionists killed in 2003 declined to a “mere” 90, suggesting
that the paramilitaries were being reigned in a little. But the
number of death threats issued were 20 percent higher, and death
threats to trade unionists’ families were up by 30 percent.
Police raids, mass detentions and forced “disappearances”
are also all higher than the previous year.
Uribe is clamping down on the opposition, while sidling yet closer
to the Republican White House in Washington. Uribe was the only
South American leader to back President George W. Bush’s invasion
of Iraq. At the time, he even went so far as to invite the United
States to invade Colombia. Uribe hopes to double the size of the
Colombian Armed Forces, and has asked the United States for more
helicopters and greater involvement in areas such as intelligence
gathering. Many in the Bush administration are keen to see the United
States expand its multi-billion dollar military investment in “Plan
Colombia.” U.S. Army Lt. Gen. James T. Hill, for example,
recently told a Senate committee, “It would be a terrible
loss if democracy failed in Colombia. You need to let me get on
the ground.”
But before that happens, the United States is pushing for Uribe
to reign in his illegal paramilitary allies. The peasant militias
and million-strong informers’ network that Uribe has launched
are evidence of the way in which the paramilitary strategy is being
institutionalized. Under the “state of unrest” that
Uribe decreed upon assuming the presidency, the police and army
were granted the right to detain citizens on the slightest suspicion
of supporting the guerrillas, without evidence or legal counsel,
and to enter people’s homes without a warrant.
As Bush and Uribe have both said time and again, in the “war
on terror” there can be no neutrals. President Uribe has branded
those NGOs that do claim to occupy a non-partisan position on the
armed conflict “political agitators in the service of terrorism,
cowards who wrap themselves in the banner of human rights.”
Only pro-government, anti-guerrilla NGOs are being left untouched.
Uribe’s strategy is to bring the war out into the open, to
declare social organizations illegal, and to use the army and police
against them directly, while holding “negotiations”
with the paramilitaries. Given the murderous tactics that Uribe
is prepared to resort to, it is easy to understand why trade unionists
and human rights defenders are inclined to feel despondent. It also
makes the unquestioning support being offered Uribe by the U.S.
and British governments all the more immoral.
Tom Feiling is a campaign officer for the UK-based
Justice
for Colombia.
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