August 2, 2004

Washington’s Paramilitary Game in Colombia

by Garry Leech

While the United States was initially supportive of President Alvaro Uribe’s negotiations with Colombia’s right-wing paramilitary group the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), recent comments by U.S. Ambassador William Wood and the issuing of drug indictments against paramilitary leaders appear to be undermining the talks. Washington’s initial endorsement of the “peace process” was likely based on overly optimistic expectations of a strengthened Colombian military and an eagerness to provide political backing for the then-recently elected Uribe. But as the talks have progressed, Washington’s support has waned, perhaps due to the possible military repercussions of a paramilitary demobilization. It has become increasingly clear that the Colombian military will not be able to effectively control all the territory currently in the hands of the paramilitaries, meaning a demobilization of the militia group will likely lead to territorial gains for the country’s leftist guerrillas.

The AUC initiated a unilateral ceasefire in December 2002 in order to set the stage for negotiations with the Uribe government. Talks intended to lead to the militia group’s demobilization officially began in July 2003 despite the fact that paramilitaries had repeatedly violated the ceasefire. Throughout 2003, both the U.S. and Colombian governments turned a blind eye to the fact that the AUC continued to kill unarmed civilians throughout the country. Uribe appeared eager to place a peace feather in his militaristic hat.

Uribe’s strategy to achieve “peace,” however, suggested an inexplicable confidence in the Colombian military’s ability to fill the void that would be left by demobilized paramilitaries. Nevertheless, Washington backed Uribe and continued to ignore the paramilitary group’s ongoing human rights abuses and its role in drug trafficking, despite having previously issued extradition requests for AUC leaders Carlos Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso. For their part, the two paramilitary chiefs called on the Colombian government to issue an amnesty and for the Bush administration to drop extradition requests, claiming that a failure to meet these demands would jeopardize the “peace process.” The Bush administration continued to support Uribe’s peace efforts and provided $3 million to help fund the demobilization of AUC fighters. And in May 2003, a U.S. embassy official even met with an AUC emissary to discuss the negotiations, despite the group’s place on the U.S. State Department’s foreign terrorist list.

In early 2004, however, Washington began changing its tune. For years the U.S. government had primarily focused its propaganda efforts on linking the leftist guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to drug trafficking. The AUC’s far more prominent role in the drug trade and its gross human rights abuses were rarely mentioned by U.S. officials. But in February 2004, Ambassador Wood initiated a propaganda campaign against the AUC when he finally acknowledged what had been obvious to most Colombians for more than a year: “It is clear that the paramilitaries have not completely met the commitments of the cease-fire.”

In the ensuing months, Bush administration officials began publicly criticizing the AUC’s role in drug trafficking. In fact, for the first time ever, rhetoric from Washington was accusing the right-wing paramilitaries of being involved in narcotics trafficking as frequently as it was making the same accusations against Colombia’s leftist “narco-guerrillas.” U.S. officials also became increasingly adamant that extradition requests for AUC leaders would not be waived in order to allow paramilitaries to demobilize and return to civilian life.

On June 16, a new round of demobilization talks began when government negotiators met with ten paramilitary leaders in a special “concentration zone” in northern Colombia. Less than two weeks later, Ambassador Wood emphasized “the importance that the process in no way prejudice the extradition of Colombians indicted in the U.S., and the need to bring gross violators of human rights and major drug traffickers to trial.” Wood also discussed the paramilitaries with the Colombian magazine Cambio, declaring:“They have only one program: narco-terror. And only one agenda: destruction.” And then, on July 22, the United States indicted two AUC leaders participating in the talks—Diego Fernando Murillo and Vicente Castaño—on drug trafficking charges, further complicating the demobilization process.

While the recent criticism of the paramilitaries has finally provided some long overdue balance to Washington’s portrayal of Colombia’s conflict—when contrasted to its previous single-minded focus on demonizing the guerrillas—the timing of the U.S. attacks against the AUC is curious to say the least. After providing billions of dollars of aid to a Colombian military with well-documented links to paramilitary death squads, and having mostly turned a blind eye to the human rights atrocities routinely committed by AUC fighters, why is Washington suddenly criticizing the right-wing militia group?

The answer may well lie in the military stalemate that currently exists in Colombia. Despite repeated claims by U.S. and Colombian officials that the armed forces have achieved the upper hand and that the FARC are now on the defensive, there have been no significant battlefield victories. Many experts agree that while the FARC are in a tactical retreat—perhaps waiting until Uribe’s term expires in 2006—they haven’t been significantly weakened militarily. In other words, the country’s conflict is currently in a stalemate, with neither side capable of achieving victory. That the FARC is still a formidable force was made apparent on July 22, the same day the United States indicted Murillo and Castaño, when some 200 rebels attacked a heavily-guarded bridge in southern Colombia, killing 13 soldiers.

While the increased strength of the Colombian military has allowed it to expand its presence in many regions, it is still the paramilitaries that are keeping the guerrillas at bay in many parts of the country. Should these forces demobilize, it is the FARC that will likely seize control of much of the vacated territory. This poses a problem for the Bush administration, especially in light of recent gains in coca eradication in rebel-controlled regions. If a paramilitary demobilization allows the FARC to expand its territorial control, then it is also likely to result in an increase in the rebel group’s military strength and the amount of funding it receives from coca cultivation.

So while the recent criticism of the paramilitaries by U.S. officials is to be welcomed, it should not necessarily be viewed as a fundamental shift in political and military strategy. For more than two decades, Washington ignored paramilitary groups’ involvement in drug trafficking, gross human rights abuses and links to the U.S.-backed military because the right-wing militias proved useful in the counterinsurgency campaign against the FARC. In a switch of tactics, it may now be raising these issues for the very same reason.

U.S. criticism of the paramilitaries, along with the threat of extradition, will likely contribute to the failure of the demobilization talks. While it is essential that paramilitary human rights abusers be punished for the atrocities they have committed, the history of U.S. involvement in Colombia suggests that this is not the driving force behind the Bush administration’s recent anti-paramilitary propaganda campaign. More likely, it is a desire to ensure that the paramilitaries continue their dirty war against the FARC and suspected guerrilla sympathizers. It is a win-win situation for the Bush administration: by undermining the demobilization talks, it can perpetuate the paramilitary project while appearing to champion human rights.

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