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October 4, 2004
Colombian Army Selectively Targets Paramilitaries
by Garry Leech
In recent weeks, the Colombian military has waged an offensive
against a dissident paramilitary group in the eastern department
of Casanare. The success of the campaign against the Casanare Peasant
Self-Defense Forces (ACC) illustrates how easily the Colombian Army
can combat the country's right-wing paramilitaries when it chooses
to do so. The country's largest paramilitary organization, the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), is also fighting the ACC
in a turf war over cocaine-producing territory. The army's ongoing
offensive against the ACC is helping the AUC consolidate its control
over the region.
During
the Colombian government's failed peace process with the country's
largest leftist guerrilla movement, the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), the rebels repeatedly demanded that the Colombian
military dismantle the AUC. The government's failure to seriously
target paramilitaries responsible for the majority of the country's
human rights abuses was one of the major stumbling blocks in the
peace process. The army's willingness to go after dissident paramilitary
groups now that the AUC is negotiating with the government not only
illustrates the military's sympathies towards the AUC, but also
its ability to effectively target the paramilitaries when it wants
to.
Unlike the guerrillas, who operate in remote rural regions with
little government presence, the paramilitaries mostly exist in towns
under government control. Often these towns contain army and police
bases. Everyone in these towns, including the army and police, know
full well who and where the paramilitaries are. Colombians in AUC-controlled
towns have told me that the army and the paramilitaries are one
and the same, and that they often conduct joint operations. The
close ties and collaboration between the Colombian military and
the AUC have also been well documented by human rights groups and
the U.S. State Department.
The ongoing failure of the military to target the AUC is partly
due to the operational convenience of having right-wing militias
available to wage a dirty war against suspected subversives. The
government has also lacked the political will to pressure the armed
forces into dismantling the paramilitaries. That is until President
Alvaro Uribe recently ordered the army to destroy the dissident
ACC paramilitary group.
The army deployed more than 1,000 soldiers in an offensive against
the ACC in August that resulted in the deaths of 21 paramilitaries.
In a battle in late September involving aircraft and helicopters,
the military killed another 13 ACC fighters, while capturing 32.
With the group now in disarray and its leader wounded and on the
run, General Carlos Alberto Ospina, commander of the Colombian Armed
Forces, stated that the ACC "has no reason to continue fighting,
so the best thing for them is to surrender and accept the terms
given by the government."
The army's recent battlefield successes against the ACC illustrate
how easily the military could have targeted the AUC in the past
if it had so desired. But the army has never mobilized against the
AUC or its leaders Carlos Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso with
the same vigor that it has gone after the guerrillas or dissident
paramilitary groups like the ACC. If it had, then the levels of
violence in Colombia could have been reduced years ago and the Pastrana
administration's peace process with the FARC might have proved more
successful. Instead, the army continues to collaborate with the
AUC and, by targeting the ACC, is helping the country's largest
paramilitary group consolidate its control over the cocaine-producing
regions of Casanare.
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