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May 22, 2006
The Rise of the Colombian Left
by Garry Leech
Given the continued popularity of Colombia’s right-wing President
Alvaro Uribe, many analysts have viewed Colombia as the exception
to South America’s shift to the Left. While it is true that
Uribe will likely be re-elected on May 28—although it no longer
appears guaranteed that he will win outright in the first round
of voting—his nearest competitor is no longer a candidate
from one of Colombia’s traditional political parties. Instead,
the center-left Democratic Pole’s candidate Carlos Gaviria
is running second in three recent polls. This unprecedented support
for a leftist Colombian presidential candidate follows on the heels
of the Democratic Pole’s successes in March’s congressional
elections. The recent rise of the electoral Left in Colombia has
primarily come at the expense of the centrist Liberal party as the
country has become increasingly polarized between Right and Left.
Despite
being linked to several ongoing political scandals, Uribe’s
Teflon coating still appears to be intact. A recent survey by pollster
Napoleon Franco shows that 57 percent of Colombians intend to vote
for Uribe on May 28. While this is still an impressive figure, it
is significantly lower than the 70 percent who supported the president
a year ago. The slip in support for Uribe has benefited the Left
as Gaviria has seen his poll numbers increase to just shy of 20
percent over the past few months. If this trend continues, there
exists the remote possibility that Uribe will fall short of the
majority he needs for a first-round victory and that Colombia’s
presidential election will enter a second round with candidates
on the Right and Left facing off for the first time in the country’s
history.
Perhaps the most significant contributing factor to Gaviria’s
growing support—and the Democratic Pole’s gains in the
congressional elections—is the decline in popularity of the
country’s largest party, the mostly centrist Liberal Party.
Liberal presidential candidate Horacio Serpa is running third in
the polls with 13 percent after finishing second in the last two
presidential elections. The lack of support for Serpa echoes the
Liberal Party’s poor performance in March’s congressional
elections where it failed to obtain a majority in Congress for the
first time in half a century.
Two factors have contributed to the polarization of Colombian electoral
politics: the region’s shift to the Left and Uribe’s
security and economic policies. The Colombian Left has not been
immune to the continent’s leftward shift led by Venezuela’s
President Hugo Chávez. The same backlash against U.S.-promoted
neoliberal economic policies that led to the election of leftist
leaders in Venezuela and Bolivia—and quasi-leftists in Argentina,
Uruguay and Brazil—is also evident in Colombia. The regional
shift to the Left, along with the continued implementation of IMF-imposed
neoliberal reforms and the recent negotiation of a free trade agreement
with the United States, has contributed to a revitalization of the
Colombian Left.
At the same time, four years of Uribe’s Democratic Security
Strategy and its related human rights abuses have pushed many Colombians
who previously identified with the progressive faction of the Liberal
Party further to the Left. Many supporters of Uribe have clearly
taken an “ends justifies the means” stance towards national
politics. Or to put it more succinctly: security trumps all. They
repeatedly point to the administration’s success in reducing
kidnapping and violent crime while ignoring growing evidence of
the administration’s ties to paramilitaries and electoral
fraud, its undermining of democracy, the country’s growing
social inequalities, and rampant human rights violations perpetrated
by the state—including killings, arbitrary arrests and crackdowns
on civil society groups.
In just the past few months, a former Colombian intelligence officer
revealed that for years the country’s secret police force—known
as the DAS and answerable only to the office of the president—has
worked closely with right-wing paramilitaries. Also, electoral judges
in northern Colombia recently testified that paramilitaries rigged
the voting in four Caribbean departments to ensure an Uribe victory
in that part of the country in 2002. And just last week, state security
forces ruthlessly killed an indigenous protester participating in
a large demonstration against the free trade agreement and Uribe’s
re-election. As a result of the excesses of the Uribe administration,
increasing numbers of Colombians have turned to the Democratic Pole
as the best hope of enhancing Colombian democracy, defending human
rights and alleviating poverty and inequality. In other words, instead
of weakening the political opposition, Uribe’s repressive
security strategy is actually strengthening and emboldening the
Left.
While Uribe is still likely to win re-election—probably in
the first round—there is no denying that the Left in Colombia
is on the rise. If this trend continues, it is not unrealistic to
think that the Democratic Pole’s 2010 presidential candidate
could prove victorious. In fact, such a scenario could even be considered
likely given the current popularity of some of the party’s
young congressional representatives such as Gustavo Petro, who received
the second-highest number of votes nationwide in the election for
the Senate.
Of course, whether or not the Left achieves such an unprecedented
success in 2010 may well depend on whether or not the Uribe administration’s
dirty war excesses contribute to a repeat of the slaughter of the
leftist Patriotic Union in the late-1980s. Hopefully, the Democratic
Pole will be spared the fate that befell its leftist predecessor
and Colombia can show that it has finally moved beyond such barbaric
electoral practices.
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