|
May 29, 2006
Uribe Victory Likely to Lead to Increased Repression
by Garry Leech
Congratulations to President Alvaro Uribe, the clear victor in
Colombia’s election after garnering an impressive 62 percent
of the vote. The election left no doubt that the majority of voting
Colombians support Uribe and his Democratic Security Strategy, a
fact that the Left both inside and outside of Colombia are going
to have to accept. However, 62 percent of the vote does not constitute
a mandate to violate the human rights of the political opposition
and others critical of the government’s security and economic
policies. For those Colombians on the Left, the struggle over the
next four years will consist of consolidating recent electoral gains
while defending themselves against a likely-intensification of government
repression.
While many
will claim that 62 percent of the vote constitutes a mandate for
Uribe, the reality is that only 28 percent of eligible voters cast
a ballot in favor of the president. Voter turnout was estimated
to be 45 percent, about the same as four years ago and low even
by Colombian standards. Consequently, Uribe only received the votes
of 62 percent of those Colombians who bothered to cast a ballot.
The low voter turnout was even more disturbing this time around
given that the country’s guerrillas kept their promise not
to disrupt the election. While authorities have traditionally blamed
low turnouts on the country’s violence and rebel attempts
to prevent voters from going to the polls, the only explanation
for the latest low turnout is widespread apathy towards the country’s
political process.
Nevertheless, Uribe clearly proved victorious at the polls and,
despite the many flaws with Colombia’s electoral process—including
coercion of voters by right-wing paramilitaries and threats against
the leftist Democratic Pole—it is evident that a significant
portion, although not necessarily a majority, of the Colombian population
supports the president. Consequently, if we on the Left insist on
repeatedly pointing to Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s
electoral successes as proof of his popularity—although clearly
Venezuela’s electoral process is nowhere near as flawed as
Colombia’s—then we should accept the fact that Uribe
maintains significant levels of popularity among Colombians. This
does not mean, however, that those opposed to Uribe have to accept
his policies, particularly when they involve repression against
certain sectors of the Colombian population.
Many Colombians voted in support of an agenda that has improved
security for them, ignoring the fact that the wealth being generated
by the country’s booming economy is not trickling down to
the poor majority and those critical of the government’s policies
have been victims of state repression, including murders, disappearances,
displacements and arbitrary arrests. Because of Colombia’s
long-running civil conflict, for those who have not been targeted
by the government’s repression, security trumped all other
concerns when it came to deciding whom to elect president.
Uribe’s electoral majority, however, does not give him a
green light to continue or intensify the repression against his
critics. Colombia claims to be a constitutional democracy and, as
such, it is not governed by simple majority rule. In other words,
Uribe is expected to govern within the confines of the country’s
Constitution, which demands that he respect and protect the rights
of every citizen, not just those supportive of his project.
The fact that Uribe failed to do this during his first term was
a significant contributing factor to leftist presidential candidate
Carlos Gaviria of the Democratic Pole garnering an unprecedented
22 percent of the vote. While they constitute an electoral minority,
Gaviria’s backers represent those Colombians who have been
victimized under Uribe’s repressive regime. And now, their
greatest fear is that Uribe’s electoral success will lead
to an intensification of the repression that has been carried out
in the name of security and economic growth.
Uribe represents the modern-day democratic authoritarian version
of Chile’s Cold War military dictator Augusto Pinochet. During
the 1970s and 1980s, a significant portion of the Chilean people
supported Pinochet’s authoritarian policies that prioritized
security and economic growth over the defense of human rights. And
while Pinochet perfected the art of “disappearing” those
critical of his government, the number of Colombians that were “disappeared”
during Uribe’s first term exceeds the total number of Chileans
that vanished during the 17-year military dictatorship.
But events presently unfolding in Chile show many Chileans now
believe that gross violations of human rights cannot be justified
by the desire to achieve security and economic growth. It is this
same belief that drives those struggling for social justice in Colombia
to continue their work to ensure that the constitutional and human
rights of all Colombians are respected and protected. And it is
even more important than ever that those throughout the world working
in solidarity with these brave Colombians intensify their efforts
to hold Uribe accountable for his abuses. Hopefully, unlike in Chile,
it won’t take over 20 years.
Back to Top .
Comments
The
views expressed in this article are that of the author
and may not reflect the views of Colombia Journal.
Copyright © 2000-2008 Colombia Journal. All rights
reserved.
|
|