October 23, 2006

Abandoning a Negotiated Prisoner Exchange for a Militant Rescue Attempt? Uribe Further Alienates Colombia’s Elite

by James J. Brittain

At a time when the Colombian government is experiencing growing urban and rural opposition to state-induced political and economic policies such the VAT tax reform, new inequitable bilateral-trade agreements with the United States, and a significant reduction in socio-economic aid to regions most affected by the civil war, one would think that the Uribe administration would seek to mend the frayed relations with his remaining allies within the traditional dominant class. However, with the recent announcement that the Colombian government seeks to replace a negotiated prisoner exchange with the FARC-EP for a military-based rescue attempt, it looks as though this rationalism has failed to enter the president’s thinking.

Ironically, due to neoliberal economic policies, Uribe has significantly decreased the percentage of foreign corporate-tax-revenue going to the Colombian state, especially when concerning energy-based primary industrial revenues, resulting in far less capital accessible for the civil war effort. During 1991 and 1992, the Colombian government designed a taxation model to assist its fiscal capacity to confront the growing power of the FARC-EP and other leftist social movements. At this time the Colombian state took measures to raise funds from its most profitable natural resource and instituted a $1-$1.50 “war tax” on every barrel of oil sold.

While this model produced millions of dollars for the Colombian state to use in its counterinsurgent activities, in 2001 several energy-based multinational corporations organized a unified opposition to the levy arguing it was a deterrent to trade, investment and profit maximization. As a direct result of increased neoliberal economic policies, and an internal decrease of state-controls over MNC activity, the “war tax” on oil was removed. Similar policies have been implemented over the past four years—including a reduction in oil royalty rates paid to the government—resulting in a systemic reduction in the amount of accessible revenue able to be utilized by the state coffers to confront the guerrillas.

With the threat of the FARC-EP not subsiding, the state has had to find other sources of capital to sustain its fight against the insurgent forces. One of the outcomes of this decreased fiscal capacity has been for the Uribe administration to increase its reliance on the nation’s economic elite. During Uribe’s first year in office, Colombia’s dominant class saw a 20 percent hike in income taxes. Following this, the state placed an additional one-time 1.2 percent tax on liquid assets belonging to the country’s wealthy for the purpose of increasing the Colombian forces’ efforts to restore security and order throughout the country.

At the time, the measures were largely supported by this sector of the population who sought to keep the principal urban-centers safe from the FARC-EP. However, over the past four years the elite-based tax structures did not subside, but were rather sustained. This has led to several scholars arguing that the upper-economic strata within Colombia have come to share the vast majority of costs associated with the civil war and thus disproportionately burdening 1.7 percent of the Colombian population while the majority reaps the security-based benefits. Due to this “burden,” an opposition has grown within this class over the last few years.

Nevertheless, in the spring of 2006, Uribe proposed an additional “one-time” elite-based tax to expand military spending. Uribe expressed his defiance against elite-grumblings and stated, “We have to consider making the richest sectors [of society] make a one-off contribution to provide money for [military] technology and transport.” Later in July, the state, obviously in disregard to the growing opposition, announced that yet another tax targeting the economic elite would be presented to members of the Colombian Congress. The tax reform sought to increase the military’s coffers by $1.2 billion through imposing a tax structure that would place a low percentage levy on financial holdings that exceed $1 million.

Increasing taxation over Colombia’s dominant economic class undoubtedly places Uribe in a compromising and difficult position when concerning his political and economic “allies.” According to Julia Sweig and Michael M. McCarthy, the dilemma facing Uribe concerning these increasing economic pushes against elite civil society hinges on whether or not “Colombia’s elite continues to make economic sacrifices, supplementing the one-time tax payment earmarked for defense spending along with a tax for social investment.” Meanwhile, Nazih Richani points out that these policies have, in actuality, led to Colombia’s elite-social base “rebelling against paying any more taxes.”

In light of the above, coupled with the fact that “to finance the war, the Uribe government is running a budget deficit of 6 percent of the country’s GDP, which is well-above the 2.5 percent limit set by the IMF,” according to Richani, Uribe cannot afford—both politically and fiscally—to escalate a military conflict with the FARC-EP. In disregard of this reality, the Colombian government has decided to negate a peaceful negotiated prisoner exchange, which would immediately increase Uribe’s political clout amongst the elite opposition with dozens of relatives from this class being returned to their families. On the contrary, Uribe paradoxically pronounced, “We cannot continue the farce of a humanitarian exchange [of prisoners] with the FARC … The only path that remains is a military rescue.”

Such a statement demonstrates Uribe’s failed memory when concerning past militaristic-based attempts at implementing a “rescue” of detained members of the elite and state forces. In the spring of 2003, such a rescue attempt was tried by the Uribe administration through the use of the military’s elite airborne “Fudra” force. The mission ended in the humiliation of the Colombian state forces when two top politicians and eight military officers being detained by the FARC-EP were killed during the rescue attempt. Maria Engqvist described the failed mission in Latin America Press:

Blaming the government for the atrocity, Juan Carlos Lecompte, a former partner and friend of detainee, former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, stated, “We are going to insist that the government abstain from doing any military operations to rescue Ingrid.” It was also during this period that numerous members of Colombia’s elite turned on Uribe, stating that he was solely to blame for the deaths of their relatives. Yolanda Pinto, the wife of Governor Gaviria, claimed, “The government provoked this situation” by failing to recognize the praxis and political mission of the FARC-EP.

While Colombian journalist Jorge Enrique Botero has noted that the FARC-EP keep detained officials and soldiers safe and within the conditions cited under the Geneva Conventions, rebel commander Raúl Reyes has emphasized that “guerrilla units have the moral obligation to save their own lives, and protect, as far as possible, the lives and physical well-being of the prisoners in their command. But in no case can rebels allow their prisoners to be taken away by enemy forces without a guerrilla military response.”

In light of the above, a military-based solution to rescuing the detained officials and soldiers will only result in a re-visitation of the events experienced three years ago. As witnessed in the past months, there is considerable support for peace negotiations and dialogue to begin between the Uribe administration and the FARC-EP, not only by the people within rural Colombia but also amongst the urban-based working class and from sectors of Colombia’s elite. By not acknowledging the position of the Colombian constituency, Uribe’s “rescue” attempts will do nothing more than accelerate the already existing opposition towards the state, most notably amongst the traditional elite.

James J. Brittain is a Ph.D. candidate and Lecturer at the University of New Brunswick, Canada. His research interests center on revolutionary and social movements throughout Latin America, the relevance of classical Marxism within contemporary geopolitics, and alternative forms of international development and social change.

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