January 7, 2008

Oil and US Policy Toward Colombia

by Michael Walker

The Bush administration has come up with numerous justifications for its annual handout of around $700 million in mostly military aid to Colombia. Of these, the war on drugs and the urgency of combating “narco-terrorists,” which is code for battling guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), are the most common. Another oft-cited, and far more unlikely, reason for beefing up Colombia’s military is the administration’s ostensible desire to “defend democracy” in Colombia. There is, however, another factor driving US involvement in Colombia that receives rather less public attention: oil.

That concerns about oil were influencing the Bush administration’s thinking about Colombia was evident from very early on in the president’s tenure. The administration’s controversial May 2001 National Energy Policy report, which called for heightened government efforts to secure supplies of oil from abroad, noted that “Colombia has…become an important supplier of oil to the United States.” Colombia was in fact only providing about 3 percent of US oil imports at the time, but in light of the Bush administration’s enthusiasm for diversifying America’s sources of oil and its eagerness to reduce its reliance on the potentially unstable and/or hostile Persian Gulf oil states, Colombia attained significance.

This Bush administration emphasis on the importance of Colombia’s oil has been a feature of policy statements since 2001. One of the reasons behind US involvement in the country, the State Department explained in a 2003 report on policy toward Colombia, was that “Colombia has important reserves of petroleum, natural gas and coal.” The point was made again in April 2007 by State Department official Charles Shapiro in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, when he stated that “Colombia is a strategic energy partner with coal and petroleum production contributing to global energy supply.”

In August, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs Reuben Jeffrey III obsequiously noted before his Colombian hosts that Colombia “is a nation rich in resources…The nation produces the highest quality sugar, cotton, cut flowers, bananas and any number of agricultural products. It is known for emeralds, not to mention oil and energy…You are so blessed in many ways.”

While Bush administration officials make no secret of the fact that oil plays a significant role in US policy towards Colombia they are less keen on advertising the fact that one of Washington’s main concerns vis-à-vis Colombian oil is keeping US petroleum corporations sweet. In February 2002, the Bush administration, as part of its aid request for fiscal year 2003, asked Congress to provide $98 million to establish and train a brigade of elite Colombian troops to protect an oil pipeline running from the Caño Limón oilfield in the eastern province of Arauca to the Caribbean port of Coveñas. The pipeline was a favorite target of guerrillas from the Army of National Liberation (ELN) and the FARC-EP, who bombed it 170 times in 2001.

This decision dovetailed very neatly with the priorities of US oil giant Occidental Petroleum Corporation, which owned over forty percent of the oil flowing through the pipeline. Occidental had long sought to draw the US government deeper into the Colombian imbroglio, disbursing some $350,000 in a successful effort to convince Congress to pass Plan Colombia, the Clinton aid package that drastically increased the US role in Colombia.

Anne Patterson, who was US ambassador to Colombia at the time, acknowledged the part played by big oil in the decision to launch the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline protection program when she stated that it was “important for…our petroleum supplies and for the confidence of our investors.” Training Colombian forces to defend the pipeline was also aimed at providing Colombia with much needed revenue to fund its war against the guerrillas. Sabotage of the pipeline was costing Colombia about $500 million a year, so it made sense to guard this source of funds.

Congress acceded to the administration’s request for funds to guard the pipeline, approving $93 million for this purpose in its budget for 2003. Another $6 million was appropriated as part of an anti-terrorism supplemental signed into law in August 2002. US Army Special Forces trainers began arriving in Arauca in early 2003, with the head of the US Army Special Forces mission proclaiming that their aim was “to train the Colombians to find, track down and kill the terrorists before they attack the pipeline.”

Congress has continued to provide funding for the pipeline program in the years since its inception, with the State Department emphasizing its continuing utility. Thus, in its 2006 budget justification, the State Department affirmed that the two Colombian brigades tasked with patrolling the pipeline “will receive additional munitions, equipment and training to sustain this high profile and important mission,” which is aimed at securing “a key element of Colombia’s economic infrastructure.”

The mission appears to have been a qualified success. A report by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) revealed that attacks on the pipeline plunged to just 17 in 2004, and 13 in the first seven months of 2005. On the other hand, the GAO also observed that the guerrillas had modified their strategy, concentrating instead on sabotaging the electric grid so as to deprive the Caño Limón oilfield of the power needed to pump oil. Such attacks rose from zero in 2001 to 23 in 2003, with eleven instances of electrical grid sabotage in the first seven months of 2005.

Colombia’s oil exports to the United States have dipped since Bush entered office, and it now only provides around 1.5 percent of annual US imports, a relatively small amount. The country’s known oil reserves are scanty, leading to fears that it will become a net importer within a few years. However, there is a widely held view that there are significant unexplored oil deposits on its territory, with Grace Livingstone suggesting in her book Inside Colombia that “Colombia has the potential to be as important an oil supplier as Venezuela to the US.” Unfortunately for the government, however, much of the area assumed to contain oil is controlled by the FARC-EP. The depletion of Colombia’s oil reserves partly explains current President Álvaro Uribe’s eagerness to court foreign investors and restructure and partially privatize the state oil company, Ecopetrol.

Notwithstanding the problems facing Colombia’s oil sector, there is every reason to believe that oil interests will continue to inform US policy toward the country. This is not just because the administration wants to ingratiate itself with US corporations like Occidental Petroleum that have a stake in Colombia. Probably the most crucial oil-related factor guiding US policy is the fear that the conflict in Colombia will spill over into neighboring countries, with potentially serious implications for US oil supplies.

The crucial role played by South America in US energy security was underlined by Admiral James Stavridis, the present commander of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), who emphasized in testimony before Congress earlier this year that the US “imports over 50 percent of its oil from the Western Hemisphere, with 34 percent coming from Latin America and the Caribbean in 2005 – outweighing the 22 percent imported from the Middle East.” Colombia’s eastern neighbor Venezuela is an especially vital source of oil for the United States, providing around 12 percent of annual US oil imports. Venezuela’s contribution is exceeded only by that of Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Canada.

A report published in 2001 by the extremely influential RAND Corporation provides an indication of the significance attached to Venezuela, with the authors describing it as “a critical country for US and Colombian security interests,” due to its regional clout and its status as “one of the world’s largest oil producers.” Ecuador, located to the south of Colombia, is itself an increasingly important source of oil for the United States, supplying 2.7 percent of US crude oil imports in 2005, double the figure for 2003.

The conflict in Colombia has already impacted upon its neighbors. In relation to Ecuador, Stavridis’ predecessor, General Bantz Craddock, commented in 2006 that “Ecuador remains plagued by illicit [drugs] trafficking and the presence of FARC members who penetrate its vulnerable northern border.” Admiral Stavridis acknowledged the seriousness attached by the United States to the regional implications of the guerrillas’ activities when he declared that “In addition to supporting Colombia, countering any expansion of FARC activity into neighboring countries is also part of our focus.”

Then there is the problem of Colombian refugees fleeing to surrounding countries. There has been an explosion in Colombians seeking asylum in Ecuador. The BBC reported in November 2006 that whereas 475 Colombians applied for asylum there in 2000, by 2003 the figure had risen to “more than 11,000 and those high figures have remained constant ever since.” The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that in total there may be around 250,000 Colombian refugees in Ecuador. Assimilating refugees is an arduous task for any state, let alone nations like Venezuela and Ecuador, many of whose citizens live in dire poverty.

To put it bluntly, the United States simply cannot afford to let the war in Colombia further destabilize its neighbors and threaten the flow of oil northward. Roughly 16 percent of the oil imported by the United States comes from Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Defeating or at least containing the FARC-EP is therefore of critical significance for US energy security. We can therefore expect that Washington will remain heavily involved in Colombia’s affairs for a long time to come.

Michael Walker is currently studying for a PhD at the University of St Andrews in the UK. His research is focused on the democracy promotion policies of the United States since President Ronald Reagan; including a case study of President George W. Bush’s Colombia policy.

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