April 2, 2008

FARC Should Release All Civilian Hostages

By Garry Leech

It would be a serious blunder from both the humanitarian and tactical perspectives if the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were to allow Ingrid Betancourt—or any other hostage for that matter—to die from illness while in captivity. From a humanitarian point of view, it is simply inhumane to continue to hold captive in the jungle without access to essential medical care anyone who is deathly ill. From a tactical perspective, the death of Betancourt would be a public relations catastrophe for the FARC and would undo the positive international exposure it gained by releasing four sick hostages in February. In fact, from both a humanitarian and tactical perspective, it would behoove the FARC to release not only Betancourt and any other sick hostages, but all of its civilian captives.

If former presidential candidate Betancourt is as sick as many people claim—something that has yet to be confirmed—then the FARC should release her immediately on humanitarian grounds. Given the degree of international publicity that has resulted from Betancourt’s kidnapping, her death in captivity would be the most serious blow ever to the FARC’s international image. But while much of the focus has been on this one high-profile prisoner, there are broader questions related to the FARC’s practice of kidnapping and detention that need to be addressed.

The FARC is not unique in its use of kidnapping as a political strategy. Both the Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua during the 1970s and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador in the 1980s, among others, kidnapped members of the political elite to use as bargaining chips in negotiations. However, because those captives rarely remained in custody for years, the kidnapping practices of the Sandinistas and FMLN tended not to evolve into public relations nightmares for those rebel groups.

The FARC has utilized kidnapping and detention, not only for political gain, but also for other purposes. Essentially, there are three categories of prisoners held by the FARC: high-profile political prisoners such as Betancourt and other politicians and government officials; police and soldiers captured in battle who could be considered prisoners of war; and kidnapped civilians who are held for ransom.

The FARC’s strategy of using its political prisoners and captured enemy fighters as pawns at the negotiating table has been a failure. In fact, there has only been one prisoner exchange between the FARC and the government in the rebel group’s 45-year existence. In 2001, the FARC released more than 200 police and soldiers in return for the liberation of 15 sick guerrillas. It is difficult for the FARC to argue that the political and tactical gains that resulted from this prisoner exchange offset the backlash the rebel group has endured in response to its practice of holding kidnapped political figures and captured government troops in jungle camps for years.

While the human rights problems related to holding civilians captive are obvious, the issue of prisoners of war is not so clear. Captured soldiers and police officers are armed combatants in a civil conflict and their imprisonment by the FARC is not, in and of itself, a human rights violation. Of course, the conditions in which they are detained might well violate human rights norms under the Geneva Conventions. Also, in addition to Colombian soldiers and police officers, the three US military contractors that have been held captive by the FARC for five years could also be considered prisoners of war. After all, they were working for the Pentagon and were engaged in intelligence-gathering operations in a conflict zone at the time of their capture.

Given the fact that there has only been one prisoner exchange agreement between the FARC and the government in more than 40 years of conflict, it is questionable whether holding prisoners of war for years makes sense for the guerrillas from either a public relations or tactical perspective. After all, the practice not only results in a lot of bad publicity for the rebels, but it also requires hundreds of guerrillas to guard the prisoners, thereby reducing the number of rebels available for combat operations.

The FARC would be wise to take a leaf out of Fidel Castro’s playbook and simply disarm and release soldiers and police captured in battle. This would not only be a public relations coup for the FARC, but it would also contribute to undermining the morale of the Colombian Armed Forces. After all, there is little incentive to fight to the death if surrendering will result in one’s immediate liberation rather than years of confinement in a jungle camp. This was a psychological strategy that Castro understood and utilized to great advantage in the Sierra Maestra.

In addition to those politicians that it kidnaps for political purposes and the prisoners of war that it holds captive, the FARC has also abducted civilians to hold for ransom in order to help fund its insurgency. Those kidnapped in order to raise revenues are primarily from the middle and upper classes as they are the ones best situated to pay ransoms. Unlike political kidnapping, this revenue-raising strategy has proven successful from a tactical perspective. However, many would argue that the negative political and public image fallout that has resulted from this strategy significantly outweighs the financial benefits accrued through the practice.

What is particularly disturbing from the FARC’s perspective is the fact that it is not only the middle and upper classes that view the rebel group negatively with regard to the issue of kidnapping. Most poor Colombians also view the practice as an unjustifiable violation of human rights. The fact that kidnapping has received a disproportionate amount of media coverage—precisely because it is the wealthy rather than the poor that are the victims—has given this particular human rights violation a significantly higher profile than other abuses in Colombia.

The high-profile mediation role played by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, the recent killing of rebel commander Raúl Reyes, and the deteriorating health of Betancourt have brought the controversy around the FARC’s practice of kidnapping and detention to a head. As a result, the guerrilla group currently finds itself caught between a rock and hard place. On the one hand, the unilateral release of Betancourt and other hostages would reward the Uribe government for its killing of Reyes. On the other hand, the heightened international profile that the FARC has enjoyed as a result of its negotiations with Chávez will be seriously jeopardized if the guerrillas terminate the process now.

Clearly, the FARC would like to portray Uribe—because of Colombian military’s killing of the rebel group’s chief negotiator Reyes—as the party responsible for the fate of the remaining hostages. However, this strategy is failing and the Colombian president has politically outmaneuvered the rebel group in recent days. Uribe’s concession to release all FARC prisoners in return for the rebel group handing over Betancourt has placed the guerrillas in a difficult position.

Essentially, the only way for the FARC to regain the political initiative and retain the increased positive public exposure it has received as a result of Chávez’s mediation efforts is to unilaterally release all of its civilian captives—and perhaps even its prisoners of war too. Such a move would boost the FARC’s international standing—much to the chagrin of Uribe. Most importantly, it would constitute a bold humanitarian gesture that is long overdue.

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