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April 9, 2001

Ecuador Human Rights Group Condemns Plan Colombia

by Ronald J. Morgan

Ecuador is expected to be the country most affected by the so-called balloon effect of Plan Colombia. As tensions increase during the coming months, as a result of the U.S.-financed "push into southern Colombia," one of the crucial organizations monitoring the situation will be the Quito-based Ecumenical Commission for Human Rights (CEDHU). The organization has been monitoring human rights in Ecuador since 1977 when a massacre of workers at the ASTRA sugar refinery made it clear a human rights organization was needed in Ecuador. CEDHU recently released a report titled, Plan Colombia and its Consequences in Ecuador. On April 3, the president of CEDHU, Maryknoll Sister Elsie Monge, spoke about Plan Colombia and CEDHU's view of the situation in Ecuador.

Plan Colombia

It is said that Plan Colombia is a plan to combat drug trafficking. But really it is evident that this is a smoke screen. If they really wanted to attack drug trafficking they would have to begin by attacking the [narcotics] business, because there are large amounts of capital involved that can't be hidden. Another aspect is the demand, which is in the developed countries--the United States and other countries. There's not much being done to control demand.

The weakest link is the production. And as a result, they are attacking the weakest point with all the damage that this means for the indigenous and peasant farmers who live in the area of coca cultivation. And there's also the ecological damage that is going to occur and already has occurred. The fumigation with the use of glyphosate (Roundup) has endangered the food supplies in the area. It has affected such plants as the yucca which is grown a lot there, the bananas, fruits.

Hidden Agenda

It is said that this is being done to combat drug trafficking. But we think that other interests are involved. These interests aren't being talked about. They're not as evident. One is the control of social sectors that might criticize, or be an obstacle to, the system and are questioning the neoliberal model that is being implemented in Colombia. Among these are the Colombian guerrillas which were formed with the objective of defending the interests of the majority against the interests of the dominant minority.

In Ecuador at this point there's the indigenous movement which is questioning the same neoliberal model. And in Venezuela there's [President Hugo] Chávez, who is a bit of a mystery. But he has popular support because he has done things in favor of the poor and has maintained a very critical position with relation to the United States (see, The Chávez Factor).

Plan Colombia is control of the Andean Region. This is one of the strategic objectives behind the plan. Plan Colombia is a bellicose plan, a military plan. The $1.3 billion contributed by the United States is for purchase of arms and helicopter which returns money to the U.S. arms industry. They are going to benefit (see, U.S. Aid Package Amounts to Corporate Welfare).

Ecuador's Slippery Slope

For a long time in Ecuador the government has said that Plan Colombia has nothing to do with us. And even the concession of the U.S. base at Manta was not going to affect us because this was only to monitor drug trafficking. But it's an advanced military base with high technology that is the eyes and ears of Plan Colombia. From there they are going to control the operations. Hopefully they're not going to be any bombings.
As a result of this we can't deny that we're now in Plan Colombia through our base. The government has said it opposes regionalization of Plan Colombia, but it's already a fact. It's a matter of how to manage it. We can't say we're against regionalization when we have the base at Manta as one of the pillars of Plan Colombia. The political discourse has been deceiving.

The Need for a Comprehensive Andean Response

The majority of our energy in Ecuador is going to go toward confronting the effects. We have to do that as an emergency response but it isn't going to solve anything. Until we solve the root causes this is going to continue and Plan Colombia is going to be here for a long time. They're talking about ten years.

We as human rights people believe that the military solution is not going to work. The reductions [in coca cultivation] that were achieved in Peru and Bolivia resulted in increases in Colombia (see, The Failure of Coca Eradication in Peru and Bolivia). If they decide to reduce production in Colombia it will relocate somewhere else. This is not going to solve the problem. And there's going to be unprecedented damage to the people and the land.

Our position is that the U.S.-Colombia devised approach of controlling drug trafficking is defining the course of the entire Andean Region. What is needed is an alternative relationship, such as the U.S. working together with the Andean Region. I also think Brazil would be interested. I think this would be a more viable alternative. At least we would have some say in this, because, while we depend on what's agreed to by the U.S. and Colombia, we don't have any say. We have to accept what they have decided. In addition to the social control factors, there are also the natural resources.

In the Putumayo area there's a lot of petroleum and it is crucial to controlling the Amazon Basin. This would include the bio-diversity and the water resources. The threat of a regional arms race is also a harmful factor. The $1.3 billion for the Colombian army is going to make it the strongest army in the region. It's going to cause an arms build-up in the other countries. This will bring more problems, hopefully not border conflicts, but maybe it will increase the internal repression.

Increased Power for Ecuador's Military

Traditionally the face of repression in Ecuador has been the police, which is not the case in the other countries where traditionally it has been the army. But lately the military has been given the role of maintaining internal order, which isn't its role. This is also harmful. There's a recent problem with the Ecuadorian military detaining Colombians. This is not their function. It should be the police who arrest these people if they've committed a crime. They're detaining Colombians for being Colombians. In some cases there have been complaints of torture. I have heard of seven cases, but these still have to be investigated and documented.

The Situation Along the Colombian Border

There has been a climate of violence in the region. And paramilitary forces are locating themselves in Ecuadorian territory. Why do they want these lands on the border? They come and go, but they are displacing Ecuadorian peasants. Is the response adequate? There is a lot of concern because of the violence of all types that is taking place--recently, killings between paramilitaries and guerillas.

The area has always been abandoned by the government. There's no adequate sewage in many areas. There's no electricity, tap water is also unavailable. The existing services are very inadequate. There are a lot of Colombians looking for work and they also need these services. It creates conflicts. They're disputing the little that is available.

The solution for some would be repression, which I don't think will resolve the problem. There's been talk, but it hasn't been put into practice, of investing money for infrastructure and social development. But this can't be done overnight. There's also been talk of building large camps to house refugees (see, Colombia's Forgotten Refugees). This is being questioned a lot, because this has occurred in other places and these camps fell under military control. Instead of refugee camps they become concentration camps. This is not the best option.

There are many contacts on the Colombian side. The people come and go, including some Colombians who work on the Ecuadorian side. We want to give the option to the Colombian people who want to come to Ecuador, who have contacts in Ecuador, to integrate into the communities. This way attention can be given to the Ecuadorian communities.

If there's a group of Colombians that come here and they give attention to them, they're going to live better than the Ecuadorians. Integration would be the ideal. But I don't think the government likes this idea much for security reasons. They can't control them as easily. We know there's a danger. We need to know who's coming here. But do we need to enclose them in these large camps?

We are talking about 1,000 who have entered Ecuador. But there have been more than 2,000 who have followed an escape route out of Putumayo into Ecuador and then back into other Colombian states like Nariño. They enter Ecuador and then return to Colombia by another route. It's a corridor. There are Colombians who have lived in Ecuador for 30 years. They come and go. The border is artificial.

About 500 Ecuadorians had to leave their homes because of paramilitary death threats. There weren't any plans to receive them or care for them in any way. The government said the housing that had been made for the Colombians could not be used for Ecuadorians. This was absurd.

Ecuadorians and the FARC

The guerrillas crossover into Ecuador many times to buy food or to rest. And the people along the river [Putumayo] know where to find them. And many times the FARC has helped peasant farmers with medicine and if they're is a sick person they help them. The relationship has been very cordial and helpful. The people call them the muchachos. If there's a problem it's easier for the muchachos to resolve it than any official authority. They have good acceptance and they don't enter the area with weapons, they don't enter with aggression. They come and go and people know them. When there's friction in the communities they turn to them.

What has happened has been confrontations between the FARC and paramilitaries, but there have not been confrontations between the Ecuadorians and the FARC. However, around 1997 the FARC ambushed an Ecuadorian military patrol, killing 11 soldiers. The military detained Ecuadorians and tortured them. They knew they weren't guerrillas. They were well-known people in their communities. The defense minister at the time accused them of being guerrilleros de finca (farm guerrillas). Who in that area isn't a farm guerrilla? Whatever that is. There was a long investigation and after four years the suspects were released.

Poverty Lures Ecuadorians to the Coca Fields

The poverty in Sucumbíos [directly across the river from the Colombian state of Putumayo] has lead Ecuadorians to work in the coca fields of Putumayo. Some have returned because it's dangerous now. There's fumigation and the amount of available work has dropped. For the farmers in Sucumbíos, it has been impressive to see the other side of the river. The Colombian side of the river is in better economic condition and I imagine it has to do with the cultivation of coca. For the Ecuadorian farmers it has been very difficult to get their products to market. There aren't many roads. Because of this difficult life on the Ecuadorian side, many have gone to work with coca in Colombia.

The Role of Ecuadorian Civil Society

We are working on two levels to insist on a political solution, to insist on pressure for that to happen. We can focus on humanitarian aid but this isn't going to solve the problem. With regard to the border problem we are coordinating with various other organizations at various levels. One objective is to hold workshops with the popular organizations in the area. There's a lack of understanding. They don't know what's behind this. What the effects are going to be. How to prepare for what's to come. We're training people in conflict resolution and how to confront the effects. We are also working with human rights organizations to document the abuses. There are organizations in Sucumbíos, Carchi, and Esmeraldas. You have to train people to do this.

The other aspect is the international dissemination of information. These will be the three areas of effort, but in coordination with people at the grassroots level who live in the area.

Ronald J. Morgan is a free-lance writer who focuses on Latin America.

This article originally appeared in Colombia Report, an online journal that was published by the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA).

 

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