July 9, 2001

Political Hardliners Seek a Military Solution to the Conflict

by Garry Leech

Over the past few months there has been a flurry of activity by political hardliners to increase the power and influence of the Colombian military in the country's political affairs. Presidential candidate and right-wing extremist Alvaro Uribe has surged to 25 percent in recent polls on a platform of strengthening the military and implementing hard-line policies against rebel insurgents. Two different versions of an anti-terrorism bill that will drastically increase the military's powers in its war against the guerrillas were approved by Colombia's Senate and Lower House and are now being reconciled by a congressional joint committee. Finally, a recently discovered plan formulated by military leaders and hard-line politicians to install a military-civilian junta following next May's presidential elections illustrates just how far Colombia's right-wing extremists are willing to go to preserve the country's social and economic status quo.

Clearly frustrated by President Andrés Pastrana's willingness to negotiate with Colombia's two largest guerrilla groups--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)--political hardliners have begun making moves to undermine the peace process. Presidential candidate Alvaro Uribe's hard-line platform towards the guerrillas has appealed to those Colombians who believe Pastrana has been too lenient with the rebel groups. Uribe has said that if elected he would not conduct peace talks with the FARC unless the rebels first agreed to a cease-fire. Furthermore, his calls for increased military aid to fight the drug war in Colombia are likely to resonate with Washington's drug warriors who would love nothing more than a hard-line ally in Bogotá.

As governor of Antioquia between 1995 and 1997, Uribe formed civilian self-defense groups to work with the security forces against the insurgents. The right-wing candidate recently stated that if elected president he would implement the same policy nationally. It is inevitable that some of these groups would evolve into paramilitary units, which, according to human rights organizations, is exactly what occurred in Antioquia during Uribe's governorship.

Uribe received 25 percent of the vote in a Gallup poll conducted in March. If he were to achieve the same numbers in next year's presidential election, the right-wing extremist would likely garner second or third place and a possible second round run-off. However, it should be noted that the survey in which Uribe polled 25 percent was conducted in major cities where his hard-line platform appeals to many middle and upper class Colombians.

The recent spate of bombings in Colombia's cities has led to the same urban middle and upper class constituents supporting two anti-terrorism bills that were recently approved by the Colombian Senate and the Lower House. A joint committee in the Congress is currently reconciling the differences between the two bills. While both bills turn human rights investigations in conflict zones over to the military, the Senate's version also authorizes the military to temporarily recruit civilians and allows a regional military commander's authority to supersede that of elected officials in conflict zones (see, When Human Rights No Longer Matter).

This increased power for a military that has been the western hemisphere's worst human rights abuser over the past decade will inevitably result in more civilian massacres. The transferring of human rights investigations from the government to the military means the army would not be answerable to anyone but itself.

A recent editorial in one of Colombia's leading daily newspapers, El Espectador, defends the proposed law by comparing Colombia's civil conflict to World War II. The article justifies unleashing the Colombian military against suspected subversives by claiming there was little debate among allied powers "about whether to defeat the Germans at whatever cost, or to disrupt actions in the theatre of operations, arguing that the constitution and laws of the invading country might be violated if the Teutonic invaders were attacked without first meeting certain requisites, or even hunting and capturing the enemy without orders from the appropriate authorities."

The article completely ignores the fact that the Colombian government is not at war with another country and, therefore, the issue of whether or not to abide by the constitution of an invading country is rendered moot. The Colombian state is at war with Colombians and the question raised by the anti-terrorism bill is whether the Colombian government should be required to abide by its own constitution and international human rights laws.

The newspaper also asks: "If we win the war, who will still be criticizing the law that helped us do it? Who will remember the theatres of operations (as we see in the legendary operations of the Second World War)? Who will protest the prevention of murders, ambushes, terrorist acts and kidnappings because one or another delinquent was taken into custody?"

This 'ends justifies the means' argument is more reminiscent of the National Security Doctrine tactics used by the southern cone military dictatorships and the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala during the 1970s and 1980s than of allied nations defending themselves against a foreign invader in World War II. The desperate arguments put forth by El Espectador illustrate the degree to which urban middle and upper class Colombians are feeling threatened by the recent escalation in urban violence and their desire to seek a solution at any cost.

The existence of one such costly solution came to light recently when it was revealed that a plan formulated by several former military leaders and hard-line politicians aims to further empower the armed forces by installing a military-civilian junta in order to implement a project of "national reconstruction."

Liberal Party Senator Luis Velez said the plan, which was presented to him by former military leaders and politicians, calls for the installing of a five-man military-civilian junta consisting of the three top vote-getting candidates in next year's presidential election and two military officers. The plan, which is dated May 2, also calls for the junta to shut down Congress if necessary.

According to Velez, retired General Jose Joaquin Matallana and Conservative Party politician Mario Jaramillo Echeverry support the plan. Matallana used to be secretary to General Rafael Navas, a member of the military junta that ruled Colombia in 1957 prior to the implementation of the National Front.

It is clear that the military and political hardliners, who have been working on this plan for the past two years as a solution to Colombia's civil conflict, know that moderate politicians and the majority of Colombians are unlikely to tolerate a traditional military coup. Therefore, by including the top three finishers in the presidential elections the coup planners are obviously hoping the Colombian people will find the quasi-democratic nature of the junta acceptable.

On the surface it appears the civilians would hold a three-to-two majority over the military members of the junta. But if right-wing extremist Alvaro Uribe were to be among the top three vote-getters in the upcoming election, his presence on the junta would swing the balance of power to the military faction.

The shutting down of Congress would further consolidate power for the hardliners by eliminating any possibility of opposition from elected officials. Such a scenario would drastically diminish Colombia's already limited democracy and result in a military escalation of the conflict that would inevitably target rural Colombians in guerrilla-controlled areas of the country.

Until last week, in spite of rhetoric stating that one of its principal goals in Colombia is to protect democracy, Washington had remained conspicuously silent regarding the recent anti-democratic maneuvers perpetrated by Colombia's hardliners. The proposed anti-terrorism law was not even mentioned in a State Department listing of the topics discussed by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Lee Armitage and Colombian Foreign Minister Guillermo Fernández de Soto during a June 12 meeting.

And it was only after prodding by Massachusetts' Democratic Representative Bill Delahunt in a congressional hearing on June 28 that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, William Brownfield, commented on the proposed law. He claimed the Bush Administration is concerned about some of the contents of Law 81 and that the limitless powers given to commanders of battalions in some zones of the country could be "misinterpreted and generate problems." One can only assume that by "problems" he meant human rights abuses. Even though Brownfield went on to point out that the anti-terrorism legislation is not yet law, it seems apparent that the State Department is doing little to prevent this occurring.

Undoubtedly, the Bush Administration and Washington's drug warriors would love nothing more than increased powers for Colombia's military to wage both the drug and counterinsurgency wars. Consequently, Bush's corporate backers with Colombian business interests (including major campaign contributor Enron Corporation) would be able to obtain the stability their operations require regardless of the consequences for Colombians who live in the rural areas where multinational mining and oil companies operate (see, The Well-Oiled Presidential Campaigns).

The recent and ongoing attempts by military and political hardliners to increase the military's power clearly illustrates that it is not the rebel insurgents who pose an immediate threat to Colombian democracy, it is hard-line politicians and military officials. With the support of the economic elite and many middle and upper class Colombians, these hardliners appear determined to preserve the social and economic status quo at all costs. However, it is clear that poor rural Colombians, who have been the principal victims of the military's counterinsurgency war, will continue to pay those costs.

This article originally appeared in Colombia Report, an online journal that was published by the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA).

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