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November 5, 2001 Losing Sight of Che Ernesto "Che" Guevara once wrote that it is essential for guerrilla groups to gain the support of the people in order for a revolution to succeed. In actuality, it is a lesson the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) learned years before Che wrote about his guerrilla warfare experiences during the Cuban Revolution. However, the FARC's evolution from armed protectors of a victimized rural population to perpetrators of crimes against the same citizenry has diminished the guerrilla group's legitimacy in the eyes of many Colombians and the international community. Furthermore, the FARC's participation in the drug trade and its use of tactics that target the civilian population, such as kidnapping and indiscriminate rocket attacks, have seriously eroded its popular support.
Consequently, both the Sandinistas and the FMLN gained substantial popular support that resulted in a seizure of power in Nicaragua and near victory in El Salvador. But in Colombia, the FARC is far from taking power and appears incapable of organizing a large-scale offensive reminiscent of the FMLN's 1989 assault on their nation's capital, San Salvador. And while it is true that Colombia is much larger than El Salvador, the FARC is fighting a similar-sized U.S.-backed army with four times as many fighters than were in the ranks of the FMLN. The FARC's inability to seriously threaten Colombia's urban power centers is largely a result of the rebels' failure to develop the level of popular support from rural and, more importantly, urban sectors that was enjoyed by the Sandinistas and the FMLN. The principal reason for this lack of widespread support is the FARC's affinity for targeting the civilian population. The FARC's kidnapping for ransom strategy initially targeted the families of drug traffickers and wealthy Colombians, but has since evolved to include the middle-class. The rebels have been widely criticized for using kidnapping, not to serve a political purpose, but simply as a means of funding their insurgency. Meanwhile, the FARC's use of gas cylinders as primitive home-made rockets to target police stations in rural towns often results in substantial collateral damage, including the deaths of many innocent civilians. Such tactics have seriously affected the public's perception of the FARC, making it increasingly difficult to accept claims by guerrilla leaders that they represent the interests of the Colombian people. Throughout the ongoing, but often stalled, peace process the FARC has shown an unwillingness to make serious compromises. However, it became clear last month that the FARC would have to concede something to President Pastrana in order for him to justify renewing the guerrilla group's safe haven. Consequently, the rebels pledged to end mass kidnappings on Colombia's highways (a promise they violated the next day) and to discuss the possibilities of a cease-fire (which was one of the goals of the peace process in the first place).
The FARC's legitimacy has been further damaged by the rebels' abuse of their authority in the zone to implement policies such as the forced HIV testing of citizens in Vistahermosa. The mandatory testing violates the civil rights of local residents, as does the rebel group's decision to expel from the town three individuals it claims tested positive for HIV. The guerrilla group's willingness to profit from the drug trade also undermines its legitimacy in the eyes of many. While FARC leaders claim they are not involved in drug trafficking--that they only tax the drug business in the same manner they tax all economic activity in the regions they control--many in the international community are disturbed by the moral questions that arise from the rebels' close association with this sordid industry. If the FARC is serious about fighting the social injustices so prevalent in Colombia, it has to stop contributing to them. And if the FARC is to have any chance of achieving the political, social and economic goals it claims to be fighting for, then its leaders need to revisit Che Guevara's revolutionary experiences. When Che and Fidel Castro obtained a substantial amount of popular support, which occurred towards the end of the Cuban revolutionary struggle, then victory became possible. However, when the local population becomes apathetic or antagonistic towards a guerrilla movement, as is currently occurring in Colombia and was the case for Che in Bolivia, then failure is virtually inevitable. This article originally appeared in Colombia Report, an online journal that was published by the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA).
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While
the FARC does not match Peru's Shining Path guerrillas and Colombia's
paramilitary groups for the levels of brutality perpetrated against
the rural population, it also has not attained the romantic revolutionary
status that was accorded Nicaragua's Sandinistas and El Salvador's
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) by many
in the international community during the 1970s and 1980s. Although
the Sandinistas and the FMLN targeted their respective nations'
infrastructure during their revolutionary struggles, for the most
part, they refrained from conducting attacks against the civilian
population. Furthermore, neither movement was seriously tainted
by involvement in the drug trade, nor did they resort to kidnapping
thousands of their fellow citizens.
Shortly
after Pastrana announced the zone's renewal, the FARC again withdrew
from the peace talks citing increased army activity around the zone's
perimeters and continued paramilitary violence against the civilian
population. While the FARC's request that the government crackdown
on paramilitary groups is legitimate, its demand that the Colombian
army relax its control of territory surrounding the rebel enclave
is, in light of continued rebel attacks against the military and
civilians outside the zone, utterly unreasonable and hypocritical.