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Contested
Country
An Examination of Current Propaganda
Techniques in the Colombian Civil War
Report
prepared by Eric Fichtl, August 2005
Introduction
What is Propaganda?
Main Participants in the Conflict
An Analysis of Selected Forms of
Rural Propaganda
Conclusion
Introduction
Colombia’s civil war has spanned more than four decades.
Its roots lie in the incomplete project of creating the Colombian
state after the 19th Century defeat of Spanish colonialism, and
in the 20th Century political rivalries of two elite political parties
whose increasingly violent internecine feuds—referred to simply
as la Violencia—ignored the backwardness and socioeconomic
marginalization of Colombia’s rural poor, for whom the state
was largely a distant abstraction only occasionally visited upon
them. Colombia’s government has never controlled all of the
Colombian territory, in part due to the country’s rugged geography
of soaring Andean mountain ranges and dense Amazonian jungles.
In addition to the local and national dynamics of struggles over
power, land, and wealth distribution, the Colombian civil war’s
longevity has imbued the conflict with characteristics of the paradigmatic
shifts in the hemispheric and global order, from Cold War rivalries
between Communism and Capitalism, through the U.S.-led “war
on drugs” and neoliberal globalization, to the present organizing
principle of the “war on terror.” During the sweep of
Colombia’s long war, revolutionary forces have rallied, fought,
and disbanded, while other actors have become entrenched in the
fight for the long haul.1
Precisely because the Colombian conflict has continued unabated
throughout these shifts, it has become a hybrid of ideological battlefields,
creating a rich environment for propaganda. For instance, by targeting
just one of the country’s leftist guerrilla groups, the Colombian
state can simultaneously claim to fight Communism, drugs, and terror
while furthering its state-building project. Needless to say, such
situations are rare in the world today.
While the Colombian state and security forces—and to a lesser
extent the illegal armed groups—have a broad array of propaganda
tools and techniques at their disposal, the underdeveloped infrastructure
and isolation of huge swaths of Colombia’s rural hinterlands,
where much of the conflict is being fought, does not lend itself
to sophisticated propaganda. Thus, while remaining feasible propaganda
strategies for urban areas, tools such as websites and televisions
have limited reach in rural areas where electricity and telephone
lines are either inexistent or frequent targets of insurgent attacks.
Similarly, any propaganda transmitted through newspapers and magazines
does not project far from the urban seats of the media outlets that
publish such periodicals, especially in light of widespread illiteracy
and the marginal profitability and risk involved with transiting
print media into the rural sector.
As a result, waging effective propaganda in Colombia’s rural
conflict zones has required the development and implementation of
more direct, on-the-ground techniques. While all the armed actors
use propaganda and obtain collateral propagandistic results from
their actions, in recent years the Colombian state and security
forces have deployed the most elaborate propaganda campaigns in
the rural sector, and have consequently been the most effective
actors at conveying their message. This study analyzes the propaganda
techniques currently being used by various armed actors in Colombia’s
rural regions, with particular emphasis on state techniques.
My primary focus is neither the content of these various actors’
messages, nor the relative merits of these groups’ ideologies
or activities. Rather, my analysis specifically focuses on the means
by which their messages are transmitted; I hope to return to the
content of the groups’ messages in future research. Much of
my analysis is based on my first-hand observation in two of Colombia’s
primary rural conflict zones: the eastern department of Arauca (June
2003) and the southern department of Caquetá (February 2004).
In both areas, I visited rural towns and villages where Colombian
state forces were in the process of consolidating control after
dislodging guerrilla forces that had long held sway in these areas.2
While there are undoubtedly regional variations and nuances, I submit
that the techniques outlined in this analysis are echoed and employed
throughout much of the country. I have also drawn on relevant academic
analysis and media reports throughout my examination.
What
is Propaganda?
In modern society, the term “propaganda” immediately
elicits feelings of suspicion, distrust, or manipulation by powerful
interests. As historian Philip Taylor demonstrates, this negative
perception of propaganda is a relatively recent phenomenon: “[B]efore
1914, propaganda simply meant the means by which the converted attempted
to persuade the unconverted.”3
Pejorative connotations of the term, Taylor argues, came about during
the First World War, when “atrocity propaganda” began
to be applied in a calculated, almost scientific manner in order
to provoke predictable emotional responses from the wartime public.4
Taylor suggests that “It is when propaganda is employed in
the service of violence, however, that we begin to mistrust it,
because it encourages people to kill people, or to acquiesce in
that slaughter.”5
Despite its openness to abuse, Taylor argues that propaganda is
a neutral process, defining it as “the deliberate
attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired
way.”6 He adds
that, “what distinguishes propaganda from all other processes
of persuasion is the question of intent.”7
Sociologist Jacques Ellul, whose scientific study of propaganda
informs most other explorations of the topic, points out that analyzing
propaganda is difficult, since it is regarded by most as an “evil”
and because it is generally a secretive action.8
Ellul’s broad definition of propaganda identifies four core
components:
- Psychological action: The propagandist seeks to modify
opinions by purely psychological means; most often he pursues
a semi-educative objective and addresses himself to his fellow
citizens.
- Psychological warfare: Here the propagandist is dealing
with a foreign adversary whose morale he seeks to destroy by psychological
means so that he begins to doubt the validity of his beliefs and
actions.
- Re-education and brainwashing: Complex methods of
transforming an adversary into an ally which can be used only
on prisoners.
- Public and human relations: These must necessarily
be included in propaganda… because they seek to adapt the
individual to a society, to a living standard, to an activity.
They serve to make him conform, which is the aim of all propaganda.9
More narrowly, Ellul defines propaganda as “techniques of
psychological influence combined with techniques of organization
and the envelopment of people with the intention of sparking action.”10
Ellul emphasizes that “Propaganda must be total. The propagandist
must utilize all of the technical means at his disposal…”11
In this regard, Ellul echoes another influential analyst (and a
practitioner) of propaganda, Edward Bernays.
Bernays served in the U.S. government’s Committee for Public
Information during the First World War, and later, his contributions
to the business of molding public opinion earned him the moniker
“the father of public relations.” In his 1928 book,
Propaganda, Bernays noted the negative connotations of
the word “propaganda,” calling it “the executive
arm of the invisible government.” Power dynamics aside, Bernays’
definition is quite simple: “The mechanism by which ideas
are disseminated on a large scale is propaganda, in the broad sense
of an organized effort to spread a particular belief or doctrine.”12
Like Ellul, Bernays stressed the totality of propaganda: “There
is no means of human communication which may not also be a means
of deliberate propaganda… The important point to the propagandist
is that the relative value of the various instruments of propaganda,
and their relation to the masses, are constantly changing.”13
Bernays’ point is an important one. Just about anything can
serve as propaganda, but some techniques and methods are more effective
than others. In the intense and unpredictable environment of low-intensity
conflict like Colombia’s, where the competing sides seek to
win over the “hearts and minds” of an embattled and
encircled public, effective propagandists must adapt to changing
circumstances and deploy only the techniques that yield worthwhile
returns in terms of public opinion.
In all these definitions and analyses, propaganda is examined almost
clinically. Judgments on the morals and ethics are left aside. I
happen to disagree with Taylor’s assertion that propaganda
is neutral, since the message is very much the purpose of propaganda,
and the message cannot be neutral. However, I mostly concur with
Taylor’s position that “propaganda analysis demands
objectivity if it is to be undertaken effectively.”14
In the interests of furthering our understanding of propaganda in
Colombia, this short study focuses on the methods employed, leaving
aside most value judgments. Further research would reveal the extent
to which the propaganda message of the various parties in Colombia’s
conflict are valid, truthful, erroneous, or deceptive. Perhaps it
is worth recalling the words of a man whose very name has become
synonymous with concerns about propaganda and the perversion of
power, George Orwell, who shrewdly observed, “All propaganda
lies even when it tells the truth.”15
Main
Participants in the Conflict
Before analyzing some of the propaganda methods currently used
in Colombia, a brief introduction to the key national players in
the Colombian civil war is necessary. The Colombian state and security
forces are headed by the president, Alvaro Uribe Vélez. Uribe,
a former governor of the relatively affluent Antioquia department,
won a landslide victory in 2002 by running on an unassailable promise
of “security with democracy” and “security for
all Colombians.”16
Uribe’s predecessor, Andres Pastrana, had overseen collapsed
peace talks with the country’s largest insurgency, and by
2002 the electorate, alarmed by rising violence (some of it attributable
to the state itself), was ready for a hard-line approach. While
Uribe has delivered the hard-line approach by ramping up military
campaigns, security remains elusive in Colombia, as is evidenced
by continued displacement and violence. Uribe has also demonstrated
authoritarian tendencies, such as his decision to create special
zones where elected civilian officials were replaced by unelected
military leaders.17 Bookish
in appearance, Uribe is a tireless campaigner, crisscrossing Colombia
for public appearances that have long hinted at his desire to serve
a second consecutive term as president, despite constitutional constraints
on doing so. Polls suggest Uribe has maintained an approval rating
of approximately 70 percent.
The Colombian military and national police are the main branches
of the state security forces, and are both administered by the Ministry
of Defense. The national police are chiefly responsible for maintaining
order in cities and towns, as well as on some roads. They also oversee
much of the state’s anti-narcotics activities. Owing to the
all encompassing nature of the civil war in Colombia, the national
police are also well-armed; in the rural sector, they frequently
reside in sandbagged barracks. The Colombian military (predominantly
the army) plays a significant role in enforcing security, especially
in the rural sector. The military is also responsible for the bulk
of the state’s counterinsurgency activities, and has targeted
the country’s leftwing guerrilla forces relentlessly. The
military has had an inconsistent position on fighting the rightwing
paramilitaries, which it helped set up in the 1980s (when militias
were legally permitted extra-state security organs).
Hounded by implications of collusion with the since-outlawed paramilitaries
and charges of involvement in human rights abuses, the military
has recently begun to target the paramilitaries, though not yet
with anything near the intensity aimed at the guerrillas. The recipient
of substantial U.S. military aid, training, and logistical support,
the Colombian military is large (with some 180,000 troops in the
army alone) and formidably armed. Since 2003, the military has reinvigorated
its campaign to conquer guerrilla-held regions of the countryside—estimated
to be 40 percent of the total area of Colombia—under a major
new offensive dubbed Plan Patriota.
Originally formed in the 1980s at the behest of large landholders,
local politicos, and drug cartel members threatened by guerrilla
kidnapping campaigns, Colombia’s rightwing paramilitaries
initially served as private—and legally recognized—security
forces. They frequently worked with the logistical support and the
active participation of the Colombian military, carrying out an
increasingly aggressive “social cleansing” campaign
against suspected guerrillas and their alleged supporters. Although
outlawed in 1989, the paramilitaries continued their activities,
often with collusion from members of the Colombian state security
forces. In 1997, Colombia’s disparate paramilitary forces
unified in a loose umbrella organization, the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC), and soon expanded to become a major fighting
force with a nationwide presence.
The AUC gained notoriety in the late 1990s for a string of massacres,
before switching tactics to one-off assassinations in order to minimize
negative publicity. Its continued violence and its heavy involvement
in the drug trade have put the AUC in the sights of the Colombian
state, though factions of the military continue to value the AUC’s
ability to carry out desired actions “off the record.”
Funded largely by payments from affluent allies and its involvement
in the drug trade, the AUC is presently engaged in a (partially
observed) cease-fire and seeks amnesty through negotiations with
the Colombian government. Many view demobilization of the AUC’s
approximately 18,000 fighters as a precursor to the group’s
emergence as a political party. The U.S. State Department holds
the AUC responsible for 70 percent of Colombia’s human rights
abuses, and added the group to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations
in 2001.
Founded in 1964, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
came out of various peasant militias that had sought to protect
themselves from the violent clashes of the two elite political parties
during the Violencia period of the late 1940s and 1950s.
Soon after its birth, the FARC established fronts in rural sectors
throughout the country, implemented agrarian reforms, and adopted
a Communist revolutionary project. Its strength concentrated in
impoverished rural areas, the FARC got involved in the drug trade
in the late 1970s, levying taxes on coca crops grown by peasants
in regions it controls. Aside from its “war tax” on
drugs, the FARC funds itself through extortion and kidnapping for
ransom, tactics that have cost it most of the support it once enjoyed
among segments of the Colombian public that thought the FARC might
emerge as a progressive political party should peace negotiations
ever prove successful.
The FARC has also built a militia presence in urban areas, and
is capable of raids and ambushes in most areas of the country, especially
along inter-city roads; meanwhile, its urban bombings and use of
crude gas cylinder projectiles have drawn it considerable scorn.
The FARC has been involved in several peace negotiations, including
a mid 1980s period when it formed a political party that was subsequently
decimated by assassinations. Its most recent peace negotiations
(1998-2002) included the state’s recognition of a cease-fire
zone under FARC control in the southern Caquetá department;
the principal towns of the zone were overrun by state forces after
the collapse of the peace talks. The FARC remains a potent force
of some 18,000 fighters with operational capacity throughout Colombia,
and has shown a propensity for patiently awaiting opportune moments
to launch renewed attacks. The U.S. State Department placed the
FARC on its inaugural Foreign Terrorist List in 1997.
Inspired by the Cuban Revolution and Catholic Liberation Theology,
the National Liberation Army (ELN) is a smaller leftwing guerrilla
group founded in 1964 by radical university students and later joined
by several Catholic priests. It has a Communist revolutionary platform
and is concentrated in rural areas in the northern half of the country.
The ELN has funded itself through kidnapping and extortion, avoiding
the drug trade on ethical grounds. The ELN has sometimes allied
with the FARC, but tends to pursue its own line. With about 4,000
active combatants, the ELN’s relatively limited role in the
conflict is nonetheless amplified by the havoc it has wreaked on
the country’s petroleum sector through repeated bombings of
oil infrastructure; oil is Colombia’s top licit export. The
ELN has been seeking a negotiated end to hostilities for several
years, to little avail. The U.S. State Department has listed the
ELN as a Foreign Terrorist organization since 1997.
No list of participants in Colombia’s civil war would be
complete without mentioning the Colombian public. Caught between
the ideological extremes of the armed actors outlined above, the
Colombian people are the main victims of the conflict. In addition
to the war-related deaths of some 3,000 civilians per year, over
2.5 million Colombians have been forcibly displaced by the violence
and insecurity since 1996.18
Compounding this social upheaval is the economic disaster in which
55 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.19
An overwhelmingly young country, most of Colombia’s population
has never experienced peace.20
In the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Colombian public,
all manner of propaganda have been deployed. Though my analysis
focuses largely on propaganda in Colombia’s rural sector,
I begin with a discussion of two passive forms of propaganda used
by all the armed actors: colors and websites.
National
Colors
In the context of a complex civil war, the national colors—yellow,
blue, and red—have been adopted by armed actors on all sides
of the conflict, while drab green military uniforms are worn by
not just the state army, but its police, their sometime allies in
the rightwing paramilitaries, and the two largest leftwing guerrilla
insurgencies (combatants of the latter three also routinely dress
in civilian clothing due to their status as illegal armed groups
and in order to blend in with the population at large).
The Colombian
flag is a horizontal tricolor topped by a broad yellow band, then
a narrower blue band, then a red band equal in size to the blue
one. It goes without saying that state agencies and security forces
incorporate the flag and national colors in their seals, symbols,
uniforms, and insignia. More interesting are the varied uses of
the national colors by the other armed groups.
The AUC uses the state flag and national colors in its uniforms
and symbols; uniformed AUC fighters tend to wear armbands with the
acronym of their particular paramilitary bloc in white letters on
a black field, with small patches of the national flag sewn to their
upper sleeves. The FARC also uses the national colors in its insignia,
and has designed a revolutionary flag that superimposes a black-outlined,
white-field in the shape of the Colombian territory over the standard
national flag; a depiction of two black rifles form an X in the
center of the state outline. When in their full dress uniform, FARC
guerrillas also wear armbands featuring the Colombian national colors.
The ELN uses the classic Marxist revolutionary colors of red and
black in most of their symbols, often eschewing the national colors;
uniformed ELN combatants wear unmarked black balaclavas or hoods,
or sometimes black and red handkerchief masks and similar armbands
with the group’s acronym written in white letters; the handkerchief
mask is a variant of the ELN’s revolutionary flag, a horizontal
bicolor topped by a red band then a black band, with a white “ELN”
centered in the field.
The use of the national colors by all sides (with the general exception
of the ELN) reflects the conflict’s status as a civil war
where Colombia itself is ostensibly at stake. Moreover, Colombia’s
national colors date back to the independence struggle against the
Spanish Crown, when a member of Simon Bolivar’s liberation
army designed a yellow, blue, and red tricolor.21
Since all parties in Colombia’s conflict hold Bolívar
and the independence struggle in a positive light, there is no contradiction
in all sides adopting the national colors.
Websites
All of Colombia’s armed actors have launched websites.22
As alluded to earlier, the websites of the armed groups are not
particularly useful propaganda tools in the infrastructure-poor
rural areas of Colombia. Internet access is sporadic or altogether
nonexistent in rural areas. But in a climate where Colombian journalists
run tremendous risks entering rural areas and encountering representatives
of the illegal armed groups, websites have emerged as an important
conduit for the transmission of information not just to the internet-surfing
public, but also to media organizations.
The websites of the Colombian President and the state security
forces, in addition to hosting sub-sections on laws, organizational
structure, statistics on various themes, and biographical profiles
of key officials, are also designed to supply very frequent updates
by conveying a steady stream of official press releases. The President’s
website, for instance, prominently displays a daily photo of Uribe’s
latest speaking engagements alongside core passages of his speeches
and links to audio excerpts. The site also highlights government-prepared
filings on topics like crime levels and new policy initiatives.
The website of the national police runs releases on the latest
crimes broken up and criminals captured—arrested drug processors,
seized cocaine, captured counterfeit materials—and stories
highlighting public order activities—police protection of
bridges or schools, or rescues of kidnap victims. The army’s
website presents a gung-ho face, frequently displaying images of
killed or captured enemy combatants under headlines such as, for
example, “Two FARC Terrorists Out of Battle in Antioquia.”
Accompanying stories by press units in the various brigades reveal
the details of how the fighters were felled and what they were carrying
when they died (more on this point later). The military’s
site also has prominent links to sections on its humanitarian programs
and respect for human rights; in comparison with U.S. military websites,
recruitment is not emphasized because Colombia has conscription.
The websites of the illegal armed groups are neither as dynamic
nor as flashy as those of the official organs of state, but they
do communicate many of the same core points: political position
statements, press releases, and information about the history and
organization of the groups. The AUC’s website features releases,
editorials, commentaries on topics like political economy and human
rights, and even an mp3 of the AUC anthem. There are also links
to the websites of the various blocs that make up the AUC; all AUC-affiliated
sites share a “newsy”, text-heavy look that downplays
the militancy of the organization (though this may be a function
of the ongoing negotiations with the government, as before the talks
AUC sites featured anti-guerrilla comics and online games, too).
The FARC’s streamlined website conveys communiqués,
interviews, open letters, and releases, with sub-sections about
topics like the participation of women and students. The FARC site
also publishes the group’s legal codes. The FARC has spent
more energy than other groups attempting to make (parts of) its
site multilingual, perhaps a reflection of its attempts to counter
the almost uniformly negative press coverage it receives within
and outside of Colombia. The ELN’s site is the most basic
in design terms, but contains the requisite communiqués,
press releases, and interviews with ELN leaders. It is set up as
an online magazine called Insurrección, volumes
of which can be viewed in HTML or downloaded in PDF or Microsoft
Word formats.
These websites are admittedly a passive form of propaganda for
the bulk of the population, in that they require a visitor to actively
engage them, rather than the other way around. However, by providing
frequent updates on the conflict, the websites serve a propaganda
purpose by transmitting the armed groups’ official information;
Ellul would most likely consider them a form of psychological action
propaganda, based on their attempts to address and “educate”
the public at large.
Information published on these groups’ websites—especially
those of the state bodies—is often picked up by information-starved
media outlets. As Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky have pointed out,
government “bureaucracies turn out a large volume of material
that meets the demands of news organizations for reliable, scheduled
flows.” Moreover, government sources “also have the
great merit of being recognizable and credible by their status and
prestige.”23 This
prestige factor, combined with the high frequency with which the
state and security forces’ websites are updated, ensures them
primacy in the press over the information transmitted via the websites
of the illegal armed groups.
An
Analysis of Selected Forms of Rural Propaganda
Earlier, I pointed out that the underdevelopment of Colombia’s
rural sector has necessitated a hands-on approach to propaganda
in these areas. Inadequate infrastructure aside, it must be noted
that Colombia’s rural regions are absolutely central to the
state’s economic development model. Colombia’s four
largest exports—illicit coca, and licit petroleum, coal and
coffee—are all produced in rural areas. Ranching, agriculture,
and mining—all crucial to the Colombian economy—are
likewise predominantly rural activities. The economic importance
of Colombia’s rural sector has meant that the countryside
has been the frequent site of armed confrontation in the civil war.
Much of the violence and most of the displacement in Colombia occurs
in small rural towns and villages where the Colombian state has
historically had a weak presence, if it was present at all, and
where distrust of the central government in distant Bogotá
runs deep.24 With this
contextualization in mind, I now turn to a discussion of some of
the propaganda techniques currently being used in Colombia’s
rural sector.
Graffiti
Graffiti is a mild form of propaganda employed particularly by
the illegal armed groups. Commonly used in cities, graffiti finds
its way into the rural sector in a variety of ways. In rural towns
and villages, buildings and objects are often tagged with the name
and perhaps a slogan of the armed group (or the bloc/front of the
group) that controls a given area. In contested towns,
graffiti marks can serve as territorial demarcation lines much like
the tags used by U.S. urban gangs. Rural armed groups also graffiti
vehicles, which become mobile symbols of the tagging group’s
presence or power, especially if the vehicle then crosses lines
and penetrates enemy territory. While undoubtedly awkward—and
potentially dangerous—for the drivers of such vehicles, graffiti
on vehicles—or on buildings—is not a particularly effective
or action-inducing form of propaganda.
A variant on graffiti is the mural. Typically painted on the exterior
walls of buildings, murals are favored by the guerrillas, who draw
inspiration from Latin America’s long history of leftwing
political murals (Che Guevara’s portrait is a popular image).
The military has painted over guerrilla murals and graffiti with
its own artwork; one reporter witnessed soldiers on patrol in an
ELN-controlled barrio in Saravena, Arauca paint a sunny day mural
over ELN tags.25
Threats
Threats—transmitted by word-of-mouth or through other communiqués—serve
an obvious propaganda purpose in Colombia’s conflict. Usually
directed at civilians, threats are an extreme form of psychological
warfare (as Ellul defines it), since they seek to break the morale
of “enemy” forces. Simply put, threats are an expression
of a particular armed group’s displeasure or distrust of the
threat recipient(s), and serve as signals to individuals to either
change behavior or suffer the invariably harsh consequences. Typically,
threats brand the recipient as a collaborator or sympathizer—or
even an active member—of the sending group’s enemy.
For example, a threat faxed to the mayor of Tame, Arauca, by a FARC
unit identified him and other local government officials, medical
personnel, ranchers, and others by name as “military
targets,” branding these individuals as “narcoparamilitaries
infiltrated among a poor people seeking a way to live in a dignified
manner.”26 Threats
are a relatively localized form of propaganda employed by the armed
groups, and their impact is limited; however, if threats are acted
upon in the form of disappearances, killings, and massacres, they
take on a significantly more pronounced propaganda purpose.
Disappearances,
Killings and Massacres
Well-documented reports show that all of Colombia’s
armed actors—the state forces as well as the illegal armed
groups—have committed and continue to commit killings and
massacres of innocent civilians.27
(A massacre is defined as the simultaneous slaughter of three or
more people in the same place and for the same reason. Disappearances—often
an intermediary status for before the victim turns up dead—are
quite similar in effect, and are not analyzed in detail here, except
to note that they generate their own acute agony for close relations
of the victims, who often do not know their loved one’s fate
for extended periods of time.) While deliberate, targeted killings
and massacres of civilians are a reprehensible aspect of Colombia’s
civil war, it is exceedingly clear that these actions serve a propaganda
purpose to the groups that commit them.
Without doubt, massacres and killings serve militarily strategic
purposes—however shameless or hollow—beyond mere propaganda:
they eliminate alleged enemies or collaborators, they prompt displacement
which clears territory for the expansion of elite interests, they
carry out “justice” (ajusticiar, to bring justice,
is a Colombian colloquial synonym of asesinar, to murder),
they show a group’s ability to match its enemy’s ferocity
quid pro quo, and so on.28
But in propaganda terms, the foremost purpose of killings and massacres
is to send a sharp message to survivors—relatives, acquaintances,
neighbors, even entire villages—that the armed actors can
and quite possibly will strike with unrestrained severity.
Considering the fact that the vast majority of killings and massacres
go unpunished in Colombia, the impunity of the killers only serves
to reinforce the original message; not only are victims ruthlessly
slaughtered, but their killers remain at large, and probably nearby.
Though Ellul might be uncomfortable with categorizing them as such,
I believe that, in the context of Colombia’s war, massacres
and killings essentially function as a most extreme and crude form
of psychological warfare; as a technique of propaganda, they certainly
bring new meaning to Bernays’ observation that “[t]here
is no means of human communication which may not also be a means
of deliberate propaganda….”29
This point warrants further exploration, but essentially, the message
is simply one of power relations—the killers have power, and
victims and survivors are powerless.
As researcher Robin Kirk has noted, for several decades Colombia
has “spoken” in a perverse vocabulary, the language
of killing and post-mortem mutilation. There is no stronger evidence
of the propagandistic use of killings and massacres than the various
mutilations developed less to harm victims themselves than to haunt
surviving witnesses of the carnage. The notorious Colombian necktie,
in which the victim’s tongue is pulled through a deep cut
beneath the jaw and left dangling on the chest, or the flower vase
cut, in which the victim’s dismembered limbs and decapitated
head are stuffed into the stump of the neck, both gained prominence
during la Violencia and remain in the vocabulary of the
armed groups, particularly the paramilitaries.
In more recent years, victims’ genitalia have been stuffed
in their mouths, pregnant women have had their fetuses cut from
their wombs, and large groups of civilians have been hacked or cut
apart by machetes and chainsaws. Sometimes, bodies were then arranged
for maximum visual effect. In Kirk’s words, “The point,
of course, was not just to kill, but to communicate. The blood-splattered
tableau mort was meant to demonstrate that there were absolutely
no limits to what would be done.”30
This orgy of violence inverts the concept of “atrocity propaganda”
common to the arsenal of the propagandist who, seeking to build
the cause for war, stirs the emotions of his people with lurid descriptions
of atrocities committed by the enemy.31
In Colombia, while massacres and killings have certainly backfired
as a form of propaganda, the atrocity has also been used as a means
of communicating a group’s “sincerity” and strength.
The AUC built its fierce reputation largely on its persistent commission
of—and claims of responsibility for—massacres. Only
after it had achieved its desired level of prominence and political
leverage did the AUC shift away from massacres in favor of targeted,
one-off killings that draw much less media coverage and public scrutiny.32
State forces are understandably hesitant to overtly use massacres
for propaganda purposes in the manner of the AUC, but have found
ways to make the dead talk: its victims, sometimes dressed post-mortem
in fatigues, are routinely presented to public eyes as “guerrillas
killed in combat.”33
The FARC has not missed out on the medium of massacres, either.
In addition to rural killings, on Inauguration Day 2002, the FARC
launched several of its notoriously inaccurate gas cylinder missiles
over the skies of Bogotá. It knew full well the chances of
killing the new president or other top officials were slim to none,
but nonetheless took the opportunity to demonstrate its ability
to strike at the heart of the Colombian state, killing at least
14 people in poor outlying areas where the projectiles landed.
In recent years, the bluntness of the massacre has been increasingly
discarded in favor of targeted assassinations, but even in single
killings, the overall effect remains the same.
The
State’s Rural Counterinsurgency Propaganda
As mentioned earlier, the state and its security forces are the
most effective propagandists in Colombia. The Colombian Army, in
particular, has become well-versed in the vocabulary of psychological
operations, or psy-ops—partially as a result of its training
by U.S. Special Forces detachments in Colombia and at the U.S. Army’s
School of the Americas (renamed in 2000, in a psy-op of its own,
as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation). As
the state forces enter and occupy regions of rural Colombia long
under the sway of the guerrillas, they are deploying a “hearts
and minds” propaganda campaign that relies more on human interaction
than on high-tech tools. At the same time, state authorities collect
images and information about their successes, which are then passed
to the national media for transmission to the Colombian public.
The following sections detail some of the key techniques of the
state’s rural counterinsurgency propaganda, as I witnessed
during the army’s Operación Nuevo Año in the
southern department of Caquetá—long a FARC stronghold—in
February 2004.
It is important to note that rural Colombians have tended to adjust
to life under a given armed group as long as that group remained
the unchallenged authority in a given region; it is at the point
when regions are contested that violence—and displacement—surge.34
Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the Colombian military’s
successful seizure of a town or village once held by the guerrillas,
much of the population of that community will flee; they do so either
out of fear of reprisals from the conquering state forces (frequently
accompanied by the arrival of the AUC) or because they are forced
to leave by the guerrillas. But since the Colombian military’s
overriding mission in guerrilla-controlled areas is ultimately one
of state-building, the state forces begin immediate efforts to “cleanse”
the scene and coax back the residents, if possible.
Clean-Up
and Coverage
Once a conquered town is secured, alleged members of the guerrillas
captured during the fighting are photographed and detained.35
As some soldiers search for bombs or other booby traps, other soldiers
or members of the Colombian state intelligence agency, the Administrative
Department of Security (DAS), interview any remaining residents
and take videos
and photographs of the surroundings, including battle damage and
any dead enemy combatants. Invariably, enemy weapons or war materiel
captured by the state forces are sorted and arranged for photographs
with jocular soldiers standing guard over the rows of bullets, two-way
radios, pistols, and other war booty. Soldiers frequently pose with
the corpses of killed enemy combatants, too. Within a short time,
selected images are incorporated into official press releases that
include hyper-detailed accounts of all seized materials and captured
or killed enemy combatants.36
These are soon passed to members of the Colombian and international
press.
Within weeks, if security conditions hold, the army may arrange
press junkets, flying or driving in selected members of the press
to inspect the cleansed town. For example, the army captured La
Unión Peneya, Caquetá on 4 January 2004; on 25 January
a first-hand write-up of the town appeared on page A-14 of the Washington
Post, a Colprensa story including army photos hit
Colombian papers the same week, and an English-language Associated
Press story followed a few days later.37
Independent reporting is not helped by the generalized hostility
of the armed actors toward the press, and Colombian journalists
in particular have been ruthlessly targeted by the various sides
in the conflict. Colombia routinely ranks as one of the most dangerous
countries in the world for journalists, and often the only way for
reporters to gain access to conflict zones is with a military escort.
This de facto embedding of the press corps offers the state considerable
influence on what stories get reported and how. As the editor-in-chief
of El Tiempo, Colombia’s leading daily, told the
BBC, “To move in these regions we have to ask permission from
the army. You go in as a group and you try to do your job. You even
have to confront the armed groups to say ‘Are you going to
let us do our job?’ It is always risky. You never know what
is going to happen.”38
While
the press is correct to follow such stories through whatever channels
possible, over-reliance on the military for access to conflict zones,
and on official sources for details about combat operations, gives
press coverage of Colombia’s war an unmistakably state-leaning
bent; it grants the state what Herman and Chomsky, in their critique
of mass media, have called a “filter,” an opportunity
to frame perceptions.39
This, in turn, necessarily serves the propaganda needs of the state,
fostering an image—however selective and subjective—of
persistent progress in its counterinsurgency effort. It bears repeating
that photos of confident-looking Colombian soldiers standing guard
over dead guerrilla fighters covered by sheets, with captured equipment
arranged by the corpses, are a mainstay in official propaganda,
and the Colombian press is not squeamish about presenting such images.
Hearts
and Minds
Aside from taking careful steps to document its victories and project
them to the Colombian public at large, as the state forces consolidate
their grip, they build up a security presence by stationing extra
police and military units in town. The army refers to this process
as “Integrated Action.” An army officer in charge of
coordinating these activities in Tame, Arauca, explained, “The
specific mission converges in two areas. One is the military presence…
including attacking the illegal groups, be they guerrillas, self-defense
groups, or militias in the town center, and also narcotraffickers…
Aside from our military operations, we also have to work on psychological
operations. These essentially say to the community, ‘We must
invest in security in order to have social progress, because without
security no one invests.’”40
In another article, I have analyzed the aforementioned security
measures.41
Below, I detail several of the psy-ops the military uses to build
support among the local populations of towns and villages they have
recently taken over. These various techniques correspond to two
forms of propaganda as described by Ellul: psychological action
which aims to alter public opinion through more and less subtle
didactic measures, and also public or human relations, which seek
the people’s integration into, and acculturation to the presence
of, the state.42
Early in the process, the army creates and broadcasts (often via
its own stations) radio spots encouraging recently displaced residents
to return to their homes. Radio is perhaps the only mass media technology
with any reach in rural areas, since battery-powered radios are
commonplace. These short announcements, backed by peppy military
brass music, sound an optimistic tone as they deliver a message
emphasizing the shared struggle for peace and security—a ubiquitous
theme in state propaganda.
Radio
spots, posters, flyers, and other materials are also aimed at members
of the illegal armed groups. In addition to winning over local civilians,
the state forces actively seek to provoke the desertion of enemy
combatants; Ellul refers to this strategy as psychological warfare.
State authorities offer a long list of enticements—for example,
help reunifying with family members, job training, cooking kits,
cash in exchange for trading in weapons—to guerrillas or paramilitaries
willing to desert. While attrition rates seem to be on the rise
as a result of these efforts, continued rural violence, displacement,
and economic disparity also make useful recruitment propaganda for
the illegal armed groups; many would-be deserters from the guerrillas
and paramilitaries also lack confidence in the state’s ability
to protect them from their former comrades in arms.
While
attempting to sway deserters, the military also works to fosters
a sense of “the helping hand of the state” by offering
food handouts and setting up tents where local residents can visit
military doctors or get free haircuts. Soldiers chum around and
smile with the locals, building up relationships on a personal level
as they try to deflate the tension residents feel in the aftermath
of conflict flare-ups so close to home. A military band may be brought
in, while soldiers dressed as cartoon characters entertain the children.
One of the Colombian state’s most explicit, and more interesting,
psychological operations is its attempt to appeal to the hearts
and minds of children in rural conflict zones. As Philip Taylor
notes, “Although much modern propaganda appeals to reason,
it is more usually felt to play on emotion, with the young being
particularly vulnerable to such emotional manipulation.”43
In the army’s Soldier for a Day program, area youngsters are
shuttled to local army bases where they are exposed to propagandistic
indoctrination disguised as fun treats and activities.44
These “soldiers for a day,” as young as five-years-old,
get to swim in the base’s pool, ride on armored personnel
carriers, and wear camouflage headbands and face paint. At they
same time, soldiers dressed as clowns dole out candy
as army psychologists encourage the children to speak openly about
any people they know or suspect to be guerrillas. Similar activities
have been brought to the streets of contested neighborhoods in rural
towns, with machine gun-toting soldiers escorting soldiers armed
with sacks of candy and dressed as clowns as they go door to door
seeking to “befriend” local children. In the towns of
Colombia’s war-torn rural sector, it is undoubtedly the case
that some of these children do have relatives who are supporters
or even members of the army’s enemies.
While the army’s tactics toward children may yield useful
bits of actionable intelligence, they also play on the innocence
of children in a repugnant manner. The propaganda value of these
techniques is also questionable, as the experience of children socializing
with soldiers they may otherwise fear could clearly be off-putting.
However, the Colombian military evidently feels that the children’s
association of candy, clowns, and soldiers may yield long-term loyalty
in regions where local residents began to interact with state authority
only recently.
Conclusion
A recurrent theme in the definitions of propaganda put forth by
Taylor, Ellul, and Bernays is the issue of intent. In Colombia’s
intractable war, intent is not always clearly discernible. The goals
of the guerrillas, the project of the paramilitaries, and the policies
of the state have been warped, diluted, and reoriented over the
decades of war; at times, the swirl of violence exposes inconsistencies
too obvious to ignore: Can a massacre win support for the perpetrators?
Can the military be allies with and enemies of the paramilitaries
at the same time? Can kidnappers create a just society? Is the route
to peace through endless war?
If the propaganda techniques I have outlined above seem inadequate
to answer these ponderous questions, perhaps it is because the war
has become self-perpetuating and no longer needs a consistent system
to organize intent, persuasion, and action. Perhaps the competing
cacophony of the often incompatible claims and counterclaims of
the armed groups has made propaganda a meaningless diversion in
a war that just goes on and on, fed by ludicrous levels of foreign
aid, astronomical drug wealth, and a culture where the rule of reason
is trumped repeatedly by the regime of the gun. And yet, propaganda
still serves a purpose in Colombia. As new generations are born
into the conflict, as the violence touches people in long-isolated
areas, and as ordinary Colombians try to balance feelings of fear,
grief, anger, anguish, and confusion, propaganda is there to offer
an answer, even if rarely the right answer.
Eric Fichtl is associate editor of Colombia
Journal.
Notes
1. For instance, the M-19 guerrillas
took up arms in 1972. After several years of unconventional and
often urban militancy, the group disarmed in 1989 to form a political
party.
2. Specifically, my first trip
occurred in June 2003, to Tame, Arauca. Some of my research from
that trip was summarized in an article entitled Araucan
Nightmare: Life and Death in Tame, August 2003. My second trip
was in February 2004, to Florencia, El Paujil, and Bolivia, in Caquetá,
as well as Puerto Asís and Santana, Putumayo. This trip coincided
with the early stages of “Operation New Year,” the forerunner
to Plan Patriota, a massive military campaign to penetrate areas
of southern Colombia long controlled by the FARC. The 2004 trip
also informed my articles, Civilian
‘Collaboration’ in Colombia’s Conflict, March
2004 and Washington Has Lost Its Way in
Colombia, August 30, 2004.
3. Taylor, Philip M. Munitions
of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the
Present Era. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995.
p. 4
4. Taylor, p. 3
5. Taylor, p. 5
6. Taylor, pp. 5-6. The italics
are Taylor’s.
7. Taylor, p. 7
8. Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda:
The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1965. Translated by Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner. p. x
9. Ellul, p. xiii
10. Ellul, p. xiii
11. Ellul, p. 9
12. Bernays, Edward. Propaganda.
New York: IG Publishing, 2004 (first ed. 1928) p. 48
13. Bernays, p. 161
14. Taylor, p. 6
15. I thank Professor Nina Khruscheva
of the New School University for bringing Orwell’s quotation
to my attention.
16. Quote cited in BBC News online
profile of President Uribe, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1996976.stm
17. For more on President Uribe’s
authoritarian tactics, see my article, Uribe
Administration Impeding Foreign Press, November 25, 2002.
18. CODHES figures http://www.codhes.org.co/cifra/GraficoTendencias1985_2005.jpg
19. Figures are a 2001 estimate
from CIA World Fact Book, 2001. Available at: http://www.nationmaster.com/country/co/Economy
20. According
to the CIA World Fact Book, 31 percent of the Colombian population
is under 14 years of age, and U.S. Census Bureau-generated population
pyramid diagrams show Colombia’s current and projected age
distribution to be heavily skewed to the young. See: http://www.nationmaster.com/country/co/Age_distribution
21. The independence army’s
flag was the basis of the flag of the post-independence Great Colombian
Federation, from which Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela emerged
as individual countries in the 1830s; for this reason they share
the same national colors. The various historical flags can be viewed
at http://www.z6.com/z6files/z6files/fotw/flags/co-gran.html.
22. The Colombian President’s
website is: http://www.presidencia.gov.co/. The Ministry of Defense’s
website is: http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/.
The Colombian Army’s website is: http://www.ejercito.mil.co/.
The National Police’s website is: http://www.policia.gov.co/.
The AUC’s website is: http://www.colombialibre.org/;
several of its constituent blocs also have their own websites. The
FARC’s website is: http://www.farc-ep.ch/.
The ELN’s website is: http://www.eln-voces.com/.
The descriptions of these websites are my impressions based on regular
visits to the sites, and were current as of May 2005. As is the
nature of the web, design overhauls are possible and unpredictable.
23. Herman, Edward S. and Noam
Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the
Mass Media. New York: Pantheon, 1988. p. 19
24. Leech, Garry. Killing
Peace: Colombia’s Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Intervention.
New York: Information Network of the Americas, 2002. p. 7
25. See Garry Leech’s article,
Informers for a Day, April 7, 2003.
26. Quote from a fax sent by the
Alfonso Castellanos Mobile Column of the FARC-EP to Mayor Jorge
Bernal of Tame, Arauca, June 9, 2003. Fax is in the author’s
possession.
27. For one of many reports detailing
the abuses committed by the various armed actors, see Human Rights
Watch. War Without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian
Law. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998.
28. Kirk, Robin. More Terrible
Than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia.
New York: Public Affairs, 2003. p. 30
29. Bernays, p.161
30. Kirk, pp. 26-27
31. Taylor, p. 3
32. The AUC’s tactical shift
is discussed by Jason Howe in his article Interview
with an Assassin, February 9, 2004.
33. Human Rights Watch, War
Without Quarter, pp. 60-70
34. For a more detailed analysis
of this point, please see the section called “Colombia’s
Shifting Front Lines” in my article Civilian
‘Collaboration’ in Colombia’s Conflict.
35. An officer from the Colombian
Army’s 12th Brigade assured me that members of the FARC are
easy to differentiate from civilians “because they carry revolvers.”
Author’s interview at Headquarters of the Army’s 12th
Brigade, Florencia, Caquetá. February 2004.
36. For example, a press release
from the 12th Brigade described the killing of three FARC combatants
under the headline, “Operation New Year Continues Producing
Results.” The following extract from the release details items
said to be on the body of one of the slain FARC fighters: “01
7.65mm pistol with silencer, 01 hand grenade, 02 bars of pentolita
[type of explosive], 07 estopinas [type of detonator], 01 bolt from
a 7.62 caliber Galil rifle, 02 meters of slow-burning wick, 02 meters
of fuse, 01 National Police uniform, and propaganda related to the
15th Front of the Terrorist FARC.” The cumulative effects
of such statistics is a powerful impression that the enemy is being
whittled away, fighter by fighter, bullet by bullet.
37. Wilson, Scott. “Colombia
Targeting Rebel Strongholds,” Washington Post, January
25, 2004, p. A-14. “No nos moverémos de este pueblo”
Colprensa, January 29, 2004. Martinez, Margarita. “Violence
Turns Village Into Ghost Town,” Associated Press,
February 1, 2005.
38. Enrique Santos Calderon, El
Tiempo Editor-in-Chief, interview entitled “Silenced by the
Gun,” on the BBC News website, May 3, 2005. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4507047.stm.
Calderon also emphasizes the necessity of using highly mobile, non-local
reporters to avoid danger, saying, “We never have the local
correspondent cover sensitive issues. We send someone from Bogotá,
who does the work and returns immediately. If he stays he will be
singled out and subjected to some kind of oppressive measure.”
39. Herman and Chomsky, p. 2
40. Author’s interview with
Capt. Paredes, Colombian Army 18th Brigade, Navos Pardo Battalion,
Tame, Arauca, June 10, 2003.
41. See my article, Araucan
Nightmare: Life and Death in Tame.
42. Ellul, p. xiii
43. Taylor, p. 9
44. See Leech, Informers
for a Day.
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