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Historical
Continuities in the
Relations of Exploitation
"We have about 50 percent
of the world's wealth, but only 6.3 percent of its population
In
this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment.
Our task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships
which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without
detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have to dispense
with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will
have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives.
We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury
of altruism and world benefaction
We should cease to talk about
vague and - for the far east - unreal objectives such as human rights,
the raising of living standards and democratization."
George Kennan, U.S. State Department
Policy Planning Study, 1949
It has been said that colonization was one of the
first steps in the globalization process. For the Europeans, colonization
fueled industrial growth by utilizing cheap labor to extract raw
materials. This new division of labor, where one actor took everything
and gave nothing, was only sustainable through the use of force.
In areas where anger and resistance were fierce and the contested
resources were desired more than labor, massacres aimed at extermination
were most useful. Globalization began, not because international
actors came together to conduct a voluntary and mutually beneficial
exchange, but because colonizers had the firepower to coerce the
colonized into a completely asymmetrical relationship. The first
global connections established a system where resources and capital
flowed from the colonized to the industrializing colonizers.
While the era of colonization has passed, certain
fundamental patterns remain. The colonizers, today's "developed"
nations, still seek to control access to inexpensive resources.
Profit maximization is the name of the game, therefore, unequal
relations of exchange are desirable. Because the more unequal the
exchange the greater the profit, the most successful players on
the global stage are those who are most willing and able to impose
these asymmetrical relationships on developing nations. Hence, although
globalization has made international exchanges more numerous than
ever before, resources and capital increasingly flow in one direction.
This is illustrated by the fact that the gap between rich and poor
countries continues to widen. Currently the net worth of the three
richest families in the world is greater than the combined gross
domestic product of the 43 poorest nations on earth.1
One person's right is another person's duty, and
the freedom to take indefinitely is accompanied by the duty to give
indefinitely. Powerful economic actors possess many rights and freedoms
but are allotted few responsibilities and perform few duties, while
less powerful beings have fewer rights, little freedom, and many
duties. This distribution of freedom and obligation is so skewed
that while some live gluttonously, others die of hunger or are killed
for challenging the superfluous resource ownership of the powerful.
The celebration of the liberty and prosperity that many living in
developed nations enjoy is largely divorced from an understanding
of the price that others have paid and continue to pay to make these
privileges possible.
The dominant voices are those coming from corporate
America. For them, neoliberal policies and a decrease in the political
regulation of their activities increase their freedom and prosperity,
but the converse is the imposition of duty on others: namely the
citizens of countries where profit maximization is carried out without
restrictions. Environmental degradation, human rights abuses, harassment
and even murder of union leaders, activists, and representatives
of non-governmental organizations are all by-products of unregulated
corporate freedom. The unrestrained drive for profit demands death
of those who get in the way. In some places, the right to maximize
profit is, in fact, accompanied by the duty to die.
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Colombia:
Demanding Wealth, Supplying Death
"We live in a world that treats
the dead better than the living. We the living are the askers of
questions and givers of answers, and we have other grave defects
unpardonable by a system that believes death, like money, improves
people."
Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins
of Latin America
In Colombia, homicide is the leading cause of death.
Each year, over 300,000 people are murdered. It is no accident that
the largest percentage of these deaths are found in the economic
poles of the country: the emerald zone of Boyaca; the gold mines
in Antioquia; the coal mines of Cesar and La Guajira; the petroleum
zones in Santander, Arauca and Casanare; the regions of commercial
agriculture; and during the period known as La Violencia
(1946-1965), in the coffee zones.
It is in these regions that the contradictions
of globalization and neoliberalism are exposed. Great wealth and
great poverty sit side by side, both sprung from the same seed.
Those who have been impoverished battle to regain what they have
lost, and those who have been enriched hire private armies to defend
what they have gained. In this battle for resources, competition
is as fierce, or dare I say it, as healthy as it can get. There
are no rules and the ends justify the means: On both sides, the
demand is for death. And, as always, it is the poor peasants who
are doing most of the dying.
In Colombia, the demand for resources and profit
is greater than the demand for human life. Hundreds of years have
not changed that pattern. From colonization to globalization, the
few have enforced asymmetrical relations of exchange on the many.
Today, international financial institutions maintain these patterns
by enforcing "freedom" and increasing liberalization of
the channels of extraction.
For some, both the elites in Colombia, and foreign
corporations profiting from operations, such as Occidental Petroleum,
BP-Amoco and others, this allows the accumulation of great wealth.
For others, especially poor rural Colombians and those dwelling
in the urban shantytowns, the result is either a slow death from
denial of basic necessities, or a quick death by private killers
hired to clear resistant peasants out of the way of economic progress.
Whatever the pretext for Plan Colombia, in actuality,
it is securing corporate access to inexpensive resources. In recent
years, emiseration of the average Colombian has resulted in an increased
popular resistance to the implementation of neoliberal economic
policies. Consequently, there has been a corresponding increase
in the levels of violence used against such elements as guerrillas,
peasants, union leaders, and human rights activists who challenge
a system of economic relations that ships resources needed for survival
off to foreign lands under the label of "free trade".
But "free trade" refers, as it always
has, to the freedom of large financial players to engage in the
maximization of profit without concerning themselves with the annoyances
of environmental, labor, or human rights regulations. Environmental
concerns aside, history proves that such an increase in exploitative
potential will provoke anger and resistance, violent repression,
and an intensifying cycle where the resultant demand is death, and
there is already enough of that.
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The
Channels of Exploitation Remain Open
"Latin America is a region
of open veins. Everything, from the discovery until our time, has
always been transmuted into European- or later United States-capital,
and as such has accumulated in distant centers of power."
Eduardo Galeano, The Open
Veins of Latin America
Colombia, like the rest of Latin America, was violently
colonized by the Spanish. The indigenous groups were subdued and
forced into labor in the mines. The land and the people were raped
and the valuable stones and minerals were shipped back to the coffers
of the Spanish crown. Independence brought little change for most
of the population. Land, resources and wealth remained concentrated
in the hands of the American-born Spaniards who inherited power.
Even the long and bloody La Violencia affected little change.
The peasants took up arms and shed their blood, but when all was
said and done, it seemed that their lives had been tossed away for
little more than political posturing. The elites of the Liberal
and Conservative parties made their peace and maintained their connections
to foreign interests. The peasants still were given nothing (see,
Fifty Years of Violence).
But resistance had been mobilizing and violence
intensified against the exploitative relations of "exchange".
Humiliation, misery and a desire for revenge birthed guerrillas
from the ravaged peasant masses. They rallied behind a platform
of social justice and violently demanded wealth redistribution and
land reform. Although the government conceded to peace negotiations
with some groups, there was no significant redistribution of land
or resources. New official economic positions merely affected superficial
changes, and, even while the Colombian economy grew consistently
under the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) regimes, wealth
continued to accumulate in the hands of the elites at the expense
of the poor.
In the 1980s, for the first time, there was a significant
challenge to the balance of power in Colombia and the established
oligarchy's hegemony over economic life. The cocaine industry inundated
entrepreneurial drug barons and cartels with U.S. dollars.
The new lords of the drug trade expanded their
might by funding private armies, a practice that originated when
large landholders and cattle ranchers took advantage of the lack
of government presence in the countryside to create death squads
to combat the guerillas and clear peasants off desirable lands.
Like the private militias of the past, the new paramilitaries secured
access to resources through force.
In Colombia, money can buy anything, even life
can be bought for a price: If the price of your life is lower than
the profit to be made from the resource you refuse to relinquish,
you die. These are market forces working more freely than people
in the United States, with the exception of the North American Indians,
have ever experienced.
The Colombian government derives most of its revenue
by taxing licit export production that is largely regulated through
regional and bilateral trade agreements and taxed upon entry into
the U.S. market. On the other hand, the drug baron's export profits
are illicit and therefore evade taxation and price caps meant to
keep capital in the United States. The drug trade, unencumbered
by state regulation, is actually free to distribute profits back
to the producers in developing nations.
The drug trade initiated a convergence of interest
between the United States and the Colombian government against the
power of this "free" drug trade. Colombia's elites needed
help defending themselves against the encroaching economic power
of the drug lords. Washington needed to reverse the flow of capital
back into the United States. In 1989, President Virgilio Barco placed
a quarter of a million dollar bounty on the heads of cartel leaders
and called for U.S. help to fight the drug cartels. Not coincidentally,
in this same year he folded to International Monetary Fund (IMF)
pressure to initiate a strategy for opening up the Colombian economy.
In 1990, Barco's successor, President Cesar Augusto
Gaviria, undertook massive reforms, including the apertura,
or "economic opening," that paved new avenues for wealth
extraction. The administration dismantled a protectionist system
that, under ISI, had been used to promote the development of domestic
industries. Tariffs, trade barriers and subsidies were reduced or
eliminated and public enterprises were privatized. Customs procedures
were simplified (which further facilitated the drug trade), restrictions
on foreign ownership of local banks were done away with, the need
for authorization on foreign investment was eliminated, foreign
interests were given free reign to repatriate profits, and portfolio
(often short term speculative capital) investment was given unconditional
tax exemption. In the middle of 1991, the financial market was also
opened, which meant that monetary and exchange rate policies could
no longer be determined by the state and were, instead, subject
to the forces of international financial movements.
True to form, the liberalization of markets let
loose massive swells of capital and deregulated their movement.
They were now free to be sucked right out of Colombia
and they
were. Falling tariffs and the elimination of domestic subsidies
decreased the relative price of imports. Rich Colombians took advantage
of the lower prices of imported luxury goods; private consumption
skyrocketed while private savings dropped to its lowest levels ever.
From 1992-1994, private international debt went from $3.5 to $8.5
billion.2
Meanwhile, a large influx of foreign capital (not
to worry: one hundred percent can be repatriated) was spurred by
the expectation of a Colombian oil bonanza. This generated an appreciation
of the domestic currency that threatened exports by decreasing their
competitiveness. Because of the liberalization of financial and
capital markets, the only policy lever available to the government
was the use of fiscal policy to control inflation. However, as the
government's budget was dwarfed by the huge sums of money sloshing
through the hands of drug traffickers and private corporations,
fiscal expenditures were ineffective. The balance of trade deteriorated
from a $2.3 billion surplus in 1991 to a $2.4 billion deficit in
1994.3
Furthermore, while the economy was opened to foreign
producers, it quickly closed for many domestic manufacturers, especially
those who could only afford small or mid-scale production. The technological
efficiency of industries in developed nations made foreign imports
more competitive. Besides the inherent advantages of large-scale
production in driving down prices, foreign corporations were also
the recipients of subsidies from their own governments and generous
tax exemptions from Colombia, benefits most small and medium-sized
Colombian producers were denied. While in theory liberalization
was supposed to spur industrial development, in actuality, it did
just the opposite: it resulted in de-industrialization.
In 1997 and 1998, massive imports of manufactured
goods led to the closing of 5,000 small factories. According to
Patricia Burtica, a representative of Colombia's largest union,
Unified Workers Central (CUT), "The opening market economy
has provoked the closing of 20,000 commercial enterprises in our
country."4 In sum,
the liberalization of the Colombian economy placed more and more
power in the hands of foreign corporations and, as intended, resulted
in a transfer of resources from lower class Colombians to the elites
and multinational corporations.
In the labor market, the Gaviria Administration
paved the way for increased unemployment that benefited the Colombian
economic elites and foreign investors. By rewriting labor legislation
in the 1991 Constitution, it became easier for employers to lay
off workers. Previously, companies had to pay a severance to workers
laid off before their contract had expired. In order to eliminate
the burden of "redundant labor", the severance requirement
was dropped and work contracts that began after 1980 could be terminated
without any economic inconvenience to the employer. As a result,
even conservative government figures (which take the informal sector
into account) concede that a fifth of the population is now unemployed.
When the informal sector is not taken into account, some estimate
unemployment to be as high as 60 percent.
In terms of land tenure, the Sustainable Development
Department of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United
Nations found that forced "liberalization" of the land
market, despite subsidies provided for rural peasants, only resulted
in a greater concentration of land ownership. In 1994, in an effort
to make land use more efficient and productive, the Colombian government
encouraged large landholders to sell parts of their land to investors.
Responding to the demands of demobilized guerrillas with whom the
government had recently signed a peace accord, the law included
a subsidy scheme to help the rural poor purchase land. However,
most landowners were still unwilling to sell to rural peasants because
they could not obtain a sufficient profit margin.
Although subsidies initially enabled some of the
rural poor to purchase land, they were unable to hold onto their
newly gained properties. Violence, intimidation, and the corruption
of local officials left them unable to defend their resources and
they were either violently displaced or forced to sell. Consequently,
the top three percent of the landed elite now own over 70 percent
of the arable land, while 57 percent of the poorest farmers subsist
on less than three percent. Once again, the deregulation of the
market only provided freedom to some, namely, to those with the
power and the capital to hold on to violently contested resources.
The powerless Colombian peasant lost yet again.
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The
Effects of Centuries of Austerity
By the end of the 1990s, external debt had grown
to five times what it had been in 1980 reaching $34.5 billion. Growth
figures of -4.9% were the lowest of the century, unemployment was
sky high, and almost 55 percent of Colombians lived in poverty.5
Colombia was in a serious recession. In December 1999, desperation
provoked the government to accept, once again, reforms favorable
to foreign investors in exchange for a $2.7 billion loan from the
International Monetary Fund.
Colombian's economic problems, according to the
IMF, were largely the result of unsustainable fiscal policies, principally,
the large increases in public spending introduced in the early 1990s.
The IMF-imposed remedy called for a severe reduction of public spending
and the creation of new taxes. Consequently, salaries were to be
reduced; the age of retirement raised; subsidies for public services
cut; the official bank and the state-owned energy, mining and communications
enterprises privatized; and massive dismissals in the public sector.
In effect, the IMF was suggesting that Colombia was in the midst
of an economic crisis because it had been too generous with its
citizens.
It is interesting to note what the increased government
revenue (and the shirts taken from the peasants' backs) is going
to pay for. According to the IMF, the goal is to "exert a strict
control over all expenditure other than interest payments."6
In other words, the IMF wants the Colombian government to take money
from its already brutalized population and deposit it directly into
the purses of rich lender nations.
According to Joseph E. Stiglitz, a professor of
economics at Stanford University and the former chief economist
at the World Bank: "Today, the mandate [of the IMF] often appears
to be that of a bill collector for lending nations: its objective
is to make sure that the debtor country has as large a war chest
as possible to repay outstanding loans."7
This relationship is quite apparent in Colombia.
In 1998, even before officially accepting the IMF loan conditions,
Colombia paid close to $4.6 billion in debt services (interest and
repayments). This was equivalent to three times the entire healthcare
budget and more than the total sum spent on education. In 2000,
after the implementation of IMF policies, debt servicing increased
by 20 percent. In 2001, this figure grew again by almost 30 percent.
In fact, 86 percent of tax income is now being used to pay debt
services.8
Debt service payments have been financed through
falling real wages, as well as by state cutbacks in healthcare,
education, and public employment. It is not surprising that the
number of dissidents in Colombian society has increased. Even during
negotiations for the IMF bail out there were massive demonstrations
in the cities. In the past year, unions, public employees, students,
human rights groups and other non-governmental organizations have
taken to the streets demanding decent wages; the right to health,
employment and education; an end to privatization and austerity;
and a moratorium on debt payments (see, Colombians
protest IMF-Imposed Austerity Measures).
When a hospital in San Juan de Dios was forced
to shut down because it could not afford to pay its electricity
bill, doctors and nurses throughout Colombia threatened to call
a nationwide strike. In the cities, the government, the elites,
multinational corporations, and their hired killers have responded
with more death; targeting union leaders, journalists, human rights
activists, and political challengers.
Meanwhile, in vast expanses of the countryside
there are still no roads, no schools, no hospitals and 85 percent
of the rural population lives in poverty. Liberalization, privatization,
and related violence have undermined subsistence and pushed many
peasants off their lands. The displaced move deeper into the jungle
where coca--because it grows in poor soil, provides bountiful yields,
and can be easily transported--is the only economically viable crop.
In order to survive, peasants must function outside the channels
regulated by neoliberal policies. As a result, some of the profits
from coca cultivation find their way back to the peasant producer
(see, The Plight of the Peasant Coca Grower).
In these areas--historically neglected or abused
by the government--the guerrillas provision justice. By taxing the
drug trade, the guerrillas build infrastructure and fund schools
and medical clinics. They also enact violent land and wealth redistribution
by murdering and kidnapping large landowners and business executives,
while bombing oil pipelines owned by elite and foreign interests.
Also, the level of rural violence escalates as
wealthy landowners, cattle ranchers, industrialists, and right-wing
political and business interests respond to the guerrilla threat
by increasing funding for their private armies. Throughout Colombia,
poverty and the demand for violence fuel the supply of killers.
Enjoying lavish funding from elite elements of
Colombian society, the paramilitaries are extremely successful in
recruiting the poor and unemployed. They offer new recruits a cellular
phone, a gun and $250 per month.9
And as poverty and unemployment increase, working as a professional
criminal becomes more attractive, especially in a country whose
citizens consider it too dangerous or futile to report criminals
to the authorities.
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Plan
Colombia: Ensuring Access to Resources
On January 11, 2000, President Clinton announced
a $1.3 billion aid package for Colombia to "assist in vital
counter-drug efforts aimed at keeping illegal drugs off our shores"
and to "help Colombia promote peace and prosperity and deepen
its democracy" (see, Plan Colombia:
A Closer Look)
By now it is common knowledge that the illicit
crop eradication tactics currently being employed as part of Plan
Colombia--aerial fumigation of coca and poppy plants--have not and
will not stop the flow of drugs into the United States (see, The
Drug War: An Exercise in Futility). In 1994, a Rand study found
that treatment was seven times more cost-effective than policing
and 23 times more cost-effective than source country interdiction.10
The forced crop eradication sponsored by Plan Colombia
will merely result in what's become known as "the balloon effect":
when pressure is applied in one area, cultivation simply shifts
to another. This was evidenced by the supposedly successful coca
eradication campaigns in Peru and Bolivia, which were immediately
followed by a coca boom in Colombia (see, The
Failure of Coca Eradication in Peru and Bolivia). According
to William M. LeoGrande, a professor of government at American University,
and Kenneth Sharpe, a professor of political science at Swarthmore
College, "You can't use military force to repeal the laws of
economics."11
The chemicals being used to destroy coca crops
are also effective in destroying licit crops, while causing environmental
damage and health problems (see, Death
Falls from the Sky). Since coca grows well in many climates,
including the jungle, and is the most lucrative cash crop available
in the Andean region, desperate peasants displaced from land contaminated
by herbicides are more likely to clear another section of rainforest
to produce coca than any other crop.
Furthermore, the proposed areas of fumigation do
not correspond to all the areas of heavy coca production. Fumigation
has largely bypassed paramilitary-controlled coca plantations even
though the connections between the paramilitaries and the international
traffickers are far more extensive than the simple taxation relationship
shown to exist between the guerrillas and the traffickers. Taking
for granted that the authors of Plan Colombia are not blundering
idiots, one must assume there is a hidden motivation underlying
the drug war campaign.
The United States is the world's largest consumer
of petroleum and access to reliable and inexpensive supplies has
always been a principle foreign policy concern. The loss of the
Panama Canal and the anti-imperialist attitudes of Hugo Chavez--the
nationalist leader of Venezuela, the single largest supplier of
oil to the United States--as well as his sympathies for the Colombian
guerillas and socialist Cuba spell trouble for U.S. oil interests
(see, The Chavez Factor).
Despite Colombia's status as the second most dangerous
country in the world in which to conduct oil exploration, when its
largest oil discovery since the 1980s was announced last June, several
companies, including Los Angeles-based Occidental Petroleum (Oxy),
seized the opportunity to increase their investment in Colombia.
However, National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas responded by
launching a new campaign of kidnappings and pipeline bombings to
protest the overgenerous concessions made to foreign corporations.
Last year, the Cano Limon pipeline was bombed 76 times and was forced
to temporarily shut down.
Consequently, oil companies need Washington's help.
Because of the violence, only 20 percent of Colombia's potential
oil producing territory has been explored; clearly there are profits
to be made. Therefore, it is not surprising that Oxy's Vice-President
of Public Affairs, Lawrence P. Meriage, joined other representatives
of corporate America in lobbying for congressional support of the
military and "counter-narcotics" components of Plan Colombia.
In a speech to the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy and Human Resources, Meriage also pushed for an extension
of military operations to oil-rich regions in northern Colombia
to "augment security for new oil development".12
The promotion of peace, prosperity and democracy
also seems to be largely a pretext. While the 80 percent of the
budget allocated to military hardware was distributed immediately,
the $15 million promised to alternative crop development and social
programs such as refugee assistance, human rights, improved law
enforcement, and judicial reform has yet to arrive. Meanwhile, the
Leahy Amendment, which makes U.S. aid contingent on human rights
conditions, was simply waived by then-President Clinton in the name
of U.S. "national security interests."
It is evident by past drug war policy that promoting
human rights is of little concern to Washington. In 1990, at the
same time President George Bush began funneling aid to the Colombian
Armed Forces (and by extension, the paramilitaries) to fight the
"war on drugs", the Andean Commission of Jurists reported
that the Colombian military was using anti-drug measures as a pretext
to arrest and murder union leaders, grassroots organizers, and members
of opposition political parties.
Over the past decade, the Colombian military has
the worst human rights record in the hemisphere. In response to
human rights groups and a handful of U.S. lawmakers, Washington
has pushed Colombia to clean up its image, crack down on corruption,
and do a better job disguising the exploitation and murder of its
own citizens. In order to hide its continuing involvement in human
rights abuses, the Colombian army now "outsources" the
violence to the privately (as opposed to publicly) run paramilitary
death squads.
The continuing intimate relationship between the
military and the paramilitaries has been well documented by reputable
human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch. Even Colombia's mainstream media--owned almost entirely
by the political and economic oligarchy, including the families
of President Andres Pastrana and Finance Minister Juan Manuel Santos--must
concede that the paramilitaries are now responsible for 80 percent
of Colombia's violent deaths.
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Plan
Colombia: A Convergence of Corporate Interests
"The fundamental principles
of American foreign policy, as they were articulated quite clearly
in the 1940s, are designed to ensure what George Kennan once called
the 'protection of our raw materials'
.The problem is that
the indigenous [and domestic] populations often have the tendency
to try to use "our raw materials" for their own purposes."
Noam Chomsky, Latin America:
From Colonization To Globalization
In September 2000, a former U.S. Special Forces
intelligence agent claimed that the purpose of Plan Colombia was
to defend the operations of Occidental, BP-Amoco and Texas Petroleum,
while securing access to potentially rich, but still unexplored,
Colombian oil fields. If this is true, then the Plan was well designed.
Not only is the flow of U.S. aid oblivious to human
rights abuses, but there also seems to be a correlation between
the two. Corporations lobby to increase aid to the very entities
that abuse human rights. It is quite telling that the paramilitaries'
political stance is in outright support of IMF-imposed privatization
programs and other economic reforms that generate profit for multinational
corporations. Even if it is not an effective way of countering the
drug trade, funding paramilitary forces is a very efficient means
of solving conflicts over valuable resources.
And while fumigation is also not an effective strategy
for waging war against drugs, it is a highly efficient method of
clearing populations from areas rich in resources and of eliminating
opposition. Fumigation forces peasants to abandon land that then
becomes available for multinational speculation. The departments
of Putumayo and Bolivar, both primary targets of Plan Colombia's
aerial fumigation campaign, have large, and still unexplored, mineral
and oil deposits.
Not surprisingly, Occidental and British Petroleum
were fervent supporters of the U.S. aid package. Occidental spent
$350,000 in the U.S. Congress ensuring that the U.S. contribution
to Plan Colombia was passed. The oil industry was responsible for
almost 20 percent of President George W. Bush's campaign funding,
while also donating large sums of money to former Vice-President
Gore's campaign (see, The Well-Oiled Presidential
Campaigns).
Other multinationals also rallied in support of
the aid package. In fact, most of the $1.3 billion has been deposited
into the bank accounts of U.S. defense contractors. Connecticut-based
United Technologies Corporation is building 30 Blackhawk helicopters
at $12.8 million a piece. It is no surprise that Senator Christopher
Dodd of Connecticut was a strong supporter of the aid package. Another
benefactor is Texas-based Textron, which is upgrading 33 Vietnam-era
Huey helicopters at a cost of $1.8 million each. While Lockheed
Martin received $68 million for the manufacture of early warning
radar systems (see, U.S. Aid Package Amounts
to Corporate Welfare). Meanwhile, Monsanto and Dupont, manufacturers
of the fumigation chemicals being sprayed on Colombian peasants,
deposited some $600,000 into political coffers during the time the
aid bill was being debated in Congress.13
The U.S. aid package and Plan Colombia effectively
support the interests of multinational corporations by funding arms
contractors, manufacturers of deadly chemicals, and private death
squads, each of which will be deployed on Colombian soil to silence
or kill those who oppose the interests of U.S. corporations.
The drug war and Neoliberalism go hand in hand:
their goal is the protection of "our raw materials". Neoliberalism
provides the rationale and a framework for opening up the Colombian
economy to foreign exploitation, while the U.S. aid package provides
the hardware to enforce the exploitation when the population refuses
to passively accept it.
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Colombia
and the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA)
"The people who try to impose
the principles of neoliberalism in the Third World and in the slums
of our cities don't want the same principles for themselves... They
want a powerful nanny state to protect them, as always."
Noam Chomsky, Latin America:
From Colonization to Globalization
Amidst popular protest, negotiations continue for
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which will extend the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) throughout the hemisphere
in 2005. In Mexico, since the passage of NAFTA, eight million more
families have fallen into poverty, one million more Mexicans work
for less than the minimum wage ($3.40 per day), and approximately
28,000 small businesses have shut down due to the influx of foreign
corporations.
The FTAA would spread and enhance this horror story
by demanding that regulations placed on multinational operations
throughout the hemisphere be eliminated to allow more profit to
flow from the South to the North. Hemispheric competition for foreign
investment will attain a whole new level of ferocity as governments
lower labor, human rights, and environmental standards in order
to offer attractive profit margins.
In Colombia, competition for foreign investment
has already made labor unions and their leaders prime targets for
violence. According to Liam Craig-Best, a human rights activist
who works closely with leaders of Colombia's largest union, Unified
Workers Central, (CUT), Colombia is the most dangerous place in
the world for union members. Last year 129 unionists were killed,
while this year 44 members have already been murdered for standing
up for labor rights.14
The FTAA will add more fuel to the fire that is
already consuming, at a massive rate, those who try to put human
life before corporate profit. Furthermore, the FTAA will increase
unregulated foreign investment, which will result in more rural
peasants being displaced by paramilitaries seeking to gain control
of lands sought after by foreign corporations.
On the environmental front, the FTAA will enhance
the degradation that has already taken a huge toll on the stability
of Colombian society. Hundreds of pipeline bombings have poured
many times the amount of oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez into the
fragile Colombian ecosystem. Meanwhile, the fumigation and violence
have pushed almost two million people off the most productive tracts
of land in the country. Many of these displaced have moved deeper
into the rainforest where their only viable means of survival is
coca cultivation, which further devastates the environment and increases
the flow of drugs to U.S. and European markets.
In other areas, FTAA agreements, like IMF loan
conditions, include commitments to liberalize trade and privatize
state-owned entities such as education, health care, social security,
and public utilities. Once again, freedom for corporations will
mean reduced access to basic survival necessities for many Colombians
who will be unable to afford the higher prices for food, water,
electricity, healthcare and education.
New regulations surrounding intellectual property
rights will allow pharmaceutical corporations to patent their marketing
rights across the entire hemisphere in order to keep drug prices
high and impede the domestic production of generic versions of life
saving drugs. Those who are unable to pay will suffer and die.
New FTAA legislation also sets the groundwork for investor to state
lawsuits (though not the other way around), which will restrict
states from taking any action that might indirectly affect an investor's
profits. This will inevitably damage the fragile Colombian peace
process. If the Colombian government can be prosecuted for trying
to enforce labor standards, implement public health regulations,
or prevent environmental degradation, then Bogota will have little
to offer the guerrillas and the ever-increasing numbers of Colombians
unhappy with deteriorating social and economic conditions.
What the FTAA amounts to is protectionism: legal
protection for the "rights" of multinational corporations
to exploit for profit. It is no coincidence that the FTAA agreement
has been negotiated behind closed doors and that, although more
than 500 corporations have been given the security clearances required
to review the FTAA documents, no labor, human rights or environmental
groups have been permitted to monitor or participate in the proceedings.
The FTAA agreements will expand and protect corporate freedom by
imposing an immense burden on the already overworked, underpaid,
and under nourished peoples of Colombia. As the injustices grow,
so will resentment and the violence (see, Colombians
Protest Fumigation and Globalization).
Although the corporations operating in Colombia
will benefit in the short-term through the removal of social and
environmental impediments to profit maximization; in the long-term,
rising violence will result in an increasingly unstable investment
climate. The freedom to displace, impoverish, and brutalize the
Colombian population while exploiting the country's resources will
force more and more peasants to take up arms or turn to the drug
trade for survival.
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An
Alternative Vision of Freedom and Globalization
Exploitative relations of exchange have thus far
dominated the globalization process. Enforcing freedom for some
has clamped shackles on others. And while for some the possibilities
for growth have become limitless, for the majority, growth is increasingly
restricted.
The neoliberal policy makers have actively enforced
this inequality by playing on a prevalent misunderstanding of the
relationship between rights and duties. The freedom of demand is
not benign, but malignant, and shantytowns, violence, and misery
are the tumors of the unrestricted drives for profit made possible
by the current global system.
However, this track of development is not inevitable.
More than 50 years ago, in the wake of World War II and the Holocaust,
developed and developing nations joined together to form the United
Nations. The UN's charter was, and still is, based on an alternative
conceptualization of the interplay between rights and duties, between
freedom and responsibility.
This understanding suggests that global well-being
is not best attained through the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest.
In order to prevent, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt put it,
the national conditions that lead to military governments and eventually
world wars, certain affairs need to be regulated by international
human rights norms. It was understood that there needed to be a
bottom line that would protect, not the fundamental rights of states
or markets, both intangible entities, but the fundamental rights
of human beings.
In the name of state rights, or market rights,
the powerful justify taking more than they give. However, as globalization
increases commonalities, those denied their freedom, those with
many duties and few rights, become more numerous and increasingly
aware of the ways in which their struggles are united. This process
is already under way as many organizations in developed and developing
nations have united in a globalized grassroots movement to combat
corporate-sponsored neoliberal globalization.
Environmental degradation has raised the issues
of globalization and social responsibility to a new level of consciousness.
The linkages connecting the well-being of citizens across the globe
have moved beyond the theoretical realm into tangible existence.
Consequently, post World War II globalization provides the world
with a renewed opportunity for awareness. There must be a bottom
line. Entities that produce systematic misery and death cannot be
justified or protected in the name of abstract concepts. Morality
must not be forfeited for either the state or the market.
In both Bogota and Washington, direct human rights
abuses have been justified in the name of "national security",
while policies supporting the "inevitable" economic process
of neoliberal globalization have institutionalized gross levels
of poverty and inequality. IMF-imposed reforms, the drug war, Plan
Colombia, and the FTAA forfeit basic and necessary standards of
morality by failing to make economic and political rights contingent
upon the duty to ensure fundamental human rights.
Our well-being is united by global systems and
our rights are contingent upon our duties. The consequences of failing
to fulfill those duties are clearly evident in the words of Holocaust
survivor Pastor Martin Neimoller:
"First [the Nazis] came for the socialists,
and I did not speak out--because I was not a socialist. Then
they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out--because
I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and
I did not speak out--because I was not a Jew. Then they came
for me--and there was no one left to speak." 15
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Report prepared by Anne Montgomery, September
2001.
This special report originally appeared in Colombia
Report, an online journal that was published by the Information
Network of the Americas (INOTA).
Back to Top
. Comments
Notes
1. A. Shepherd, "The
Rich Poor Gap Grows," ABC News, August 1, 1999, ABC
News Internet Ventures, Online
2. Jorge Ramirez Ocampo,
"The Colombian Apertura: An assessment," Colombia:
The Politics of Reforming the State, Ed. Eduardo Posada-Carbo
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 193
3. Ibid.
4. Garry M. Leech, "Colombians
Protest IMF- Imposed Austerity Measures," Colombia Report,
August 6, 2000, The Information Network of the Americas, Online
5. Cited in Alberto Yepes
P., "Colombia. Who Benefits from Adjustment, War, and the Free
Market?" Social Watch, 2001, Third World Institute, Online
6. Cited in Alberto Yepes
P., "Colombia. Who Benefits from Adjustment, War, and the Free
Market?" Social Watch, 2001, Third World Institute, Online
7. Joseph Stiglitz, "The
Failure of the Fund: Rethinking the IMF Response," Harvard
International Review, Summer 2001, p. 16
8. Cited in Alberto Yepes
P., "Colombia. Who Benefits from Adjustment, War, and the Free
Market?" Social Watch, 2001, Third World Institute, Online
9. Scott Wilson, "Colombia
Right's 'Cleaning' Campaign," Washington Post Foreign Service,
April 17, 2001, The Washington Post Company, Online
10. C. Peter Rydell
and Susan S. Everingham, "Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus
Demand Programs," RAND, 1994, The RAND Corporation, Online
11. William M. LeoGrande
and Kenneth Sharpe, "A Plan, But No Clear Objective. General
Powell to Secretary Powell: We Need to Talk Colombia", Washington
Post, April 1, 2001, The Washington Post Company, Online
12. Colombian Project,
"Testimony of Lawrence P. Meriage before the House Government
Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources,"
Center for International Policy, February 15, 2000, Online
13. Liam Craig-Best
and Rowan Shingler, "Fumigation: An Attack on the Ecology and
People of Colombia," Spectrazine, June 7, 2001, Online
14. Liam Craig-Best,
interview with the author, August 23, 2001
15. Jewish Virtual Library,
"Martin Neimoeller: The Failure to Speak Up Against the Nazis,"
2001, The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, Online
Report prepared by Anne Montgomery, September
2001.
This special report originally appeared in Colombia
Report, an online journal that was published by the Information
Network of the Americas (INOTA).
Back to Top .
Comments
The
views expressed in this article are that of the author
and may not reflect the views of Colombia Journal.
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