Plan
Colombia and its
Consequences in Ecuador
Report
by the Ecumenical Human Rights Commission of Ecuador (CEDHU),
March 2001
Historical Background of the Colombian Conflict
Plan Colombia: Definition and Funding
Plan Colombia: Effects in Ecuador
Plan Colombia: Final Considerations
Historical
Background of the Colombian Conflict
In order to understand Plan Colombia and the events
leading up to its creation, it is important to have a basic understanding
of Colombia's history, especially the last 100 years. A brief
study of this period reveals the reasons why the country has been
suffering from extremely violent episodes that have wreaked havoc
on its social, cultural and economic conditions.
Toward the end of the 19th century, Colombia's economic and political
stability was disturbed by conflicts between the two ruling parties
(Conservatives and Liberals), which erupted in "The War of
a Thousand Days" (1899 to 1902). The war, which claimed an
estimated 100,000 lives, only brought temporary peace. In the
late 1940s and 1950s, three times that number died during a period
known as La Violencia.
The end of La Violencia came with the issuance of the "Declaration
of Sitges" (1958), in which the Conservative and the Liberal
party agreed to govern jointly as part of the National Front in
order to keep the political and economic power in the hands of
both political parties. The National Front government, aided by
the Alliance for Progress (an inter-American program of economic
assistance, which began in the 1960s), implemented social, political
and economic reforms, established a political bipartisan system
and drafted a new constitution.
Unfortunately, this did not solve the country's woes, and social
injustice continued, especially affecting the middle and the lower
economic classes. The resulting dissatisfaction manifested itself
in the establishment and growth of guerrilla groups formed by
liberal and communist ideologues and common citizens. Between
1964 and the 1970s, the groups consolidated to form four main
guerrilla groups: "Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia"
(FARC), "National Liberation Army" (ELN), "Popular
Liberation Army" (EPL) and "M-19" ("April
19 Movement", which later became a political party). Violence
increased as the Colombian government, aided by the U.S., mobilized
itself against these groups.
During a downturn in the economy in the late 1970's, guerrilla
warfare escalated and the Colombian government passed legislation
that gave more freedom to the military, which unleashed a wave
of generalized repression. Disappearances, torture, and political
assassinations became common.
Between 1980 and 1982, several guerrilla groups participated in
the kidnappings and killings of prominent and wealthy Colombian
citizens, as well as the 1980 takeover of the Embassy of the Dominican
Republic. Between 1982 and 1984, a handful of economically and
politically influential citizens whose family members had been
victimized by the guerrillas decided to take the law into their
own hands and formed counter-guerrilla groups, which came to be
known as paramilitary forces. Among the most prominent of these
original groups were "Death to Kidnappers" (MAS) and
"Peasants Self-Defense Units of Córdoba and Urabá"
(ACCU). Today the national paramilitary organization, headed by
Carlos Castaño, is called the United Self-Defense Units
of Colombia (AUC).
The official origin of the paramilitaries dates back to the mid-60s
when the Colombian government legalized civilian armament in order
to counter guerrilla warfare. In 1989, however, the groups were
made illegal and the government tried to disarm them, albeit unsuccessfully.
The paramilitary groups grew in strength with the support of wealthy
citizens, the drug industry and the unofficial aid and cooperation
of the Colombian military, which considered them collaborators
in the struggle against the guerrillas.
All three armed groups in Colombia -- the paramilitaries, the
guerrillas and the state's military forces -- are known to be
responsible, either directly or indirectly, for thousands of human
rights violations each year, and the numbers are rising. Ten years
ago, there were 100 reported kidnappings in Colombia; last year,
3706 were reported, according to País Libre, a Colombian
human rights organization. It is estimated that guerrillas carry
out 75% of the kidnappings, while 10% are committed by paramilitaries.
However, 80% of the total number of human rights violations in
2000 were attributed to the paramilitaries (mainly murders and
displacements), who often work in tandem with the military. In
the last decade, the groups were responsible for an estimated
35,000 murders, many of which took place in the form of massacres.
Unfortunately, several attempts to end the violence by holding
negotiation sessions and signing peace treaties with the guerrillas
and paramilitary groups have failed.
The Colombian drug trade has a 40-year history. As in most Latin
American countries, drugs grown in Colombia date back to pre-colonial
times when the autochthonous plants were used in traditional ceremonies
and for medicinal purposes. With the explosion of illegal drug
use in the U.S. and Europe in the 60's, however, local and foreign
investment stimulated the production of large quantities of the
mind-altering substances for North American and European consumption
in the 1960's and 1970's. As the industry grew, the Colombian
government, backed by other countries, began to fight it. Vulnerable,
the drug traffickers consolidated their power in the form of "cartels"
and fought government's efforts to destroy their trade.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, these cartels were responsible
for many assassinations and violent attacks against the government
and Colombian citizens, as well as violent acts committed among
themselves. As the drug problem infiltrated the political, social,
cultural and economic spheres of society, the drug cartels financed
guerrilla and paramilitary groups while supporting politicians
and major leadership groups in the country.
Over the years, the conflict and resulting violence have expanded
throughout the region. Guerrilla, paramilitary and military warfare
has become part of the reality of countries like Ecuador, Perú,
Venezuela, Brazil and Bolivia as the groups have expanded their
influence in the region. Unfortunately, it is the citizens of
Colombia and its neighbors countries who suffer most from the
conflict: extreme poverty, displacement, destruction of crops,
abuse of power, and death are only some of the consequences they
must face.
Back to Top
Plan
Colombia: Definition and Funding
There have been numerous attempts over the years
to bring an end to the violence and drug trafficking in Colombia.
The latest is a proposal drafted by the Pastrana administration
in 1999 called Plan Colombia, which is a comprehensive plan for
peace, prosperity, and the strengthening of the state.
In 1999 President Pastrana visited the U.S. to garner support
for his proposal. In July 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed
into law a $1.3 billion aid package as the U.S. contribution to
the plan and, in March 2001, President Bush and members of the
U.S. Congress announced their desire to regionalize the plan and
increase its budget.
The plan includes ten strategies (economic, fiscal and financial,
military, judicial and human rights, counter-narcotics, alternative
development, social participation, human development, peace and
international affairs) designed to address all aspects of the
problems Colombia faces. These strategies include actions to stabilize
the economy, promote trade and investment, stop drug activity
at the production and trading levels, reform the judicial system,
promote democratization and social development, and further the
peace process in general.
The
total budget for the Plan is $7.5 billion, of which the Colombian
government originally pledged $4 billion, the U.S. $1.3 billion,
and the European Union and other countries $2.2 billion. To this
day, full funding has not materialized. In October 2000 the European
Union voted to contribute only $250 million and other nations
such as Japan pledged only in the form of loans. In addition,
Colombia has yet to come up with the $4 billion they committed
to the Plan.
Of
the money committed by the U.S., $860.3 was earmarked for Colombia,
$180 million for aid to other countries, and $223.5 million for
the budgets of U.S. agencies in the region. Of the $860.3 million
allocated to Colombia, $687.3 million is going to military and
police assistance, $68.5 million to alternative development, $51
million to human rights, $37.5 million to the displaced, $13 million
to judicial reform, and $3 million to the peace process.
Until now, the majority of the money for Plan Colombia
has gone toward the military offensive in the southern region
of the country. The money pledged to neighboring countries totals
$180 million, of which $32 million was given to Peru, $110 million
to Bolivia, $20 million to Ecuador, and $18 million to other countries
in the region. Of the $180 million, $87 million was put toward
the military anti-narcotic effort. In addition, the U.S. government
obtained permission from the Ecuadorian government to install
a military base in the city-port of Manta. Though the base is
not officially part of Plan Colombia, its purpose is to carry
out surveillance of drug cultivation and trafficking activity,
especially in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and the Caribbean.
Back to Top
Plan
Colombia: Effects in Ecuador
Plan Colombia is designed to eradicate drug crops,
put a stop to the violence and raise the socio-economic level
in Colombia, but the effects of the plan are not limited to within
the country's borders. All four nations that border Colombia face
certain repercussions and have reacted in various ways to the
plan. The two nations that have openly voiced their support are
Peru, which happened only after Fujimori resigned and an interim
prime minister was appointed, and Ecuador. Both Venezuela and
Brazil have made clear their intention to withhold support.
It is Ecuador that faces the greatest danger as the Colombian
military sprays coca fields and violence escalates in the southern
Putumayo region of Colombia. The main consequences in Ecuador
of the military push south in Colombia are the arrival of hundreds
of refugees, the spillover of violence and the possibility of
coca cultivation and processing on Ecuadorian soil. These are
problems that would confound any nation, but Ecuador in its weak
and vulnerable socio-economic and political condition is especially
susceptible to their negative consequences.
Socio-economic Information about Colombia
and Ecuador:
|
Indicators*
|
Colombia
|
Ecuador
|
|
Area
|
1,200,000
km2 |
283,600 km2 |
| Population |
41.5 million |
13 million |
| Poulation
Growth Rate |
1.8% |
1.9% |
| Life
Expectancy |
70 years |
70 years |
| Urban
Population |
From 57% in
1951 to 74% in 1994 |
64.3% |
| Type
of Government |
Democratic
Republic |
Democratic
Republic |
| President |
Andrés
Pastrana, elected in 1998 |
Gustavo Noboa,
in power since 2000 |
| GDP |
$88.9 billion |
$18.7 billion |
| Annual
Growth Rate |
3.2% |
1.9% |
| GDP
Per Capita |
$2,250 |
$1,310 |
| Main
Exports |
Oil, coffee,
coal, bananas, flowers |
Oil, bananas,
coffee, sea products |
| Un/sub-employment
Rate |
19.7% |
74.9% |
| Poverty
Rate |
Not available |
56% (1999),
3.5 indigents (The estimate for 2000 is 70%) |
| Inflation |
8.75% |
91% |
Division
of Industry
(% of GDP) |
14.1% agriculture/mining
24.4% industry
61.5% finance and services |
12% agriculture/mining
32.7% industry
55.2% finance and services |
| Present
Value of Debt |
$34.2 billion |
$14.2 billion |
| Migratory
Facts |
Since 1998,
600,000 Colombians have been displaced due to internal conflicts
(317,000 in 2000). In the year 2000, 15,000 left Colombia.
|
In the year
2000, 300,000 people left Ecuador in search of better economic
conditions. |
*Data obtained from the World Bank
development report and other sources. All data is from the year
2000 unless otherwise noted.
In the past three to four years Ecuador has experienced several
shocks at the national level that have affected all levels of
society. Beginning with President Abdalá Bucaram's fall
from power in 1997, the nation entered a period of political and
economic instability that worsened when dozens of banks closed
their doors in March 1999 and the government of President Jamil
Mahuad froze all bank accounts in the country. Then, in June 1999,
Ecuador shocked the world when it defaulted on its repayment of
Brady Bonds lent by the United States.
The country's situation deteriorated further in 1999 when President
Jamil Mahuad announced that the country would dollarize its economy.
This led thousands of indigenous and other citizens, with the
support of the army, to march to Quito in January 2000 and attempt
a popular revolt that resulted in his flight from office. Though
meant to reverse the decision to dollarize, the revolt did not
succeed -- Vice President Noboa became president and continued
with the same socio-economic policies.
Effects of these crises and overall deterioration have been profound.
The country's sub- and unemployment rate rose to 74.9% in 2000,
inflation skyrocketed to 91% in the same year and external debt
is now at $14.2 billion. Economic measures are periodically forced
upon the population to maintain compliance with the regulations
of international lenders (IMF and World Bank). These measures
generally result in popular protests and indigenous uprisings.
Amidst all of this, "discoveries" of corruption among
government and business officials routinely appear in the news,
disillusioning the public. With little hope for the future, hundreds
of thousands of Ecuadorians have left the country in search of
employment abroad.
It is no wonder, then, that the country, while officially supportive
of Plan Colombia, fears its consequences. Ecuador is dealing with
the effects at the national level but it is in the north that
the effects are most immediate. The province of Sucumbios lies
directly south of the region of Putumayo in Colombia, in the Amazon
region of Ecuador. Despite being one of the main centers of oil
production in Ecuador, Sucumbios lacks a potable drinking water
system, a sanitary sewage system, paved roads and consistent electricity
service. In addition, its education and health care systems are
underdeveloped and inadequate, and sub- and unemployment rates
in the province rival national levels.
This reality is shared by the jungle province of Orellana, south
of Sucumbios. In the other border provinces of Carchi, in the
Sierra region, and Esmeraldas, on the coast, infrastructure is
more developed. However, should the effects of the Plan further
encroach upon Ecuadorian territory, these provinces will also
be forced to deal with consequences for which they are not prepared.
Sucumbios began to work on its response to Plan Colombia when
the plan was announced. The Plan of Contingency, developed and
executed by the state, the Church of St. Michael in Sucumbios
(ISAMIS), and the UN High Commission for Human Rights (ACNUR),
is Ecuador's answer to the refugee problem in Sucumbios. Since
August, those in charge of the joint effort have registered the
refugees, operated two refugee centers and provided other forms
of support, including the provision of basic health care and food
coupons.
In anticipation of the arrival of still more Colombians, they
also constructed a facility in the area to house 5,000 people.
Though the Plan of Contingency has addressed the refugees' most
immediate needs, there still exists the issue of employing those
eligible to work. Jobless, they remain idle in the homes of relatives
and friends or in the refugee centers. If displacement of Colombians
continues at the same rate and other funds are not procured, funding
for the plan, currently provided by the United Nations High Commission
for Refugees (ACNUR), will run out.
Sucumbios faces not only the displacement of Colombians to Ecuador
but also the displacement of its own citizens. In January and
February of this year, due to the escalation of the guerrilla-paramilitary-army
warfare in the Putumayo area, the members of four indigenous communities
at the very edge of the province were forced to leave their homes
under threats of death. Over 300 Ecuadorian citizens have sought
refuge in Sucumbios, Quito and other parts of the country. Ultimately,
they want to return to their homes but it is unclear whether they
will be able to while Plan Colombia is in operation.
At the national level, Ecuador has other problems to address.
The base in Manta has been called a compromise of Ecuador's neutrality
by some. Certain anti-U.S. groups in Colombia view the base as
a sign of Ecuador's willingness to collaborate with "the
enemy." In addition, should the war regionalize as is feared,
the government might take money from other parts of the national
budget to spend on defense and beef up the military. This will
lead to further militarization of the state, a result almost guaranteed
since Dr. Moeller received $150 million from the U.S. in March,
including a percentage to fortify military patrols of the Ecuadorian-Colombian
border.
There are also concerns about the health and environmental effects
of the sprayings and the growth of the drug industry in Ecuador.
Although the sprayings are taking place only in Colombia, the
chemical Glyphosate can be carried by air and water over the border.
Officially not harmful to the environment or humans, the chemical
is being blamed for illnesses reported since last summer. It has
also been proven that the chemical is not only destroying drug
crops but other plants as well. "Acción Ecológica",
an environmental organization in Ecuador, has reported that crops
in Sucumbios are suffering the effects of the arrival of the chemical
to Ecuadorian soil.
One criticism of eradication efforts such as Plan Colombia is
that if cultivation is destroyed in one region, it will increase
in others, commonly known as the balloon effect. This effect has
already been seen in Ecuador. Between January and March of this
year, three drug-processing plants were discovered and destroyed
in Sucumbios. In addition, Ecuadorians fear that some of the displaced
and idle Colombians will resort to the only means of making a
living that they know -- coca cultivation.
Perhaps the most immediate fear of the Ecuadorian population,
especially in the northern provinces, is an increase in violence
resulting from the Colombian conflict. There have already been
documented cases of murders between paramilitaries, guerrillas
and military forces of Colombia and Ecuador, violent acts committed
by Colombians against Ecuadorians and vice versa and disappearances
of civilians by military forces in both countries. The provinces
of Esmeraldas, Sucumbios and Carchi are among the four provinces
in the country with the most homicides.
Back to Top
Plan
Colombia: Final Considerations
According to Noam Chomsky, drug production and trafficking
is the second-largest source of national income in the world,
after gun production and sales. The economic and political power
of the industry can be extremely dangerous to nations that border
major drug-producing countries. In Colombia, the level of corruption
and the influence of drug trafficking has turned the country into
what academics call a narco-state. As such, the nation's influence
in the region and the implications of its plan to eradicate its
drug industry have all five neighboring countries on edge. They
fear the possibility of becoming narco-states themselves, should
Colombia "succeed".
Social scientists agree that U.S. support was granted after careful
consideration and prioritization of its interests. Among these
interests are oil, minerals, forest resources, and, perhaps a
more remote possibility but certainly valid, water, claimed by
many to be the future's most valuable and scarce resource. Some
think that in order to protect these interests outside its borders,
the U.S. is supporting Plan Colombia in order to have military
and political influence in the region. Taking this theory one
step further, it is logical that the U.S. would want to destroy
leftist armed forces, who could block access to their interests.
The base in Manta could also function to support these interests.
One of the most worrisome aspects of the plan is
its emphasis on the military solution. The fact that it ignores
human rights violations, destruction of the environment and civil
unrest led the European Union to withdraw its economic support
for the plan and insist upon development projects in the area.
Local organizations are using the same reasoning when asking governments
to reconsider their support and alternatively consider projects
that will promote local and national development, create jobs,
promote environmental protection, and stop drug use at the demand
end and not only at the production level.
Document prepared by the
Ecumenical Human Rights Commission of Ecuador (CEDHU), March 16,
2001.
This special report originally
appeared in Colombia Report, an
online journal that was published by the Information Network of
the Americas (INOTA).
